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Letter from the Editor

Letter from the Editor
On behalf of the editorial board, I am proud to present
the Spring 2017 edition of the Penn History Review. Since its
inception over twenty-five years ago, the PHR has dedicated
itself to promoting the work of undergraduate history students
at the University of Pennsylvania and schools across the nation.
In this issue, you will find a diverse selection of papers that cover
topics from nineteenth-century Great Britain to America in the
1960s, addressing questions of diplomacy, identity, and the role
of the press. Each one of these works exemplifies the core values
of the Penn History Review: originality, thorough research, and
high-quality writing. We hope that they provide both intellectual
engagement and an enjoyable read.
In our first article, “Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy:
Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Victorian
Britain, Julia Fine examines the role of the aristocracy in shaping
displays of public art in Victorian Britain. Using parliamentary
records, newspaper articles, and art-related treatises, she traces
the evolution of projects such as the South Kensington Museum
and the Great Exhibition of 1851. Her work also explores the
work of government committees and reports, indicating that
the state was interested in controlling these public displays. The
paper reveals that aristocrats still held some sway in the art world,
but their influence significantly decreased throughout the latter
half of the nineteenth century.
The next piece is David Murrell’s An Affair on Every
Continent: French Reaction to the Foreign Press during the Dreyfus
Affair. The work analyzes the infamous case of Alfred Dreyfus,
whose story captivated France and the world from 1894 to 1906.
Focusing on the role of the media, Murrell shows that the French
government was largely unable to censor discussion of the affair
in the international press, although it was successful in suppressing
6
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some theater productions. Moreover, he demonstrates that the
affair served as a preview of the mass media pressures that
would become prevalent in twentieth-century European states.
The third paper, Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict,
was written by Chloé Nurik. Relying on a wide array of primary
source documents, she highlights changing notions of masculinity
among college students in 1920s America. Her work details the
traditions and rituals that were prevalent at schools such as
Harvard, Yale, and Penn during this time period. In addition, the
article traces the impact of fraternities, college sports, and other
influential extracurricular activities. Ultimately, she finds that
young men preserved key aspects of character-based masculinity,
while also incorporating modernized elements such as physical
appearance and social popularity.
In The Big Stick Split in Two: Roosevelt vs. Hay on the AngloAmerican Relationship, William Shirey provides a compelling
analysis of the relationship between the United States and Great
Britain during the Roosevelt administration. In particular, he
uses the Alaskan boundary crisis of the early 1900s as a lens to
examine the diplomatic approaches of Theodore Roosevelt and
his Anglophilic secretary of state, John Hay. The paper concludes
that President Roosevelt’s belligerence often threatened relations
between the two countries, and thus other members of his
administration played a more important role in rapprochement
than historians have acknowledged.
Our final piece, “We of the South”: President Lyndon Johnson,
Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the Re-Southernization of the White House,
was authored by Simon Panitz from the University of North
Carolina. He focuses on the complex relationship between
Lyndon Johnson and North Carolina newspaper editor Jonathan
Worth Daniels, who worked to help the president carry the Tar
Heel State in the election of 1964. Panitz explores the personal
backgrounds of both Johnson and Daniels, with particular
emphasis on the influence of their fathers. The article also
highlights the collaborative nature of the relationship between
Penn History Review
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the two men, as they worked together to promote civil rights in
the 1960s.
In addition to these works, we have included abstracts
from the senior honors theses of several Penn history majors.
The thesis program is a year-long commitment that requires
intensive research, original historical analysis, and tremendous
dedication. By including these abstracts, we hope to showcase
the outstanding scholarship that these students have produced
over the past year. Congratulations to all of the seniors who
completed this formidable challenge!
The editorial board would also like to thank a number of
people who helped make this edition possible. We are extremely
grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate Chair of the
History Department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the department’s
Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies. Both of them
have provided helpful guidance and insight throughout the
editing and publishing process. We would also like to thank the
faculty members at Penn and other universities who promoted
our publication, in addition to the many students who submitted
their excellent work for consideration. Thank you as well to each
one of our authors, who worked tirelessly to refine their articles
for publication.
Lastly, I would like to thank all of our editors for their
exceptionally hard work on this edition of the Penn History Review.
We will greatly miss our graduating seniors, Andrés De Los Ríos,
Aaron Mandelbaum, Gregory Olberding, and Dan Thompson.
Their enthusiasm for history and commitment to publishing
excellent scholarship have helped shape the PHR over the past
several years. I am especially indebted to Aaron, our Editor-inChief emeritus, for his invaluable advice and assistance over the
course of this semester. Without his dedication, this edition
would not have been possible. At the same time, we are excited
to welcome on two new editors, Julia Barr and Helen Berhanu,
who have already made a positive impact on our journal.

8
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Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors
who contributed to this edition of the Penn History Review!

Michael J. Torcello
Editor-in-Chief
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“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy:
Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and
Cultural Control in Victorian Britain
Julia Fine
“The advancement of the Fine Arts and Practical Science will be
readily recognized by you as worthy of the Attention of a great
and enlightened Nation. I have directed that a comprehensive
Scheme shall be laid before you, having in view the Promotion
of these Objects, towards which I invite your Aid and
Co-operation.”1
With these words delivered to both the House of
Commons and the House of Lords, Queen Victoria opened
Parliament on November 11, 1852. Her firm direction to
prioritize the encouragement of art was a clear advancement
from the early rejections of national collections at the turn of
the nineteenth century and the ensuing governmental disinterest
in the National Gallery. Victoria’s interest in this subject derived
chiefly from her German-born husband, Prince Albert, who was
keenly devoted to the state of arts and sciences in the country.
His influence was seen in many different events and institutions,
including the 1851 Great Exhibition, the South Kensington
complex, and the 1857 Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition.2
Since the end of Charles I’s reign in 1649, the British monarchy
had not played a predominant role in either the patronage or
display of art; the prince’s active involvement in the cultural
realm thus represented a significant shift. This, however, did not
indicate a return to elite, aristocratic control. Rather, the prince
aligned himself with the emerging professional class, as opposed
to the traditional ruling aristocracy, who viewed him with scorn.3
Indeed, his passion for art was connected with his desire for
“the Progress and Improvement of the Public.”4 To Albert, the
10

Julia Fine

“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

cultivation of popular interest in the arts was of direct value to
the development of British industrial craft. This ethos was shared
by leading cultural bureaucrats including Henry Cole, who would
play a critical role in the emerging South Kensington Museum.
New conceptions about the functions of a public art museum
and what it should house were developed in this mid-Victorian
period, and they were articulated by figures like the prince and
professionals such as Cole and the curator J.C. Robinson. The
definition of fine art expanded from simply referring to painting
and sculpture to encompassing the decorative arts, a term coined
by Robinson referring to art objects that are also functional.5
As laid out by the 1836 Select Committee, increasing emphasis
was placed on the education of the working classes, both for
their moral elevation and for the improvement of manufactures.
How were these novel concerns embodied in art museums and
exhibitions? Did the transfer of control from elite connoisseurs
to middle-class experts result in the exclusion of the aristocracy
from the art world, or was the presence of the old guard still felt
in these institutions? Ultimately, aristocratic control markedly
diminished, but did not disappear completely.
Art, Manufactures, and Increased Access
The South Kensington Museum, now known as the
Victoria & Albert Museum, grew out of two pivotal events: the
1836 Select Committee and the 1851 Great Exhibition. While
the Select Committee was instrumental in the reform of the
National Gallery in 1855, it also introduced new ideas of what
art museums could contain and the effect that they could have.
During the proceedings of the 1860 Select Committee on the
South Kensington Museum, Henry Cole, the museum’s first
director, was asked to describe the origins of its collection.
He responded by pointing to the conclusions reached by the
committee members in 1836. He quoted directly from the
report, referring to its statement that “the Arts have received
Penn History Review
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little encouragement in this country” and that in a nation such
as England, where industry reigned supreme, “the connexion
between art and manufacture is most important.”6 The 1836
report also posited that it would be beneficial to develop a system
of public galleries and museums of art throughout the country,
and the members proposed a specific acquisition policy. Cole
quoted from the report, “Besides casts and paintings, copies of
the arabesques of Raphael, the designs at Pompeii, specimens
from the era of the revival of the arts, everything, in short, which
exhibits in combination the efforts of the artist and the workman,
should be sought for in the formation of such institutions.” In
addition to historical objects, the committee concluded that
modern examples should also be included; the combination
would educate the viewer in the principles of design.7 According
to Cole, these ideas served as a guide to the South Kensington
Museum, and as a result of this report, the first Government
School of Design was opened in 1837 in Somerset House, which
the Royal Academy had recently vacated. Eventually, through a
series of gradual developments, the Schools of Design evolved
to create the Museum.8
In fact, the Government had already concluded that
action needed to be taken to remedy the sorry state of Britain’s
manufactures before the report was ultimately published
on August 16, 1836. In July of that year, the Board of Trade
asked the treasury to provide money for a School of Design.9
The House of Commons voted in favor of a £1,500 grant for
such a project, “with a view to the improvement of the national
manufactures.”10 The president of the Board of Trade, Charles
Poulett Thomson, called a meeting of artists and businessmen to
become the Council of the School.11 Thomson was a supporter
of free trade and parliamentary reform, and he originally won
his seat in Parliament due to the support of the utilitarian Jeremy
Bentham and the Radical Joseph Hume.12 However, he staffed
the council exclusively with Royal Academicians, which infuriated
critics like the MP William Ewart and the artist Benjamin Robert
12
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Haydon, who had not wanted the School to be subservient to the
old guard.13 They set up a rival institution called the Society for
Promoting the Arts of Design, which did not help the fledgling
Government School.14 As Cole reported, the first school was
housed in Somerset House in London, and more were opened
in various manufacturing cities throughout the country. By the
1840s, schools had been opened in Manchester, Birmingham,
Coventry, Sheffield, Nottingham, York, Newcastle upon Tyne,
and Glasgow.15 This coincided with increased access to art and art
education through a flourishing press; affordable drawing books
removed the activity from the realm of elite women and artists
and brought it to a wider section of society. Similarly, illustrated
periodicals like the Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion
of Useful Knowledge introduced a new, working class audience to
aesthetic and visual culture.16
While the original mission of the School did not
prioritize building a collection for a museum, various specimens
were acquired under the superintendence of the Scottish painter
William Dyce, appointed in 1838. His dream, never achieved,
was to form a museum of industrial, or ornamental, art. He did,
however, acquire plaster casts of antique sculpture; his most
important purchase was a copy of Raphael’s fresco paintings of
decorative patterns in the Vatican, known as the Loggie. Dyce
found the responsibilities of the position too difficult, and
another Scottish artist, Charles Heath Wilson, assumed the
role.17 He was determined to build for the students a collection
of more than just plaster casts. In one of his annual reports to
Parliament, he noted that the School had begun to acquire “real
specimens of various kinds of ornamental manufactures, and
decorative work” including:
patterns of stained-paper hangings, rich
embroidered silks, and tissues of silk and glass,
printed calicos, wood carving, ornaments of
lacquered embossed metal, models in papierPenn History Review
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maché, imitations of antique stained glass from
Nuremburg, iron castings in panel work, fancy
earthenware, enameled tiles, and several examples
of decorative painting, in tempera, enamel, fresco,
encaustic, &c., including some valuable coloured
tracings from fresco ornaments in Mantua.18
The report further noted that the School’s collection was open to
the public on Mondays between one and three o’clock. However,
the rooms in Somerset House did not provide adequate space
for the growing number of objects, and thus not only were they
generally unavailable to the public, but they were also difficult for
the students to view freely.19
The School of Design was dogged by criticism throughout
the first decade of its existence. A letter from a professor in the
School, Richard Redgrave (who would later hold a position at the
South Kensington Museum), to the prime minister, Lord John
Russell, encapsulated many of the critics’ complaints. There
was a concern that students were simply being taught to copy;
Redgrave wrote that “Nature, as the true source of ornamental
design, [should] be more fully insisted upon” and that “the
principles of taste only are to be sought in the application of antique
art to the wants of the age.” In this way, the originality of British
design would be improved, thus increasing the competitiveness
of their manufactures in the foreign market.20 He further noted
that biennial exhibitions of works of design should be instituted
for both the students and the public, as this would “improve
their taste.”21 Public exhibitions were becoming an integral part
of the new educative mission for art. Eventually, critiques of
the School led to a Select Committee on the School of Design
in 1849, which concluded that the School had not achieved its
goal of design improvement. Upon the report’s release, the Art
Journal reported that there had been a “universally acknowledged
necessity” for such an institution, and yet “the shadow of twelve
years’ disheartening failure casts its gloom.”22 However, reforms
14
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were not undertaken at that point.23 It took one of the most
momentous events in the history of Victorian Britain, along with
a prominent and influential civil servant, to effect change and
transform the fledgling collection of the School of Design into
a fully formed public museum.
The Great Exhibition of 1851, or the Universal
Exhibition of the Works of all Nations, was the accomplishment
of a variety of administrators and civil servants, but credit is
largely given to Prince Albert and Henry Cole for both its
creation and extension into permanent institutions. Albert
came to England already steeped in Saxon traditions of a love
for art collecting,24 and he was well-versed in all of Western art
history, ranging from the Gothic to the Mannerist to the pictures
popularized during an Italian Grand Tour.25 In fact, his taste in
painting was advanced compared to the elite connoisseurs in
control of the National Gallery before Charles Eastlake became
director.26 He also believed that art was intimately connected
to the character and industrial wealth of the nation.27 As such,
he was appointed for membership in the rather inactive Society
for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce,
founded in 1754. He assumed the presidency in 1843, and in
1847 the Society held a successful exhibition of manufactures
that was visited by over twenty thousand people. Two more were
held in the ensuing years, so a national exhibition featuring wares
from around the world was announced for 1851, to be divided
into four sections: “Raw Materials of Manufactures – British
Colonial, and Foreign, Machinery and Mechanical Inventions,
Manufactures, Sculpture and Plastic Art generally.” The focus
of this exhibition was not on the fine arts. A Royal Commission
was enacted, and it included notables from all walks of life,
including members of the aristocracy such as Earl Granville, the
Duke of Buccleuch, and the Earl of Ellesmere. Members from
both political parties were present, with Whig Prime Minister
Lord John Russell as a representative for the Government and
Sir Robert Peel for the Tory opposition. Wealthy city dwellers
Penn History Review
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including Thomas Baring and prominent cultural figures like
Eastlake rounded out the group.28 However, just as the trustees
of the National Gallery were rendered largely figureheads after
the 1855 reform, the commission members did not play an
active role in running the exhibition and simply lent an air of
prestige. Albert led an executive committee that included Henry
Cole, Charles Wentworth Dilke, Colonel William Reid, and the
scientist Lyon Playfair.29 Funding for the building, known as
the Crystal Palace and designed by Joseph Paxton, came from
wealthy businessmen committed to free trade, who tended to
be more supportive of the prince than the hereditary classes. In
particular, £20,000 was guaranteed from the railway contractor
Samuel Morton Peto.30
The exhibition proved to be a tremendous success, with
over six million visitors. The revenue from the entrance fees
ranging from one shilling to three pounds left the Commission
with a surplus of £186,000. The ability to stage the exhibition
was a confirmation of Victorian superiority, and it symbolized
the era’s supreme self-confidence. There was, however, great
concern over the poor design quality of the British manufactures
on exhibit, prompting Ralph Wornum, a lecturer at the School
of Design, to write a prize-winning article in the Art Journal,
entitled “The Exhibition as a Lesson in Taste,” about the
inferiority of English wares.31 Indeed, the British Quarterly Review
remarked, “We have learnt from the Great Exhibition that there
are numerous points in which we are inferior to the foreigner,
and in some, as in the principles of design, and the science of
coloured harmony, we are lamentably ignorant.”32 France had
1,710 exhibits at the Crystal Palace and collected 1,043 awards, as
compared to Britain’s 2,155 awards for 6,861 exhibits.33 This was
a national embarrassment and provided further proof that the
School of Design had not achieved its mission. Henry Cole had
long campaigned against what he regarded as the failures of the
School. From 1849 to 1852, he published the Journal of Design and
Manufactures, dedicated to Prince Albert, which claimed to provide
16
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“utility to all branches of commerce influenced by ornamental
design” and worked to “aid in the reform of our Schools of
Design.”34 It stressed Cole’s principles of taste, which rested on
the notions that form and function must coexist harmoniously
and the beauty of an object must match its purpose.35 Cole had
been appointed to the Society for the Encouragement of Arts in
1846, and as such he played a leading role in the exhibition. This
experience, in conjunction with his leading advocacy against
the School of Design in its current state, made him the natural
choice to be appointed as the School’s new head, at a time when
its inadequacy had been proven so decisively. Thus, in January
1852, the Board of Trade named him to this new role; this
appointment was a critical step toward the creation of the South
Kensington Museum.36
Henry Cole was born in 1808 and grew up in a middle-class
household. In 1826, his family rented space in a London home
owned by the writer Thomas Love Peacock, who had a profound
effect on Cole’s later activities and beliefs. He introduced a young
Cole to John Stuart Mill and his circle of philosophic radicals,
informed by the principles of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism.
While he never became a political activist, these Benthamite
views, steeped in rhetoric against privilege, suffused his work. In
Cole’s first civil service job, he waged a reform campaign against
the Tory aristocracy-run Record Commission. Later, in his role
as cultural bureaucrat, he consistently prioritized working-class
artisans.37 His interest in the art world began in the 1840s, when
he published cheap guidebooks to historic sites and museums,
including the National Gallery, under the pseudonym Felix
Summerly. These were expressly created for the poorer working
class; in the National Gallery catalogue, he wrote:
Throngs counted by hundreds of thousands
belong far less to the ranks of wealth owning
picture galleries than to poverty owning none but
this; and that the lowly in station are the chief
Penn History Review
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visitants, were there no other evidence, seems to
be shewn in the small purchase of the official
shilling catalogues. Out of every seventy-six
comers only one buys a shilling catalogue. Such a
scanty sale seems to prove that by far the largest
proportion of visitors are those to whom the
outlay of twelve-pence is the denial of a dinner,
and that a cheaper catalogue is wanted.38
Cole had a clear interest in widening cultural access to a greater
section of society. He started the company Felix Summerly’s Art
Manufactures, which produced household goods such as tea
sets and mugs, designed by artists with whom he shared design
principles, including Richard Redgrave, so that they adhered to
strict standards of taste.39

Henry Cole Tea Service, designed by Sir Henry Cole for Felix Summerly’s Art
Manufactures; made by Minton & Co., Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire, 1846,
earthenware, Victoria & Albert Museum, London, United Kingdom.
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Upon his appointment to the School of Design, Cole
immediately embarked on its reorganization. He believed the
School should become its own department under the purview
of the Board of Trade, to be called the Department of Practical
Art. Cole became the superintendent of general management
and Redgrave was named art advisor. Parliament granted a
budget of £10,050, and its first report, published in 1853, laid
out the Department’s goals. The first two promoted general and
advanced instruction in art for all classes of society, in order to
advance correct taste for the producers and consumers of goods.40
To that end, the Department began to teach elementary art in its
branch schools across the country, and it also instructed teachers
so that they could impart their skills to students. According to the
historian Janet Minihan, with this system, “Art had at last lost its
official status as a polite, aristocratic skill and received significant
acknowledgement of its importance in general education.”41 The
third goal, and the one most important to the development of
the South Kensington, sought “the Application of the Principles
of Technical Art to the improvement of manufactures, together
with the establishment of Museums, by which all classes might
be induced to investigate those common principles of taste,
which may be traced in the works of excellence of all ages.”42
The School headquarters moved from Somerset House to
Marlborough House in Pall Mall, which was used as a minor
royal residence and had more room for the display of collections.
Prince Albert granted permission to use this space, as long as the
Department aligned itself with his goals for the future of the
1851 Exhibition. He envisaged a set of permanent institutions
that would apply the principles of art and science to industry;
this was to be an educational mission for the working classes.
The Royal Commission was extended after the conclusion of the
exhibition in order to administer the surplus profits, which were
used to secure a plot of land just south of Hyde Park, finally
completed in 1858. It was christened as South Kensington,
and numerous museums for the arts and sciences would be set
Penn History Review

19

“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

there. The museum at Marlborough House would relocate there
in 1857 and be renamed the South Kensington Museum. The
prince had a keen interest in science as well, and through his
influence the Department of Practical Art would be enlarged to
become the Department of Science and Art, with Lyon Playfair
serving with Henry Cole as joint secretary and specifically in
charge of scientific education.43 Later, the Department would be
moved from the Board of Trade to the Committee of Council
on Education.44
The nucleus of the museum of art manufactures was
located at Marlborough House. At the end of the exhibition in
October 1851, Parliament granted £5,000 to the Department to
purchase objects that had been on display that would function
as models of good design to serve as the basis of a national
collection. Cole and Redgrave served on a committee to make
these selections, and their choices encompassed works from
many different countries. These were moved to Marlborough,
along with the original collection formed at Somerset House.
Thus, the early museum was composed largely of contemporary
wares, intended to instruct in the principles of taste for industrial
objects. This soon changed, as evidenced by the shift from the
name “Museum of Manufactures” to “Museum of Ornamental
Art.”45 Indeed, the Third Report of the Department of Science
and Art stated that the objects that had been acquired in the wake
of the exhibition were diverse in nature, but were all modern,
and thus, “For this reason later additions to the collection,
which have been very numerous, have mainly consisted of
works from bygone periods.” It went on to assert that while the
Museum had an avowedly educational mission, it was meant not
just for students but also for the general public and even the
collector, “whose pursuits it is, for many obvious reasons, clearly
a national duty to countenance and encourage.” The goal was
“the illustration, by actual monuments, of all art which finds its
material expression in objects of utility, or in works avowedly
decorative.”46 These statements illuminate the purpose of
20
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the ensuing acquisitions, which evince the subtle shift from a
purely practical mission to better the abilities of artisans for the
improvement of manufactures to one that aimed to raise the
standards of all members of society.
Cole firmly believed in the efficacy of elevating the
taste of consumers rather than focusing on the producers. The
museum, by promoting his view of superior design quality, had
the best chance of achieving this goal, as it was the only feasible
means of educating the adult.47 This was seen as critical among
art professionals in the mid-nineteenth century, when rising
wealth among the middling classes meant that they were now
empowered to purchase. However, their standards of taste had
not been refined and elevated from a long history of familial
collecting.48 Indeed, Anna Jameson had discussed the issue a few
years earlier in her 1849 Art Journal essay, “Some thoughts on art,
addressed to the Uninitiated.” She noted that, “‘the million’ have
become patrons of art” and “thus it is a matter of very serious
import that the young should be trained to discernment and
refinement in the appreciation of such objects as are addressed
to the mind through the eye, that the public taste should, through
the rising generation, be more generally educated.”49 The
purpose of Cole’s new museum was intimately connected with
the broadening access of different sectors of society to aesthetic
culture. Thus, in order to speak to all classes of consumers, the
rooms at Marlborough were designed to evoke the decorated
rooms of an elite collector, but there were also classrooms and
lecture halls to promote the educational mission.50
A combination of purchases and loans enriched the
Museum’s collections. In 1853, Cole and Redgrave approved the
purchase of a collection of pottery made by James Bandinel of
the Foreign Office. The next year, the Gherardini Collection was
up for sale. Gherardini was an Italian who had inherited a group
of wax and terracotta models by Italian Renaissance masters.
These were first exhibited in the Museum for one month in order
to ascertain the opinion of the public as to whether or not they
Penn History Review
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William Linnaeus Casey, The First Room at Marlborough House, 1856, watercolor,
London, United Kingdom.

should be purchased, and this collection passed the test.51 This
was typical of departmental policy, as the board minutes of the
Department of Science and Art reveal that items were typically
displayed for a considerable period of time, from a couple
months to two years, before being purchased by Parliament.52
In 1855, the late antiquarian Whig MP Ralph Bernal’s collection,
which contained art objects from the Byzantine era through the
eighteenth century, was a potential acquisition for the museum.
These items included porcelain, metalwork, jewelry, and furniture,
among other categories. While Cole and the Department had
hoped to purchase this in full, the Government believed the
price to be too high and ordered it to go up for auction. The
Museum was not allowed to spend more than £12,000, and it
obtained 730 pieces.53 Interestingly, Bernal had remarked during
parliamentary debates on the Museums Act 1845, which gave
local town councils the ability to establish museums, that the
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country needed “a Museum of Art and Antiquities…which
would be worthy of the English nation.”54 His collection helped
to form the basis of such a museum.
One of the most important purchases in the Museum’s
early acquisition history was Jules Soulages’s collection. Soulages
was a lawyer from Toulouse, France, who had acquired objects
in Italy including enamels, medals, glass, bronzes, decorative
furniture, and majolica.55 His collection practices specified that
“his object was the illustration of Art, and not the indulgence
of a taste for the merely curious,” and his acquisitions did not
typically receive the “designation of ‘high art.’”56 Cole wished to
bring the entire collection to the Museum, and a subscribers’
fund of “disinterested and public spirited men”57 was set
up in order to purchase it before Government approval. The
subscribers included some members of the aristocracy, including
Earl Granville, Lord Ashburton, the Duke of Hamilton, and the
Marquess of Hertford. However, it was mainly composed of
wealthy men of business, men connected to the Department of
Science and Art, and artists.58 Nevertheless, when it came time for
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston to examine the objects exhibited
at Marlborough House, he disliked their medieval style and did
not understand how they would improve British manufactures.
His disapproval proved decisive, and thus the collection could not
be retained. Even at a time when aristocratic power was receding,
the idiosyncratic aesthetic sense of a politician could still retain
significance in determining cultural policy. The collection was
sold to the executive committee of the Manchester Art Treasures
Exhibition, and later the Department bought it back in portions.59
In fact, those in favor of the collection believed it would not only
improve manufacture design, commerce, and the public taste,
but would also help form “a large and complete historical and
artistic museum.”60 The curator J.C. Robinson, who would have
a profound effect on the Museum’s collection, advocated this
latter acquisition policy.
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The collections and individual specimens purchased
for or donated to the Museum were not typically held by the
aristocracy. However, aristocrats granted liberal access to their
property by loaning objects for temporary exhibition. The earliest
example of this came with an exhibition of Historic Cabinet
Work at Gore House, also owned by the Department. Lenders to
this exhibit included numerous aristocrats, including the Duke of
Hamilton, the Duke of Buccleuch, the Duke of Devonshire, the
Duke of Northumberland, the Earl Spencer, the Earl Granville,
and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby, among others.61 In fact, the
Museum, in both its earliest form and such later iterations as
the South Kensington and Victoria & Albert Museum, was the
first permanent institution to produce numerous temporary
exhibitions. By contrast, the British Museum and the National
Gallery relied solely on their permanent collections comprised
of donations and purchases.62 In 1880, Robinson wrote that the
system allowed “the enormous accumulation of works of art of
all kinds, in the possession of the Crown, or corporations, and
societies, the ancestral gatherings of the nobles and gentry of
the land, and the rich collections of amateurs and connoisseurs,
[to be] made available for the delight and instruction of
everybody.”63 Indeed, this policy had a beneficial effect for both
the Museum and the benefactors. A more widely held perception
of the artistic value of the historic decorative arts, which were
not as well known or authoritatively discussed in literature as
fine arts, was encouraged by the elite status of those who lent
them. Moreover, the social pedigree of the owners aroused
further public interest in the items. The loaner’s name was
always prominently displayed on labels and in catalogues.64 The
announcement of the cabinetry exhibition lauded those who
had “liberally offered” their objects for display and study.65 That
the names of these contributors were so well publicized and
celebrated suggests that their generosity was intended, at least in
part, to reap a reputational benefit.
The tenor of the parliamentary debates over the
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retention of the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park is illustrative of
the tenuous position of the aristocracy at this time. After the
Great Exhibition had concluded, some executives and MPs
wished to maintain the physical location of the building in order
to provide a recreational space for the working classes. During
debates in April 1852, the MP James Heywood, a Liberal with
radical tendencies who supported increased access to public
museums,66 claimed that whereas the middle class was in favor
of keeping it, the aristocracy opposed the plans, and this class
division could “agitate this country.”67 While this statement
was not entirely accurate, as friends of the movement for the
preservation of the Crystal Palace included notables such as
the Duke of Devonshire (Joseph Paxton’s patron), the Duke of
Argyll, and Lord Harrowby,68 Heywood’s subsequent remarks
are significant. He recounted a story in which he met a French
nobleman at Haddon Hall, the seat of the Duke of Rutland.
The Frenchman explained that “a reason why the English
aristocracy retained their privileges and position, and the French
lost theirs, [is] that the English aristocracy knew when to make
just concessions.” Heywood then concluded that this was a
moment for the aristocracy to “make a small concession to the
opinions and wishes of the middle classes.”69 Later in the debate,
the Radical MP Thomas Wakley noted that the aristocracy “had
risen wonderfully in the estimation of the people since they
had mingled with them at the Crystal Palace,” but they would
“lose more in public estimation if they now demolished that
building.”70
Ultimately, these impassioned pleas did not save the
Crystal Palace; it vacated Hyde Park and was re-erected at
Sydenham by a private company as a visitor attraction.71 However,
these statements help to clarify the nature and purpose of the
aristocracy’s involvement with a museum that was far removed
from any notions of elite trusteeship and taste in the fine art of
painting. Indeed, it has been described as a “middle-class space,
where middle-class norms of behaviour were protected and, if
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possible, enforced; middle-class values shaped and strengthened;
and middle-class hierarchies displayed.”72 Aristocrats were
absent from the management and creation of the institution.
The Art Journal commented approvingly in August 1861 that
the South Kensington Museum did not suffer from “an effete
system of trusteeship” with “gentlemen little conversant with
the matters they are called upon to decide,” which had afflicted
the National Gallery. Rather, the South Kensington was “new,
active, intelligent, and useful.”73 As with the National Gallery,
members of the aristocracy did not make permanent bequests
of their property. However, they did not shun the Museum, and
they complied when their holdings were solicited and desired,
perhaps out of an aspiration to gain in the “public estimation,”
in the words of Wakley, at a time when the middle class was
asserting its power in all areas of society. The Art Journal remarked
on the temporary loan policy again in November, noting that the
periodical had often focused on the incredible amount of art still
held privately in Britain, including paintings and decorative art,
but now “collectors have been frequently induced to allow their
treasures to pass temporarily from their cabinets to the public
gaze.” Thus, the Journal stated approvingly, knowledge of the
historic ornamental objects was extended beyond “a few wealthy
individuals.”74
Eighteenth-century, Grand Tour-era preferences may
have been irrelevant to the approach of the new museum, but
Cole made sure that his firmest standard of what constituted
good taste was followed. He and his fellow design reformers were
attempting to become new societal tastemakers; he chose objects
that he believed exemplified these principles and didactically
explained his doctrine in affordable catalogues.75 In the early
days of the Museum at Marlborough House, Cole devised a
room called “Examples of False Principles in Decoration,”
which later came to be known as the “Chamber of Horrors,”
where he showcased what he viewed as bad taste.76 This attempt
to impose notions of taste was not uniformly accepted, as
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Cole and Redgrave faced criticism from numerous sources,
including a notable Manchester economist named F.J. Prouting,
writing under the pseudonym Argus. He published a series of
pamphlets called A Mild Remonstrance against the Taste-Censorship at
Marlborough House, in which he demonstrated his contempt for
what he believed to be the foreign preferences of the museum’s
managers.77 He wrote sarcastically: “Englishmen know nothing
of taste…Benighted Britons…know nothing of Beauty, nothing
of Refinement, nothing of Fine Art, nothing of Taste!”78 He
charged that these notions governed Cole’s administration of
the Museum. In fact, the idea of a correct standard of taste was
itself a foreign, Continental creation.79 Prouting asserted that “if
these qualities are real and definable, and if they have anything to
do with morals and right-mindedness, we think England has as
good a claim to the possession of Taste and to the appreciation
of the Beautiful.”80 These complaints are striking in their
resemblance to the attacks leveled against aristocrats during the
eighteenth century, an era in which they retained cultural control.
They too were chastised for their foreign proclivities, preferring
European masters to native British artists. Cole’s attempt to
impose aesthetic criteria subjected him to the same criticisms
that the aristocracy had faced decades earlier when they dictated
the standards of taste.
Cole was not alone in shaping acquisition policy at the
Museum. John Charles Robinson was appointed curator in 1853,
and he energetically drove the collection toward an art historical
approach. His concern was not simply to elevate the standards
of taste in contemporary society; he was primarily focused on
the representation of a full history of decorative art.81 Indeed, he
had a wide-ranging interest in art that had not been popularized
in Britain yet, such as the Portuguese and Spanish schools,
including the work of El Greco.82 He went to Paris as a young
man to study art, and his experiences there were to have an effect
on his later collection practices. Various antiquarian collections
existed in Paris in the nineteenth century following the French
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Revolution, during which many of the objects and artifacts of
the Middle Ages were in danger of destruction due to their
association with the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Almost
immediately, however, scholars and collectors attempted to
rescue these items. These grew into great collections, including
the influential Musée de Cluny, which opened in 1832 and was
transformed into a public museum in 1844. The French viewed
this museum of decorative art not as a means to improve
manufacture design, but rather as a way of showcasing history
through objects.83 This idea of a museum featuring a historical
series of art objects would come to suffuse Robinson’s activities
as curator. He focused heavily on medieval and Renaissance art,
engineering the acquisition of an important group of Italian
Renaissance sculptures, despite the contemporary view that
this had little to do with improvement of industry or taste and
thus did not fit the Museum’s purported mission.84 Robinson
was a serious scholar, writing well-respected catalogues on the
works in the Museum, including the Soulages Collection and
the Italian sculptures. He served as a mediator of Cole’s didactic
utilitarian taste reform, and there are obvious parallels with the
new director of the National Gallery, Charles Locke Eastlake,
who similarly tempered the aristocratic trustees’ elite preferences
by embarking on a campaign to collect early Italian masters.85
Experts in the emerging discipline of art history endeavored to
tell a fuller story of the fine arts and material culture, rather than
catering either to eighteenth-century connoisseur taste or the
principles of correct design for economic benefit. Knowledge
of art spread to all classes of society in this period, but it was
also transforming into a serious field of study, which would have
a profound effect on museums and exhibitions.
Victorian museums thus accommodated themselves to
distinct visions and impulses. Regardless of the collection policy
pursued, however, there remained a general sense that exposure
to the art objects would be morally and educationally beneficial.
When the Museum of Ornamental Art at Marlborough House
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moved to its new location and became the South Kensington
Museum, the institution took on even more revolutionary
characteristics. The original museum aimed to be available to the
broader public, open from Monday to Friday with Saturday as a
free day.86 However, the South Kensington went even further,
as Cole intended this museum primarily to benefit the working
class. In his 1857 Introductory Lectures on the Science and Art
Department and the South Kensington Museum, he remarked:
“It is much less for the rich that the State should provide public
galleries of paintings and objects of art and science, than for
those classes who would be absolutely destitute of the enjoyment
of them, unless they were provided by the State.”87 To that end,
the museum was open six days a week throughout the year, with
no vacation, and on three nights a week it would be open until
ten o’clock in the evening. This policy was expressly for workers
who would not be able to visit during the day,88 and it was
achievable through gas lighting the galleries. Chambers’s Journal of
Popular Literature, Science and Arts celebrated this as a “successful
novelty…for artisan visitors who cannot come during the day.”89
It was for this reason that middle-class collector John Sheepshanks
decided to donate his collection of British paintings to the South
Kensington rather than the National Gallery, as Robert Vernon,
the other eminent collector of British artwork, had done.
Whereas Vernon had longed for elite approval, Sheepshanks was
secure in his middle-class identity and preferred the beneficial
policies toward the lower orders at the South Kensington. He
agreed with the liberal access policies, even desirous that his
pictures be open to the public on Sunday.90 Critics charged that
the location of the museum in West London rendered it too
far from the working-class public it supposedly served to be of
any value, and indeed the neighborhood of South Kensington
did have aristocratic associations.91 Cole consistently defended
the museum’s accessibility, reporting during proceedings of the
1860 Select Committee on the South Kensington Museum that
his institution averaged thirty thousand more visitors per year
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than the British Museum.92 He was aware of the potential issues,
however, and therefore he collaborated in the construction of
boulevards and roads to improve access. The museum was also
situated on omnibus routes, and Cole helped ensure that it would
be a stop on the new Underground system.93
As the Museum was so clearly oriented toward the
accommodation of the working class, and entirely managed by
middle-class professionals, it would be easy to conclude that elite
aristocrats were largely absent from this new mission. However,
The Literary Gazette reported upon its opening that “The Museum
appears to have excited much interest among the higher orders. It
was attended by crowds of well-dressed people.”94 Further, when
the Queen attended a private viewing of the museum before it
opened to the public, the Morning Star noted that she was met
there by notables such as the Marquess of Lansdowne, Lord
Stanley of Alderley, and the Duke of Buccleuch.95 These figures
were sufficiently important to merit continued reporting on their
public activities, and their art possessions were highly prized for
their potential as valuable additions to loan exhibitions. Members
of the aristocracy did not create this institution, or propagate the
rhetoric that surrounded it, but they were generous toward it.
These balancing forces, along with the emergence of scholarly art
history, would express themselves in one of the most important
cultural events in mid-Victorian Britain: the 1857 Manchester
Art Treasures Exhibition.
Art Treasures and Art Wealth:
Equipoise in the Cultural Realm
As a result of the movement of art from country homes
to the capital that began in the eighteenth century, art in Britain
was increasingly centered in London. As part of the ongoing
effort to make art and art instruction more available to the wider
populace, the Museum of Ornamental Art instituted a provincial
loan system in which certain objects deemed unnecessary to the
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central museum would be circulated to the provinces, a practice
that would be continued by the South Kensington Museum.
In this way, “the contents of the Museum will, in time, have
been literally brought home to each locality, and [an] incentive
to the formation of permanent local museums of art will thus
be given.”96 The desire to increase access to art for the entire
country, especially in industrial towns and cities, precipitated
the Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition. Manchester was the
epitome of an urban, manufacturing city in the mid-nineteenth
century, controlled by the new wealthy middle class. It was
not a coincidence that the most comprehensive blockbuster
art exhibition in Britain took place there.97 The Art-Treasures
Examiner, a special publication issued by a city newspaper, The
Manchester Examiner and Times, described the origins and impetus
behind this venture:
It was in the early part of the year 1856 that several
of the influential merchants and manufacturers
of Manchester, strongly impressed with the
happy results of the Paris Exhibition of the
previous summer, as well as those of the Dublin
Exhibition of 1853—forcibly struck, above all,
with the important claims and uses of the fine
arts, and calling to mind the remark made by Dr
Waagen in his valuable work, that the art-treasures
in the United Kingdom were of a character, in
amount and interest, to surpass those contained
in the collections upon the continent, bethought
them of the grand idea of bringing the élite of
these works into view under one roof, for the
edification of their fellow-men.98
Waagen’s Treasures of Art in Great Britain, which brought to
light the numerous private art collections of quality in Britain,
provided the idea to bring these works together in one space for
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the benefit of the public.
This concept eventually made its way to Thomas
Fairbairn, who had been a commissioner of the Great Exhibition
and became the principal driver of the Art Treasures Exhibition.
He was the chairman of the executive committee, composed of
notable Manchester citizens, which raised a guarantee fund of
over £70,000 in order to begin planning. He then reached out
to Prince Albert to receive royal patronage from him and the
Queen, which was, not surprisingly, quickly granted, as Albert
took a keen interest in the project. The Earl of Ellesmere was
appointed president of the General Council, which lent an air
of prestige and authority to the exhibition. Ellesmere, son of
the Marquess of Stafford, was a trustee of the National Gallery
and a member of a family with a long history of involvement
in the arts. Several other noblemen were approached to provide
their support, including Lord Derby and Lord Overstone.99
Manchester businessmen were responsible for the creation and
management of the project, while the royalty and aristocracy
served as prestigious figureheads. This was a project that
encompassed both sectors of society, although the driving force
came from the newly wealthy.
In order to successfully mount this exhibition, it
was critical that those who held art treasures in their private
possessions would be willing to lend them. The Report of the
Executive Committee asserted its confidence that gifts would be
forthcoming, stating:
It will be necessary to invite extensive cooperation from all patrons and lovers of Art, and
the Committee have reason to believe, from the
very favourable reception which the project has
already experienced…from all classes among the
Public…that they will not meet with any serious
difficulty in securing contributions.100
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Indeed, the response to loan requests was overwhelmingly
positive.101 The solicitations often noted the support that the
monarchy had given to the project;102 Prince Albert wrote to the
Earl of Ellesmere expressing his opinion that collectors would
be willing to part with their paintings and objects if they knew
that not doing so would “mar the realisation of a great National
object.”103 This was a project with patriotic implications, and the
elite were expected to play their part due to the value attributed
to their holdings. The contributors’ generosity was lauded in the
press, with the Art-Treasures Examiner pointing to some of the
most prolific donors, including the Duke of Hamilton, the Duke
of Newcastle, the Duke of Manchester, Earl de Grey, Lord
Overstone, Lord Ashburton, the Earl of Portsmouth, the Duke
of Richmond, and the Duke of Marlborough.104 The publication
sniffed at the “ingratitude” of the Duke of Devonshire, who
had contributed nothing even though he held a significant
collection at Chatsworth and Devonshire House.105 However,
the duke had declined to participate due to ill health, not out
of any disdain for the project,106 and he in fact paid a visit to
the exhibition, which the Art-Treasures Examiner noted.107 Many
other elite figures attended, but it was by no means a preserve
of the aristocracy and the wealthy. Indeed, the organizers hoped
for the attendance of the working class, and the entrance fees
on Saturday afternoons were reduced in order to induce them
to come.108 In fact, the exhibition garnered over one million
visitors, greatly helped by the ever-increasing railway system that
made cheap travel much more feasible.109
The Art Treasures Exhibition showcased the harmony
between the belief that comprehensiveness was publicly
beneficial along with an increasingly sophisticated understanding
of art history. It occurred at the moment when art history was
emerging as a codified field of study, and the paintings and
objects exhibited, as well as the way in which they were displayed,
reflected this scholarly, universal impulse. The exhibition included
“not only Oil Paintings, Water-colour Drawings, Engravings, and
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Photographs” but also sculpture in all media, decorative furniture,
musical instruments, glass, tapestry, antiquities, and costume,
reflecting the collections of the South Kensington.110 Both old
master paintings and contemporary British art were included.111
Notably, Italian paintings from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
early fifteenth centuries were displayed,112 reflecting Eastlake’s
new acquisition policy. The paintings were hung chronologically
and by school.113 The art critic George Scharf was responsible
for the selection and discussion of the old masters, and his goal
was to showcase a complete sample of the history of art from
the Byzantine to the Baroque.114 This exhibition demonstrated
the same scholarly interest evidenced by the new professional
class of curators such as Eastlake and Robinson.
The Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition confirmed
that the possessions acquired over generations of aristocratic
collecting, along with holdings of the newly wealthy purchasers
of the nineteenth century, were emphatically part of the national
cultural heritage, even if they were still held privately. The Art
Journal remarked approvingly that “the aristocracy—of rank and
riches—[were] not only willing, but desirous, that the people
should, as widely as possible, participate in the enjoyments
they themselves derive from their treasures.”115 As long as they
afforded liberal access to their works, there was a sense that the
objects belonged to the British public as a whole. This growing
consensus was further confirmed by a temporary exhibition
curated by Robinson at the South Kensington in 1862, officially
titled the “Special Exhibition of Works of Art of the Medieval,
Renaissance, and More Recent Periods, on loan at the South
Kensington Museum,” but colloquially known as “The Art
Wealth of England.”116 This was intended to demonstrate
representative specimens of decorative art throughout the ages,
and requests were sent out for donations from the monarchy,
universities, corporations, and private aristocratic and wealthy
collectors. Gifts were liberally given by all of the groups, and
it was difficult to accommodate everything that arrived at the
34

Julia Fine

“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

The Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition - The Great Hall,
from The Illustrated London News
(London, United Kingdom, May 30, 1857).

Museum.117 Notables such as the Marquess of Abercorn, the
Duke of Devonshire, Earl Granville, the Duke of Richmond,
and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby all contributed, and they were
joined by other non-aristocratic collectors.118 This exhibit
was the brainchild of a new organization of which Robinson
was a member, the Fine Arts Club, which included scholars,
connoisseurs, and collectors who shared and discussed their
knowledge and possessions. In the late 1860s, this club was rechristened as the Burlington Fine Arts Club, an organization
that brought prominent members of the old aristocratic guard,
such as Lord Lansdowne, into association with professional
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curators like Robinson. The historian Gordon Fyfe describes the
foundation of this club as a moment of “cultural rapprochement
between the old and new orders.”119 Indeed, the “Art Wealth”
exhibit represented an attendant turning point in the history
of the South Kensington Museum, as it had little to do with
the utilitarian purpose of elevating contemporary taste and was
instead a celebration of the history of collecting in Britain, often
under the purview of the aristocracy.120
The historian W.L. Burn famously described midVictorian Britain as an age of equipoise, signifying a period of
political and social harmony, one in which class conflict waned,
hierarchies were made slightly more flexible, and balance was
maintained.121 Historians have debated this interpretation, but the
evolution of the South Kensington Museum and the Manchester
Art Treasures Exhibition in the 1850s and 1860s proves that
equipoise had arrived in the cultural realm. A vast new populace
was allowed ever-increasing access to works of art that had
previously been the preserve of the elite. Eighteenth-century
connoisseur taste no longer dominated, and there was a new
expert class of curators that emphasized a more comprehensive
art historical approach, while bureaucrats like Cole asserted
the achievement of the education, refinement, and broadened
cultural horizons of the working class as the primary goal of
museums. The aristocracy had relinquished cultural control, but
the oversight of a realm of society that had once been dominated
by a particular class could not be so simply transferred. Indeed,
even though trustees at the National Gallery lost much of their
power, they were not abolished altogether. Aristocratic donations
were solicited and appreciated for temporary exhibition, and
their treasures were claimed as the nation’s cultural heritage,
without demanding that they be bequeathed permanently to the
public. The aristocracy continued to lend an air of prestige, even
if they no longer managed and created cultural institutions. Just
as J.J. Angerstein, a banker, followed connoisseur preferences,
and Robert Vernon, a middle-class collector, yearned for
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acceptance from the old guard, many middle-class grandees still
aped aristocratic techniques and ideas throughout the period.
The reach of the art world had been expanded to all classes of
society, and it was professionally controlled, but the influence
of generations of aristocratic cultural authority was still felt to a
significant extent.
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An Affair on Every Continent:
French Reaction to the Foreign Press
during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
On October 15, 1894, artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus
was summoned to the French Ministry of War in Paris. At the
time, the Jewish soldier, born in the northeastern French region
of Alsace, thought nothing of the matter, believing he was merely
due for his annual inspection. The only peculiarity was that he
was specifically ordered to wear civilian clothing, but this seemed
unimportant. Upon arriving at the ministry building, Lieutenant
Colonel Charles du Paty de Clam met Dreyfus and asked the artillery captain to compose a letter on his behalf, citing a sore finger.
Dreyfus obliged, still unaware that anything was amiss. It was only
after he had finished the letter, when du Paty de Clam rose and announced emphatically, “In the name of the law, I arrest you; you
are accused of the crime of high treason,”1 that Dreyfus realized
this was no ordinary inspection.
Such were the humble beginnings of what came to be
known as the Dreyfus affair, an international scandal that wracked
France, as well as the rest of the world, from 1894 until 1906.
Specifically, Dreyfus had been accused of passing on French army
secrets to the German military attaché in Paris, Maximilien von
Schwartzkoppen. As evidence, senior officials on the French General Staff cited a document which would come to be known as the
bordereau, an unsigned sheet of paper containing sensitive French
military information that had been picked up by a French spy in
Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket at the German embassy. When du
Paty de Clam summoned Dreyfus on that mid-October morning,
his finger was not really injured. It was a trap, meant to prove that
Dreyfus’s hand had written the incriminating document. The evi44

David Murrell

An Affair on Every Continent

dence was good enough for du Paty de Clam, for he immediately
ordered Dreyfus’s incarceration. Dreyfus was then convicted by
a closed-door military tribunal in December 1894 and sent to
Devil’s Island, a penal colony off the coast of French Guiana,
South America, notorious for its brutal conditions. With Dreyfus
shipped halfway across the world and locked in a stone cabin
measuring four square meters,2 the story of a traitorous Jewish
officer ought to have ended once and for all.
Without the mass press that was burgeoning throughout
Europe and, indeed, much of the world, this might very well
have been the case. The turn of the twentieth century, however,
brought with it a newly powerful actor: the modern newspaper.

Illustration of Alfred Dreyfus’s degradation ceremony
at the École Militaire
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In France, the foundations for a literate, engaged citizenry were
laid decades earlier with the adoption of the 1833 Loi Guizot,
which established primary schools throughout the country and
created a new base of readers in addition to the urban dwellers
and educated classes.3 Not only were these new segments of society now capable of reading, but they also had access to a novel
brand of popular press which, according to historian Christophe
Charle, “abandoned the political function that dominated the
press, instead choosing to distract and move the new readers,
leading to the development of so-called tabloids.”4 With its diverse cast of characters, the Dreyfus affair served as fantastic
tabloid fodder throughout Europe. Whether one was a “Dreyfusard” supporting the artillery captain, or an “anti-Dreyfusard” in
favor of the guilty verdict, there was no shortage of heroes and
villains to support.
The case itself had an inherently dramatic quality to it,
for it soon became evident that a number of the documents used
to convict Dreyfus in his first court-martial were forgeries created by members of the French military. Colonel Georges Picquart, one of Dreyfus’s earliest defenders in the military, also
realized that the leaks to Schwartzkoppen had continued even
after Dreyfus’s arrest, which led him to discover the real traitor,
a soldier by the name of Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. While the
French military had no desire to reopen the Dreyfus case, even
wrongly clearing Esterhazy of any wrongdoing in a court-martial, the press was now reporting on the various developments in
the nascent affair with great zeal. This was in large part thanks
to an article from a French newspaper, Georges Clemenceau’s
L’Aurore, which helped spark serious international interest in the
Dreyfus affair. That article was “J’accuse…!,” celebrated French
novelist Émile Zola’s seminal open letter to French President Félix Fauré, published January 13, 1898. In “J’accuse,” Zola alleged
that a massive conspiracy was being propagated by the French
government and military to cover up Dreyfus’s innocence. In
the aftermath of the article’s publication, it became clear that the
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French government would not succeed in burying the Dreyfus
case, for Zola had managed to transform it into a bona fide international scandal. Indeed, from 1898 onward, Zola’s open letter
polarized individual citizens within France, while also galvanizing support for Dreyfus throughout the world in the pages of
the foreign press.
There would be many developments and revelations
between January 1898 and August 1899, the month Dreyfus
was recalled from Devil’s Island for a second military tribunal
in Rennes, France. But in some ways, Zola’s “J’accuse,” imposing such pressure upon the French government, fast-tracked
the Dreyfus case straight to Rennes. Indeed, by this point, the
Dreyfus affair had gripped France, as well as the rest of Europe. In one Belgian town, the entire community put on a parade
in advance of the Rennes court-martial, complete with citizens
dressed up as French officers and lawyers.5 It is conceivable that
these Belgian townsfolk were not well-versed in the political and
legal intricacies of the Dreyfus affair. But to them, these details
did not matter. They were drawn to the characters and the theatrics of it all, as if the affair itself were a real-life play. This was
the legacy of the popular press, which highlighted narrative and
drama over the more burdensome legal and political details.
If the French government was concerned about the political and social ramifications of an incendiary article like Zola’s,
then it was equally troubled by the new international tenor of
the affair. Admittedly, these fears proved to be quite rational.
On the day of Dreyfus’s reconviction at Rennes, demonstrations
broke out in favor of the ex-captain around the world. From
Egypt to Australia, and virtually everywhere in between, the
message was the same: people were indignant that Dreyfus had
been reconvicted, particularly given the revelations that many of
the documents used to convict him had been fraudulent.6 The
French consul in Melbourne, Australia, reported that the situation “could not be worse.”7 In Belgium, the press was described
as having a “rare violence.”8 Tens of thousands demonstrated
Penn History Review

47

An Affair on Every Continent

in favor of Dreyfus at Hyde Park in London, England.9 And in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, a group of socialists signed a petition
condemning the verdict, with the hope that their message could
be transmitted to Dreyfus’s lawyer, Fernand Labori.10
In 1899, nearly five years after Dreyfus’s original conviction, the case inspired more controversy than ever before. It was
ultimately the risk of a continued media fiasco that led French
President Émile Loubet to offer Dreyfus a pardon, which the
artillery captain accepted on September 19, 1899. This, however, did not bring about a calm denouement to the affair. Indeed, the Dreyfus affair was like a Hydra: when one controversy

Émile Zola’s “J’accuse…!”
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was settled, two more appeared in its place. Eventually, in 1904,
Dreyfus’s lawyer submitted a request on behalf of his client for
a new appeal. After a slow march through the French courts,
the Supreme Court of Appeal announced on July 12, 1906, that
Alfred Dreyfus was innocent. The French Senate passed a bill to
promote Dreyfus to the rank of major within the army. The following decade, Dreyfus would serve alongside his countrymen as
an artillery officer in the First World War.
The foreign press played an instrumental role during the
affair, familiarizing individuals across borders and continents
with the plight of Dreyfus. These people then mobilized around
the world, pressuring the French government to amend the verdict. Newspapers worldwide, some utilizing news agencies such
as Reuters and others hiring their own foreign correspondents,
reported detailed updates on the affair on a daily basis. The extent of the spread of information was impressive, even by today’s standards. In 1898, for instance, the London Times republished a letter, originally sent to a newspaper in Vienna, Austria,
which had been written by an American woman living in a small
Finnish town.11 The woman, describing the conditions in her village, reported, “People here are so frightfully interested in [the
affair]. Even the peasants in quite out of the way places spoke
about it to my husband on his last journey. The general opinion
in this country is that Dreyfus is innocent.”12
This sort of article, which did not condemn the French
state or military, was relatively benign as far as the French government was concerned. But there were still many other stories
written by the foreign press that directly attacked the French
government’s treatment of Dreyfus and, at least implicitly and
occasionally explicitly, encouraged its readers to protest against
France. Such demonstrations and discourse inevitably hurt
France’s reputation as a bastion of justice and equality, a position
it had enjoyed since the French Revolution in 1789. This change
in perception was a central concern of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which kept detailed reports from its consuls and
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ambassadors abroad pertaining to the activities of the foreign
press.
Of much greater concern to the ministry, however, was
the publication of numerous articles, particularly in neighboring Britain, which subsequently trickled into France and served
to reignite the debate surrounding Dreyfus. This phenomenon
was especially prevalent during the years between Dreyfus’s first
conviction in 1894 and the publication of “J’accuse” in 1898,
a period when the affair was by no means entrenched as an international scandal. Most famously, in 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus,
the brother of Alfred, convinced the British Daily Chronicle to
publish a false story proclaiming that his brother had escaped
from Devil’s Island.13 Mathieu hoped this would keep his brother’s name in the press and provide a reminder that the Dreyfus
affair had not yet concluded. Ultimately, Mathieu’s gamble paid
dividends as a number of British papers picked up the story,
prompting the French press to follow suit and thus keeping the
Dreyfus scandal in the public consciousness in France.
Given this volatile atmosphere, it should come as no surprise that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to keep
close tabs on the foreign media in order to control any discourse
pertaining to Dreyfus. This desire to control information abroad
led the French government to pursue attempts at censorship
more broadly than it ever did with its own domestic press. Although the French certainly spied on their own newspapers and
reporters, the government never moved to prevent the publication of a domestic news story. This was due to the Press Law of
1881, which effectively guaranteed newspapers the freedom to
print whatever they pleased. The French treatment of the foreign press, on the other hand, was a different story, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly attempted to intervene through
diplomatic channels in order to limit the publication of damning
materials against the French state. Unfortunately for the French
government, many of the foreign countries that covered the affair most aggressively (particularly Belgium, Britain, Germany,
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and Switzerland) either had their own liberalized press laws or
had no incentive to restrict the publication of articles that were
hostile to France. For these reasons, the French focused their
censorship efforts, particularly within Europe, on theater productions, which were not yet granted similar freedoms from government censors. Even on the few occasions when France did
move to influence the press outside of Europe, the country’s
efforts were generally unsuccessful.
***
Relative to the rest of the world, the European press received the vast majority of attention from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. This was expected, for Europeans were much closer to
France geographically and thus more familiar with the country’s
history and culture. Naturally, this geographic proximity enabled
the European press to locate more sources and invest more in
breaking stories over the course of the entire affair, as opposed
to covering only crucial events such as the Rennes court-martial.
The shared cultural and historical understanding among Europeans was a primary reason the French government was so
concerned with European press coverage. Indeed, much of the
affair was couched in terms that were intra-European in nature,
making it relevant to the entire continent. When the coverage
was critical of France, as it almost always was, this constituted a
political threat. For instance, after the British Daily Mail coined
the term in September 1899, much of the European press began
referring to the Dreyfus affair as France’s “moral Sedan,” connecting the scandal to France’s humiliating military defeat at the
Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Moreover, the European press had an incentive to market the affair in
a way that appealed to Europeans on a broader level. In doing
so, the press created a continent-wide scandal, involving various
players from France, Germany, and Italy alike. It became impossible for Europeans not to link the infiltration of Maximilien von
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Schwartzkoppen, the German spy to whom Dreyfus allegedly
sold military secrets, to the French military and its involvement
in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, the Dreyfusard European
press could not help but frame the ex-captain’s convictions as a
repudiation of the gains of the French Revolution. In this regard, Europe was better equipped to cover the affair with vitriol
and acumen than any other part of the world.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted immense resources to tracking the activities of this international press. The
department’s minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, received daily updates
from his consular and ambassadorial staff on the day’s foreign
news. These dispatches took many different forms: press clippings of specific articles, hand-written translations, and detailed
syntheses describing the coverage of numerous papers. In the
early days of the affair, it was not a foregone conclusion that the
foreign press would become obsessed with covering the case of
Alfred Dreyfus. For instance, on November 6, 1897, the French
ambassador to Germany wrote to Hanotaux, “the Affair in question offers no direct interest for the German government.”14 The
sentiment was echoed by the German press, and one German
newspaper, La Gazette de la Croix, mentioned, “This whole question is for France an internal affair, of which we in Germany do
not need to exaggerate the significance.”15
This detachment disappeared in a matter of weeks, following allegations in the French press that the German kaiser
himself dealt with Dreyfus and coordinated his espionage. Such
an assertion transformed the Dreyfus affair in the eyes of the
German populace from an entirely French scandal into a calumny that attacked the honor and reputation of Germany. In other
words, the affair became something of a geopolitical conflict. As
the French ambassador to Germany later described, “As a result
of all this, the German newspapers have modified their original
attitude and no longer publish exclusively news articles about the
affair.”16 Indeed, La Gazette de la Croix, which had downplayed
the affair’s significance weeks earlier, now termed it France’s
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“military Panama,” referring to the bribery scandal over the Panama Canal that walloped the French government in 1892. If this
anti-French sentiment was only burgeoning in Germany by the
end of November, it no doubt crystallized the following month.
On December 12, 1897, Henri de Rochefort published an even
more accusatory article in his popular newspaper L’Intransigeant,
further implicating German Kaiser Wilhelm II.17
This budding conflict with Germany was certainly troubling for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French
ambassador to Germany continued to provide numerous updates on the “biased and Francophobic” writings in German
newspapers, such as those by the Paris correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt.18 Germany was expected to cover the basic facts of
the affair, but this transition to aggressive anti-French opinion
pieces did not bode well for Franco-German relations. Indeed,
only two decades earlier, France had lost the mineral-rich territory of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The relationship between
the two European powers, therefore, was already tense. And for
a country that wished to appear strong in the aftermath of such
a devastating military defeat, the Dreyfus affair seemed to do
just the opposite for France, reflecting the image of a nation in
decline for all to see. In the context of Franco-German relations,
these small changes in public perception had tangible diplomatic
consequences.
Although no British diplomats were implicated in the
Dreyfus affair, much of the British press coverage has been understood by historians in similar geopolitical terms. As historian
Ricky Lee Sherrod argues, British interest in the affair stemmed
in part from fear over the prospect of a diminishing role of liberalism—particularly as it pertained to enlightened notions of
justice, democracy, and laissez-faire economics—in the coming twentieth century. The recently unified German Kaiserreich
seemed to demonstrate that a state could achieve its desired
ends through means that were decidedly illiberal, and the Dreyfus affair signaled that perhaps France was journeying down a
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similar path. Thus, as Sherrod writes, British reportage of the
affair reflected “a subliminal sense of national insecurity,” which
highlighted “an intense concern about the future of liberalism
and the declining popularity of liberal values in both Britain and
Europe.”19 As one magazine in Edinburgh noted, “If what is
now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the
world, then the beginning of a new century may be a rude one, a
terrible shaking, the end of which no human foresight can predict.”20 But if the British media were concerned about the future
of European liberalism, then the Dreyfus affair offered a rare
opportunity for Britain to assume the mantle as the “true world
leader and principal promoter of civilization and progressive
ways. The Affair demonstrated the fragility of French claims in
these respects.”21 This widespread sense of disappointment with
the apparent French descent into injustice and illiberalism was
not only felt across the English Channel. In 1898, the French
consul in Antwerp, Belgium, recorded a conversation in which
a local dignitary in the Masonic Lodge said, “If a war broke out
between France and Germany, all of the people would be happy
to hear of the defeat of the [French] ‘Grand Nation,’ which has
abdicated the ideas of justice and humanity of which she has
been the guardian since 1789.”22
Historian Ronald K. Huch identifies a British press that
was quite brazen in its geopolitical motivations for covering the
Dreyfus affair. Huch notes that there were protests throughout
Britain after Dreyfus’s second conviction at Rennes, but the moment Dreyfus was pardoned, the country seemed to lose any
sense of outrage regarding the affair. Thus, while a small number
of British citizens continued their noble fight and claimed that
a pardon was still unjust, most of the population felt as though
their task had been completed. Huch argues that this reaction
was no surprise, writing, “In England, the reaction to the Rennes
trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.”23 In
other words, the British had used the affair as a means of criticizing the French, stoking the centuries-old rivalry between the two
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countries. The moment France realized the folly of its ways and
pardoned Dreyfus, however, the British no longer had anything
to gain from attacking the French. Put simply, the fate of Dreyfus himself was irrelevant.
The aforementioned “J’accuse” was unquestionably the
spark that ignited much of the rhetoric surrounding the Dreyfus
affair around the globe. This rhetoric had tangible consequences
for French citizens living abroad. Indeed, in one February 1898
report sent to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rotterdam consul in the Netherlands warned that “business with our
country is suffering from the current crisis. A certain number of
travelling French commerce agents have been recently recalled
by their firms because they have not been able to conduct any
business.”24 Reports such as this one solidified the belief within
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the spread of antiFrench commentary across Europe had to be halted.
In Amsterdam, the French consul general reported that
many of Zola’s pamphlets had been translated into Dutch and
were now appearing in the windows of libraries across the city.25
Equally concerning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the fact
that two pro-Dreyfus French newspapers, Le Siècle and L’Aurore,
were beginning to emerge on the shelves of small boutiques in
the Netherlands. The Amsterdam consul concluded that, since
these newspapers were not being sold in the official kiosks that
had a monopoly on the sale of foreign newspapers, they must
have been coming directly from Paris as a propaganda tool to
sow anti-French discord.26 Hanotaux found this development so
troubling that he forwarded the consul general’s message to his
superior, Prime Minister Jules Méline, and to his colleague in
the French cabinet, Minister of War Jean-Baptiste Billot. The
subtext in Hanotaux’s action is clear: the French government
may not have been able to censor Le Siècle or L’Aurore within its
own borders, but it certainly could attempt to prevent the illegal
smuggling of these Dreyfusard papers throughout Europe.
In attempting to control the foreign press’s access to
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French newspapers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached out
to diplomats in neighboring countries. Only three days after Hanotaux received the news from his consul in Amsterdam, the
Ministry of the Interior sent him a separate message, asking Hanotaux to telegraph his German counterpart to see if L’Aurore
was sold there too.27 The French suspected that the newspaper
had made its way to Germany either through Belgium or the
Netherlands. Still, there is no evidence that the French government solicited the Germans to ban the sale of L’Aurore. Rather,
it is likely that the French were attempting to uncover the extent
of the smuggling of the newspapers, which they could then address internally by preventing them from ever leaving France illegally in the first place.

Members of the foreign press at the 1899 Rennes court-martial.
From Cinq semaines à Rennes, deux cents photographies de Gerschel
(Paris, France: F. Juven, 1900).
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***
Although the French government had to exercise some
degree of caution in controlling the press abroad, it felt much
more freedom in pursuing censorship of the arts, particularly the
theater. Even France itself, which had almost fully liberalized its
press laws in 1881, did not end censorship of the theater until
1906. This was in part because in the mid-nineteenth century, the
theater was considered even more influential than the press, as
it was one of the only ways through which the illiterate masses
could be exposed to political caricature and criticism of the ruling elites.28 However, as the century progressed and the masses
became more literate, the printed word surpassed plays as a more
powerful medium for influencing public opinion. Nevertheless,
the French government remained invested in censorship of theatrical productions sympathetic to Dreyfus. In particular, the
production of a play entitled “Dreyfus, or the Martyr of Devil’s
Island,” which quickly spread across Europe, preoccupied the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. In a letter dated January
17, 1898, French diplomats in Belgium first notified Minister Hanotaux about the play’s existence. Hanotaux and the French consul of Antwerp then worked together to find a way to outlaw the
performance altogether.29 Despite their efforts, the play’s popularity persisted and performances were carried out on a regular
basis in countries such as Italy and the Netherlands. Although
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of
the Italian government, was able to suppress a production of the
play being staged in San Remo, Italy, Dreyfus’s mass appeal rendered the play too difficult to suppress entirely. Indeed, not long
after receiving the positive news regarding San Remo, Hanotaux
confided to his consul in Amsterdam, “Are these performances
still going on? I can only regret that they haven’t been forbidden
like they were in The Hague.”30
French efforts to suppress theater productions brought
mixed results. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Penn History Review

57

An Affair on Every Continent

did enforce the interdiction of some performances, particularly
in countries that maintained strong and beneficial diplomatic relations with France. Unlike major European powers such as Britain or Germany, smaller European states understood that there
was little to gain from consistently tarnishing France’s world
standing. As a result, these smaller countries were more sympathetic to France’s plight. As one Italian newspaper proclaimed,
“We love France and we wish her only the best: we hope she
stays in Europe as a leader of civilization rather than of barbarism.”31 These smaller European states were perhaps also wary
that a similar scandal could befall them one day in this new mass
media environment—they understood that by helping France
now during this time of need, they could rely upon the country
to return the favor at a later date.
Even for those European governments that did sympathize with France, enacting censorship necessitated a calculation
between the benefit of helping France versus the social cost of
enacting overly harsh suppression. In Amsterdam, for example,
the French were unable to convince Dutch diplomats to ban the
production of “Devil’s Island.” On January 26, 1898, the Amsterdam consul general broke the news to Hanotaux, writing, “A
prohibition would only create in the press an ardent polemic; the
legality and the opportunity would be contested…It would be a
redoubling of commotion, extra publicity from which only those
amateurs seeking scandal would benefit.”32 This must have come
as a disappointment to Minster Hanotaux, but the failure illustrates the complicated position occupied by the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs when it came to the coverage of the Dreyfus
affair abroad. Although the press was much more of a threat to
public opinion given its ability to reach and affect more people, it
was nearly impossible to censor the scandal through diplomatic
channels due to the widespread freedom of the press laws in Europe. All that was left to censor, then, were the cheap and often
poorly attended “Boulevard theater” productions, such as “The
Captain Dreyfus,” which was staged in Hamburg, Germany, in
58

David Murrell

An Affair on Every Continent

February 1898. According to one Frenchman who attended the
play on behalf of the French consul, the spectacle was terrible.
“Poorly directed and without any artistic value,” he wrote, “there
were at least as many whistles as there was applause.”33

An advertisement for an American play based on the 1899 work Devil’s Island:
A Novel founded upon the famous Dreyfus case. Though there is no evidence the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever sought to censor this particular
production, plays such as this one were often the targets of censorship efforts
led by the ministry.
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The French efforts to censor negative press in the arts
constitute an early form of so-called “cultural diplomacy.”34 This
was, of course, unlike the cultural diplomacy of the Cold War,
where cultural products were sent from the United States to
the Soviet Union, and vice versa, in an effort to establish some
degree of understanding between the two enemy powers. Instead, in the French context, cultural diplomacy was a strategy
implemented as a means of shaping the cultural realm of foreign countries in a way that was beneficial to French interests.
Such efforts at cultural diplomacy were not deployed solely by
the French. After the Rennes retrial and the decision to convict
Dreyfus, masses across Europe petitioned their respective governments to use cultural events to punish France. This took the
form of calls to boycott the 1900 World’s Fair, which was to
be held in Paris. These demands began as early as 1898, albeit
more quietly. One German newspaper first made the suggestion
after Zola was convicted for libel following the publication of
“J’accuse.”35 The French took these concerns seriously, for the
World’s Fair was anticipated to be not only an economic boon
for France, but also an opportunity to celebrate the country’s history and glory as one of the great states of Europe. Any boycott
would have been a serious blow both to finance and national
pride. In September 1899, the French consul at Hamburg alerted
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about a German news article that
suggested a boycott and also noted that “many very important
American businesses have made the decision to send nothing to
the Exposition if the situation does not improve, and the business world in England is set to follow this example as well.”36 As
Michael Burns notes in his historical study of the 1900 World’s
Fair and the Dreyfus pardon, the risk of losing the international
festival played a significant role in pressuring the French government to pardon Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict. As Burns
asserts,
[Prime Minister Pierre] Waldeck-Rousseau’s gov60
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ernment quickly realized that a pardon would
serve many purposes: it would eliminate the very
real possibility of the prisoner’s death while in
custody…The pardon would also serve to liberate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and thereby pacify many factions in France); and it would
salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming international protest.37
Although the threats to boycott never derived from individual governments, the international community nevertheless
exercised its own sort of pressure on France, much like France
did in its suppression of foreign theater productions through
cultural diplomacy.
***
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French made little if any
effort to engage with or amend the portrayal of Alfred Dreyfus in the United States. Perhaps in that country, where freedom
of speech was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of society, the
French recognized that any requests for censorship would either
not be accepted or not be upheld. That is not to say, however,
that the French ignored American coverage of the Dreyfus affair altogether. And there was indeed tremendous coverage of
the scandal in the United States, which continued to crest leading up to and during the 1899 Rennes trial. As Egal Feldman,
a scholar of Jewish American history, records in his book The
Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, for a country “aspiring to play a meaningful, if not heroic, role in the world, it was
only natural that the attention of Americans would be attracted
to major political and social crises abroad.”38 Much of the affair was transmitted to the United States through British media
outlets—only a few newspapers based out of major cities in the
United States could afford their own foreign correspondents to
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travel to France and report on the unfolding events there—and
consequently, a significant portion of American coverage began
to reflect certain British idiosyncrasies and perspectives. Most
notably, this manifested into what Feldman terms an “AngloAmerican bond” in judicial procedures.39 A New York Times article from 1898 illustrates this tendency:
In France…there are no rules of evidence…
Witnesses have appeared before the judges and
have spoken their minds freely. They have not
presented evidence. They have given their own
opinions. They have expressed the opinions of
others. They have repeated conversations that
they have heard at second or third hand. All this
is called testimony in Europe.40
Much of this coverage can be interpreted as American self-congratulation. The not-so-subtle subtext in articles such as these
was that Dreyfus’s conviction never could have occurred in a
more civilized or democratic nation such as the United States,
where judicial procedures and norms were much more rational.
In this regard, American press coverage hardly differed from the
self-aggrandizement that historian Ricky Lee Sherrod detected
in his study of the British press.
On the other hand, the French judiciary undeniably tolerated a great deal of testimony that would have been impermissible in the United States. During the Rennes court-martial, for
instance, former French Minister of War Auguste Mercier testified that German and British bankers had donated over thirtyfive million francs to mysterious forces—frequently referred to
in the anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusard press as the so-called “Jewish Syndicate”—who were working to exonerate Dreyfus.41 The
French newspapers were left to rebut this claim, with one article
in Le Figaro commenting, “Nothing is more unjust, nothing more
slanderous, monstrous, however, than that accusation of Gen62
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eral Mercier…It is an attempt to dishonor all those who fight for
the triumph of the truth.”42 Thus, in France, newspapers played
the role of quasi-arbiter, condemning false testimony when the
judicial structure failed to do so. Still, to an American public unfamiliar with the intricacies of French legal customs, testimony
like Mercier’s was laughable and undermined justice.
The French were well aware of the growing power of
the United States, and this sometimes manifested itself as unreasonable paranoia about the influence of the American press. The
most pronounced instance of such fears transpired in December
1897, when Minister Hanotaux sent a letter to the New York
consul marked “very confidential,” inquiring into an alleged plot
orchestrated by the New York newspaper the World to free Dreyfus from Devil’s Island:
An individual who calls himself Antoine de Bastillac, and who has collaborated at the World in
New York, recently passed through Paris, stating
that he had participated in a plot that was organized a few months ago in the United States by
the Israelite director of the newspaper to remove
Dreyfus; he assures that the project will soon be
restarted and that an expedition will be organized
in Louisiana to this end, under the pretext of a
shipment of arms to Cuba. Do your best to provide me information on Bastillac and on what he
alleges. If need be, consult with your colleague in
New Orleans.43
That the French believed such a complex scheme to be plausible
speaks volumes about their perception of the American press.
Indeed, the French were so concerned about the possibility of
such a plot that they even contacted Spain to request that the
Spanish provide any intelligence they might have procured pertaining to the alleged conspiracy. Such a plan never materialized
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and was, of course, no more than an elaborate fiction. Yet the
seriousness with which the French government processed and
reacted to this warning reveals a deep-seated fear of the power
of the American press.
If French government officials feared American newspaper influence, they also often expressed disdain for the negative
coverage that so frequently emanated from the United States.
The reports sent from the Chicago consul to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Rennes trial of 1899 were particularly indicative of this French sentiment, which contained a
powerful mix of wounded pride and betrayal. In these letters, the
Chicago consul compiled an impressive list of grievances against
the United States. From criticism of the newspaper coverage
itself, to jealousy over the country’s privileged position in the
world, to dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of American society
as a whole, these missives expressed in impassioned language the
frustration felt by a proud Frenchman and diplomat serving his
country in hostile isolation.
In one of the consul’s earliest letters to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, dated August 24, 1899, the diplomat noted with
contempt that every single newspaper in Chicago was supporting Dreyfus. This was compounded by the fact that, curiously,
many pro-Dreyfus Frenchmen had been contributing articles to
the American press, which had infused the local coverage with
a heretofore unseen tenacity and proximity to the story. As the
consul in Chicago observed, “Numerous French writers such
as Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Marcel Prévost, and Clemenceau contribute regularly to this extraordinary service of the
American press, which we can say has been unanimously favorable to the condemned of 1894.”44 He later continued, “All good
Frenchmen abroad cannot rid themselves of an incommensurate
sadness in the presence of exaggerated interference of the foreign press in a family affair.”45 Implied in these musings of the
consul was the belief that the foreign press took an interest in the
Dreyfus affair not for noble reasons of justice, but instead due to
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a voyeuristic fascination with watching and analyzing what he believed to be a private “family affair.” Thus, it must have been disheartening for the diplomat to hear from an American journalist
that “It is good style now to run down France; it makes money;
it shows to France that there is something else than herself and
behind her in the world.”46
Arguably the most fascinating aspects of these letters
from the consul in Chicago were his own interpretations of
American society near the turn of the twentieth century and the
visible contradictions he discerned between the holier-than-thou
tone expressed in American newspapers versus the actual news
unfolding within the borders of the United States. Of particular
interest was an anecdote reported by the consul in 1899, when a
Jewish cadet was forced to leave the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, following repeated anti-Semitic
treatment from his classmates. On this issue, the consul in Chicago noted that the American press remained silent. “It is, anyhow,
the third incident of this sort that has occurred in recent years…
We are getting used to being treated in the manner in which
we treat China…At home, we cover up all things,” he mused,
mimicking the American thought process, “but when we need
to provide something exciting to our readers, we demand light,
always more light on the affairs of France.”47 If American antiSemitism and hypocrisy were not already disgraceful enough,
the consul also hurled accusations at the Americans for being
fortunate geographically, yet ungrateful to the French, who had
helped secure American independence over a century earlier:
If they had, to the west, a powerful Mexico possessing a fleet twice their size, and wealth, and an
incommensurable means of attacking them, the
press of this country would better understand
the indignity of its current behavior against our
nation, which has poured its blood and given its
gold, even when it was weak and fighting almost
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without hope for its independence from which it
has grown ever since.48
The link between the foreign press and diplomacy was
clear to the Chicago consul. In his view, the press was a tool with
which geopolitical games could be conducted. This was by no
means incorrect, for as has been noted earlier, the British press
printed false stories about Dreyfus’s escape from Devil’s Island
with the hopes that this would reignite the affair. Indeed, the
British motivation for doing so was, as Ronald Huch contended,
to help encourage anti-French sentiment and in turn promote
the superiority of the British.49 The French diplomat in Chicago
perceived many similarities in American press coverage, speculating that the country’s pro-Dreyfus sentiments stemmed from,
above all, a desire for Anglo-American friendship: “I am convinced that the American press would not be so violent against
us, if behind its movements existed the desire…to benefit their
new British friends.”50 This is precisely what Egal Feldman speculates, referring to the Anglo-American friendship as “a rediscovery of a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, a ‘unique partnership’; proposals were even made for an alliance or reunion of the
English-speaking people.”51 But the consul in Chicago was not
only concerned with the burgeoning Anglo-American friendship. In a letter sent on September 10, 1899, the French diplomat
also reported that Kaiser Wilhelm II recently sent a German flag
to Chicago and remarked to an American that “a war between
Germany and the United States would be impossible.”52 For the
French, witnessing this condemnation from both Britain and
Germany must have been a gravely concerning diplomatic development. Perhaps most frustrating of all was the fact that France
was powerless to control the American press. With regards to
the United States, therefore, France found itself in a subservient
position, only able to express its displeasure in private dispatches
sent back to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
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***
Beyond Europe and the United States, France attempted
to control the foreign discourse surrounding the Dreyfus affair
with greater latitude, particularly in South America and India. No
longer burdened by strictly enforced liberal freedoms granted to
the press, the French could refocus their attention to influencing the printed word, which they never dared to do in Europe
or the United States. Indeed, on September 19, 1897, Minister
Hanotaux sent a telegram to the French consul in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. “I understand that certain Brazilian newspapers are covering the Dreyfus Affair in order to spread negative press about
the government of the Republic,” the minister said, “I ask you
to keep watch over this campaign, and if necessary, refute the
noise put into circulation.”53 The order coming from the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs here was somewhat ambiguous—
perhaps Hanotaux was using a euphemism to advocate for direct attempts at censorship of the Brazilian newspapers. Even
if Hanotaux only meant for his consul in Rio to make a public
denunciation of the Brazilian press, this still demonstrated a degree of direct intervention into another country’s foreign affairs
that France did not even attempt to employ in Europe.
France still met some opposition in its quest to control
the foreign press outside of Europe. Perhaps the most glaring
failure came in British-controlled India, following a particularly
incendiary sermon given by the bishop of Calcutta in September 1899. The speech, which was printed in its entirety in the
local newspaper The Englishman, attacked the moral fiber of the
French state for allowing the Dreyfus affair to transpire in the
first place, despite the recent pardon of the artillery captain. The
bishop began by lamenting the entire ordeal: “What has become
then of those high principles of liberty, equality, and brotherhood of which France has been held to be the self-constituted
exponent? What final interest can a nation possess save in truth
and justice and equity?”54 Next, he issued an attack on France,
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denouncing the French people with a flourish:
There are conditions of a comity among nations
as among individuals. We do not endow a man
with our confidence if he has proved guilty of
some flagrant crime; at least until he has repented of it. Nor can we stand upon friendly terms
with a nation of men which has violated the elementary laws of human truth and justice.55
Despite this disappointment in the French regime though, the
bishop’s sermon concluded on an optimistic note:
Let us pray then that France, that great and gallant nation, may know ere it be too late “the
things which belong unto her peace.” Let us pray
that she may cast off the bondage of that military
spirit which idolizes and sanctifies mere force.
Let us pray that she may turn her back upon the
unhappy policy which has too often in public
life ignored or dishonoured the sacred name of
God. Let us pray that in her national history she
may recognize and realise yet again the eternal
principles of truth and justice and equity.56
Unsurprisingly, the French found this sermon to be
harsh and unacceptable, going so far as to lodge an official complaint with the British colonial government.57 Citing a number of
different passages from the sermon, including one in which the
bishop advocated a boycott of the 1900 World’s Fair, the French
consul general in Calcutta claimed that the sermon was “injurious” and “an act of hostility against France.” Three weeks later,
the French government received a response from the colonial
government, which refused to apologize for the bishop’s behavior:
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The government of India can accept no responsibility for statements on matters of current interest that may be uttered from the pulpit either
by the metropolitan or by any Bishop or minister of religion in India. Such a responsibility is
not, so far as the government of India are aware,
assumed by the civil power in any country; and
it would appear to be fatal to that freedom of
thought and speech with which the pulpit among
all civilized peoples is, by virtues of its moral and
spiritual authority, endowed.58
This controversy helps reveal a crucial element of the
French response to the foreign press: the French government
was concerned not only with newspaper coverage pertaining to
the Dreyfus affair, but also with the spread of information pertaining to Dreyfus more generally, whether it be a sermon or a
theater production. Nor did these goals seem to have any sort
of geographic limits—indeed even India, which was neither a
French colony nor close to the European continent, was not exempt from receiving the attention of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
***
That the French government invested so many resources
in the monitoring of the foreign press served as a tacit acknowledgement that the foreign press was among the primary engines
driving the scandal of the Dreyfus affair. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a rather simple strategy when it came to controlling coverage of the affair: limit any discourse, positive or negative, pertaining to Alfred Dreyfus. The hope was that by limiting
any kind of knowledge, foreign populations would eventually
lose interest in the drama of the affair. Given the links between
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foreign and French publications, this strategy might have served
as a means of minimizing French interest in the affair as well.
As a result, within Europe the French government
looked to control those elements of the press that it could manipulate with ease. This frequently meant wielding France’s close
diplomatic ties to its neighbors to engage in a sort of “cultural
diplomacy,” by which France could convince other countries to
suppress certain theater productions about Dreyfus. In this cultural realm, however, France experienced limited victories. The
theater had been the primary means of disseminating information to the masses in the mid-nineteenth century, but by the turn
of the twentieth century, the masses of Europe began to receive
much of their information from the press. And when France
turned its sights to this newly influential European press, other
states’ liberal press laws severely limited the country’s ability to
restrict the growing discourse of the Dreyfus affair.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the French experienced
no successes of any sort. The American press viewed the Dreyfus affair as a means of solidifying its friendship with Britain
and felt especially secure in knowing that the French could not
censor them in any way. The only arena in which the French government could attempt to control both the press and the cultural
sphere, therefore, was outside of the United States and Europe.
Even in these cases, however, the French experienced opposition. In a humiliating display of its own weakness, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not even manage to quell the antiFrench rhetoric of an anonymous preacher in the British imperial colony of India. This incident served to demonstrate both
the incredible spread of information about Dreyfus’s plight, as
well as the inability of France to control foreign engagement
with the scandal.
Confronted by a new era in which the press acted as the
engine of knowledge and scandal in the world, the French were
presented with a Sisyphean endeavor when it came to limiting
the scope of the Dreyfus affair. These forces would only con70
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tinue to swell in the coming twentieth century, as newspapers
continued to exert a massive influence on society. Indeed, in the
years leading up to the First World War, the German government
also began to closely monitor the press as a means of gauging
public opinion. It too viewed the press as a device with which it
could track and potentially influence the public.59 The Germans
would soon find, as the French had before, that their patriotic
press was ultimately impossible to control. The British would
also come to learn this lesson, for in 1909, the famous “We
want eight and won’t wait!” slogan propagated by the patriotic
press and naval armament interest groups compelled the Liberal
government to double its annual dreadnought production from
four to eight ships.60 These were the same underlying forces that
gripped France during the affair. The Dreyfus affair was thus a
preview of the powerful mass media and domestic pressures that
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
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Gin, Gentlemen, and
Generational Conflict
Chloé Nurik
And there are certain definite duties of the student
at Harvard…He must be a gentleman. A gentleman respects
tradition. And the traditions at Harvard are quiet traditions.
Nothing so bespeaks a vulgar and impoverished intellect as
noise in word or action.
—The Harvard Crimson, 19261
College Windows, a FLIRTATION,
Moonshine, gin, HALLUCINATION;
This is part of EDUCATION
Living in our GENERATION.
—The Punchbowl, 19252
During the 1920s, youth symbolized modernity, progress,
and development as a young generation of Americans espoused
new values and served as a lightning rod for social change. College men epitomized these transformations as they confronted
the values of their educational institutions and asserted unique
aspects of their identities, which they believed separated them
from the previous generation.3 Through on-campus protests,
open defiance of Prohibition, and a cavalier attitude toward academics, collegiates defined a new type of masculinity that challenged authority and prioritized peer approval. In addition to
these changes, historians cite the increased prominence of college sports (particularly football) and fraternities as evidence of
a dramatic transition from an internal, character-based model of
masculinity to an external, personality-based model.4 However,
a close examination of college records and student publications
reveals that many young men attending Harvard, Yale, and the
University of Pennsylvania in this decade sought to retain key
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aspects of character-based masculinity (such as honor, integrity,
and self-sacrifice) while incorporating features of the more modernized version (such as social popularity, physical appearance,
and self-indulgence). Their lived experiences call into question
the existing historiography by suggesting that notions of masculinity did not shift in an abrupt or absolute manner in the 1920s.5
Campus activities that promoted male bonding and school spirit
became more significant in this era but were also present in previous decades, revealing continuity in forms of masculine affiliation and rituals across generations. Furthermore, many young
men at elite universities struggled to incorporate disparate and
opposing notions of masculinity into their identities. They adopted a complex, multifaceted construct of manhood that simultaneously anchored them to the past and allowed them to
embrace the new values of a modernized society.
Peer Culture and Intergenerational Conflict
In the 1920s, due to increased enrollment in college6
and the establishment of a “network of peer relations,” youth
suddenly burst onto the social scene and became influential in
American society.7 The devastation of World War I significantly affected the mentality of young people, creating a profound
sense of disillusionment coupled with an urgency to live life to
its fullest.8 Consequently, members of the younger generation
sought to differentiate themselves from the older generation,
blaming their elders for leading the nation into war. In his 1920
article, “These Wild Young People,” John F. Carter Jr. makes the
resentment of youth explicit:
I would like to observe that the older generation
had certainly pretty well ruined this world before
passing it on to us…We have been forced to live
in an atmosphere of “to-morrow we die,” and
so, naturally, we drank and were merry…We may
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be fire, but it was they who made us play with
gunpowder.9
In this indictment, Carter distances youth from the older generation, a dynamic that fueled the importance of peer affiliations.
The primary sphere of influence for youth shifted from
authorities to peers, a transition that was especially dramatic for
college men who operated within a subculture separate from the
outside world.10 From the time freshmen arrived on campus,
they confronted a new social order and sought the acceptance
of their peers. In 1925, Yale’s Eli Book provided the following
advice to freshmen: “here in college we find ourselves in a world
teeming with men of about our own age whom we meet at every turn, going to the same places, doing pretty much the same
things, living all about us in the Oval. From among these we are
going inevitably to choose our associates and our friends.”11 As
reflected in this statement, students valued college as an avenue
through which they could form social connections, strategically
positioning themselves for later success.12 The locus of influence
naturally shifts from parental authority to peer approval when
youth leave for college. However, this transition may have been
more dramatic during this era, as young men felt compelled to
differentiate themselves from the older generation and empowered themselves through the expansion and idealization of youth
culture.13
In their eagerness to identify with peers, college men emphasized modern values, adopting habits of dress and behavior
that helped them fit in.14 They conformed to a set of standards
that defined a new type of masculinity, setting them apart from
their fathers.15 A 1923 ad featured in The Harvard Crimson captures this tendency.16 As a young, clean-shaven man compares
himself to a picture of his heavily mustached father, he draws
attention to the contrast in their appearances: “And Dad was my
age when he sat for that!”17 On a superficial level, this ad conveys the message that a more youthful look can be achieved by
Penn History Review

77

Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict

purchasing the featured shaving cream. However, on a symbolic
level, the dual image in the ad exaggerates the clash between generations of men who subscribed to different values. Young men
grounded themselves in a changing world by highlighting these
contrasts. By rejecting certain characteristics they saw in their
fathers, collegiates defined their identities in opposition to these
images and aligned themselves with their peer culture.18

This ad plays off a stark contrast between a young man
and his father.
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Anchored by their social communities, emboldened college men challenged institutional authority and envisioned themselves as the vanguard of cultural change. Their sense of selfimportance is evident in a speech by Hannibal Hamlin on Yale’s
Class Day in 1927: “CLASSMATES—You are the apostles of
change…You are 1927, typifying nothing and representing everything…The Class of 1927 is pointed to as the end of an old
era, as the beginning of a new era, and as the transition between
the two.”19 Hamlin’s impassioned speech suggests that collegiates
recognized this era as a liminal period between old and new values. They viewed themselves as both unique and the product of
generations who came before them. Elite universities fostered a
sense of connection to the past by reminding students of their
place in a long lineage of cultivated leaders. Schools expected
students to appreciate their pedigree and to make the institution
a cornerstone of their identity. Yale collegiate E. J. Begien made
this agenda evident in his address to the freshman class of 1926:
“You are coming to New Haven to be for four years a part of
that process whereby Yale men are made…[and] each man…
will add to the store for the generations to come.”20 These socially conservative institutions promoted Victorian values, and
collegiates carried the mantle of their school’s legacy upon their
shoulders. While college men in the 1920s still clung to an institutional identity that offered them social prestige (expressing
pride about being a “Yale Man” or a “Harvard Man”),21 they also
railed against the old order and tested the bounds of established
authority.
Boys Behaving Badly
College men of this era had a reputation for self-indulgence, personal vanity, and lack of restraint.22 In mass media representations, collegiates were depicted as rambunctious,
rebellious, and immoral.23 While this portrayal was stereotyped
and flat, a review of student records reveals that it held more
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than a grain of truth. Archival sources indicate that college men
bonded with each other by transgressing laws, bending rules,
and behaving mischievously. These peccadilloes were a central
way in which young collegiates enacted their masculinity, illustrating the connection between behavior and gender construction.24 Feminist theorist Judith Butler explains that individuals
rehearse, perform, and repeat gendered actions in order to fulfill
social scripts.25 Men of the 1920s “performed”26 their manhood
through rebellious actions during Prohibition, a so-called “Dry
Decade.”27 Historian Paula Fass identifies alcohol consumption
in this era as a ritualized masculine behavior: “unlike the other
moral issues of the twenties, drinking was a male-centered problem…Drinking had always been a male prerogative.”28 Collegiates consumed alcohol at parties and at football games, openly
demonstrating their disregard for the law.29 They used alcohol as
a signifier of manly defiance and carefree living. Historian Nicholas Syrett explains that since drinking in the 1920s represented
“a defiance not only of the college administration but also of
federal law,” drinking became a key way to demonstrate masculine bravado within one’s peer group.30 For example, the 1927
Yale Class book included humorous comments from students
that linked college life with alcohol consumption. When asked,
“What do you think is Yale’s greatest need?” a student responded, “Repeal of 18th Amendment.”31 When asked, “What is your
chief regret in regard to your college career?” one student said
“Prohibition,” while another quipped, “Not drinking more.”32
Rather than feeling the need to hide the fact that they engaged
in this illegal activity, collegiates at Yale (and other Ivy League
schools) openly flaunted their drinking habits. By failing to enforce the law, school administrators provided an opportunity for
collegiates to bond through rebellious acts.
Many college men broke with the gentleman-like conduct stressed by their upbringing and were prone to mischievous behavior. They played practical jokes, engaged in demonstrations, and took collective action over minor grievances. For
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instance, students at Harvard, who were tired of being served
the same food, protested through an “egg rebellion.”33 Yale athletes, celebrating a football victory over Harvard, carried away
the goalposts as “Souvenirs.”34 In the classroom, students often
created chaos, showing little interest in academics and minimal
respect for their professors. In fact, students sometimes threw
objects (such as raw eggs) at their professors during lectures.35
During this era, school-wide rituals became immensely
popular, particularly those that pivoted on class rivalry. At the
University of Pennsylvania, these events occurred with such regularity that they became a routine part of college life: “Throughout the school year, the freshmen would struggle to meet the
challenges set by the sophomores as a rite of passage into the
privileged world of the University.”36 One annual ritual in the
1920s was an event in which sophomore and junior architecture
students at Penn fought over the right to wear smocks (to signify
the dominance of their class), resulting in mudslinging and tearing clothes off one another.37

This 1929 photo at the University of Pennsylvania shows the Smock Fight.38
According to scholar Amey Hutchins, students “hurled eggs and mud.”39
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Students at the University of Pennsylvania engaged in the
annual Pants Fight to show their class pride.40

Several of the rituals at Penn became so popular that
they drew spectators from the city of Philadelphia to the campus. However, the level of rowdiness was sometimes difficult
to contain, and there were a few occasions when such events
brought negative attention to the school. Such was the case with
the annual “Pants Fight,” an end of the year event that started
in 1922 in which freshmen and sophomores engaged in a brawl,
culminating in the losers being stripped of their pants.41 In May
1923, when a group of enthusiastic freshmen publically advertised this fight by appearing on a trolley car wearing only their
undergarments, “they drew gasps of horror from maids and matrons by trying to board a Woodland Avenue trolley car in which
girls and women were passengers,” and they were promptly arrested for their indiscretion.42 School administrators valued interclass rivalries, which expanded in the 1920s, as a way of promoting class unity and school spirit. In fact, the annual “Flour Fight”
and “Poster Fight,” which were physically dangerous (sometimes
resulting in concussions and broken bones), were routinely at-
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tended by faculty spectators who cheered and hissed at participants during the event.43 It seems that university administrators
and collegiates alike viewed these organized fights as a natural
part of manhood and as a way for new students to prove their
worth as college men.44
The majority of these rituals were intended to provide
an outlet for expressing the playful vitality of youth and to foster
male bonding. However, some incidents erupted into widespread
rioting that created chaos and spilled over into the local community.45 Rioting at Harvard, Yale, and Penn had a contagion
effect, starting on one campus and then spreading to the others
in succession.46 In 1925, The Harvard Crimson published an editorial that applauded a recent incident of rioting at Yale: “Judging
by newspaper accounts of it, the annual freshman riot at Yale
was a great success.”47 These comments endorsing the rebellious
behavior of Yale students may have encouraged collegiates at
Harvard to act in a similar manner. Archival records indicate that
rioting at Penn increased in frequency over the course of the
decade with one riot in 1920, two riots in 1928, and four riots
in 1929.48 Some students regarded these incidents as a source of
amusement and an outlet for their pent-up energy.49 This tendency is exemplified in the aftermath of a riot in 1929, as students
justified their behavior by stating: “We didn’t have any fun for a
long time.”50 Thus, their pursuit of pleasure sanctioned the destruction of property and sometimes even led them to block authorities from controlling the situation.51 Students at Penn were
suspected of burning down a fraternity house and then jeering at
firemen when they arrived on the scene.52
A well-publicized riot between Harvard students and
the local police force in 1927 illustrates how peer bonding in
collegiate communities empowered men to act in a disruptive
way. While attending a show at University Theatre, students
(who may have been intoxicated)53 threw “eggs and vegetables
at the actors” and produced a “shower of coins” on the stage.54
As students left the show, a “great deal of horseplay from the
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crowd” resulted, and when police rushed to the scene, they hit a
student over the head with a stick.55 During the subsequent legal
proceedings, collegiates took a bold stance: they defended one
another in court by shifting the blame to local police officers
rather than taking responsibility for their own actions.56 Students
testified that the police officers were deliberately violent towards
them and were overheard bragging to one another: “we licked
[the collegiates] good and proper.”57 An editorial from The Harvard Crimson entitled “Riot or Assault?”58 reinforced the perception that the students were victimized by declaring: “there was
no riot until wagon loads of police charged the crowd…The
police, in other words, created a riot before quelling it.”59 Testimony offered by both sides suggests that generational and class
differences played a part in fueling the conflict between these
men.
In some instances in which young men acted out, authorities allowed them great latitude and were reluctant to impose
sanctions even when their infractions were dramatic. Following
the Freshman Riot of June 4, 1923, Yale parents and administrators exhibited ambivalence about enforcing institutional compliance, suggesting that masculine standards of behavior were in
flux.60 During this event, freshmen threw bottles out of their
dorm windows, dumped buckets of water outside, shot firecrackers at lamps, threw burning paper, and even destroyed city
property, forcing the fire department to come.61 Administrators
estimated that 341 of the 789 members of the class (a staggering 43%) participated in the riot.62 School officials initially felt
pressed to respond in a harsh manner, as these students not only
vandalized public property but also stepped outside the bounds
of what was considered appropriate conduct of a Yale Man.63 After much deliberation, administrators decided to ban participants
from sports for the first term of the following year.64 While this
was the most lenient option out of several considered,65 it was
enough to trigger a wave of protest letters from parents who, in
almost every instance, insisted that their son was being punished
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too harshly, was an honorable boy, and had barely contributed
to the ruckus.66 Under pressure from angry alumni and parents,
school authorities quickly overturned their ruling.67
As revealed in their letters, Yale parents ascribed the riotous behavior of their sons to youthful impulses and did not
consider their actions to reflect poorly on their character. This
attitude suggests that they adopted changing views of masculinity, granting greater tolerance for behaviors that might have been
considered unacceptable in their own generation.68 Through
their interference, the older generation validated peer influence
and endorsed the concept of adolescence as a distinct stage of
life that extended through the college years.69 This tendency is
evident in the way that a Yale parent admonished the administration (rather than his own son) by appealing to a naturalized view
of gender: “Extra curriculum activity furnishes the main outlet
for the surplus team of youth, and by repressing it, you destroy
your safety valve and thereby increase your hazard…boys will
be boys.”70 When the young men involved in this riot committed acts of defiance, their parents excused their poor behavior
and irresponsibility rather than upholding the institution’s moral
code. This attitude not only signaled a shift in the expectations
of male behaviors, but also reflected a sense of elite privilege.
These incidents illustrate how manifestations of college masculinity reflected a complex mosaic of on-campus culture, class
values, and broader social changes.
Secret Societies and Fraternal Masculinity
College men prioritized forms of exclusive male bonding at this time due to a confluence of factors. At the turn of the
century, an influx of immigrants to the United States from eastern European countries led to increased cultural heterogeneity.71
Penn’s Quaker heritage and its greater degree of diversity made
the process of absorbing these students less disruptive (and less
threatening) than at Harvard and Yale, institutions that prided
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themselves on their traditional Anglo-Saxon roots.72 As their social environment was altered by newcomers from more diverse
and less desirable backgrounds, it became more important for
students to carve out special spaces for themselves on campus.73
Yale University, with “its distinctive—and professedly
meritocratic—social system,” bestowed prestige upon a select
group of students who were “tapped” for membership into secret societies during the spring semester of their junior year.74
Societies such as Skull and Bones, Scroll and Key, Wolf ’s Head,
and Elihu represented a longstanding tradition at Yale, but membership took on special meaning in the 1920s as a way of reinforcing class distinctions within the student body.75 Since selection for senior societies was based heavily on a student’s contribution to the Yale community through leadership positions, the
competition to rise to the top of the school’s social hierarchy
was fierce.76 However, this system became self-perpetuating as
certain groups of students were denied leadership opportunities
(and sometimes even membership) in extracurricular clubs. Students who had come to Yale directly from public schools (rather
than preparatory schools) and those who were Jewish were at a
disadvantage, as the former were rarely “tapped” for membership and the latter were altogether excluded.77 Social class was
clearly required for initiation. Yale’s secret societies thus ensured
a separate social space—one of enviable distinction—for young
men of means who reflected its Anglo-Saxon ideal.
Select clubs were also a part of the undergraduate culture
at Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania, albeit
to a lesser degree. Through the years, generations of Harvard
men vied for spots in Final Clubs such as Porcellian, AD, Fly,
Spee, and Delphia, which mirrored Yale’s senior societies in function and status.78 These Final Clubs had a long-standing tradition
of selecting well-groomed men from the most prominent social
circles, favoring students who were legacies or came from elite
boarding schools.79 Many of those selected, such as Theodore
Roosevelt, went on to become national leaders, highlighting the
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importance of this avenue for establishing connections.80 Penn
also established senior societies, including the Mortarboard, Friars, and Sphinx in the early twentieth century.81 Although these
clubs were not cloaked in the same mystery as those at Yale and
Harvard, they were also based on leadership and sociality. Thus,
there was an imperative at all three universities for students to
develop their social capital so that they might be recognized as
the quintessential collegiate by their peers.82
While fraternities were less selective than these senior societies, they were also an important part of campus culture, providing a way to assert aspirational masculinity. Although fraternities had existed for a long time at these elite universities, they
increased in status and prominence during this time.83 In fact, the
1920s witnessed a large growth in fraternity membership, indicating the rising popularity of this form of male homosociality.84
Nicholas Syrett notes both the continuity and progression of
this tradition:
The seeds of 1920s fraternal masculinity had
been planted long before the dawn of the twentieth century: the reverence of athletics and of
other extracurricular involvement, the exclusivity...None of this was particularly new. Novel,
however, was the degree to which all of these elements were emphasized among fraternity men...
Fraternity men’s actions were by definition the
most cutting edge, the most worthy of emulation—in short, the most collegiate. To be popular
on campus, one played by fraternity rules almost
without exception or one did not play at all.85
Fraternities had special appeal because they not only
perpetuated social distinctions within the student body, but also
provided a clear model of masculinity, regulating standards of
behavior at a point when ambiguity, uncertainty, and role confuPenn History Review
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sion characterized college life.86 They offered young, impressionable men the chance to bond with others who held similar values and behaved in comparable ways.87 During rush, fraternities
enabled student-judges to exclude classmates who did not meet
their subjective notions of social worth. An article from the Yale
Daily News described the process of selecting fraternity brothers,
declaring: “The essential requirements are…conventionality and
conformance to a certain social standard.”88 Here, it is important
to note that students constructed these standards so that the fraternities mirrored their own values. Thus, through this process,
fraternities reinforced a limited notion of masculinity that was
passed down from one generation of brothers to the next, ensuring continuity and conformity within the system.
From the start, fraternities aimed to promote a specific
form of masculinity. In fact, the process of rushing was likened
to dating, in which a potential brother experienced “calling and
hold-offs.”89 As students attended smokers90 at the most prestigious fraternities, “judges” would question them about their
family background, financial status, dating life, and activities.91
Fraternities looked for students who, in addition to having the
right pedigree, demonstrated a fun-loving nature and a certain
mischievousness endemic to masculinity at this time. In a 1923
letter to the editor of the Yale Daily News, a recruit recalled how
he was spurned during this process. When the student explained
at a fraternity house that he did not drink alcohol, his interviewer
promptly “emptied his mouthful of cigarette smoke into [his]
face and passed onto the next candidate.”92 Thus, in this situation, peers selected the type of men with whom they wanted to
associate, favoring those who displayed a similar rowdiness and
disregard for institutional authority.
Fraternities had a significant impact not only in determining which traits were socially desirable, but also in raising the
social capital of those men selected to join, setting in motion a
self-perpetuating system of elitism. An editorial from The Pennsylvanian noted, “seldom is it that a worth-while man does not
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receive a bid from at least one house.”93 This statement reflects
the belief that if a collegiate was not pursued by at least one fraternity, he was not considered to be socially desirable. Such a rejection was perceived by other college men as a sign of personal
deficiency rather than a reflection of a flawed selection process
that favored cronyism.
Since men on campus were judged on their fraternity affiliation, freshmen felt pressured to get in with the good crowd
from the start of their tenure in college. A 1923 editorial from
The Pennsylvanian acknowledged that successful rushing mattered
to freshmen “because it will have a great bearing on the three
and one-half years that remain of [their] college career.”94 The
social clout of fraternities (an intangible quality) was concretized
through the fraternity pin, which became a coveted possession.
As a status symbol, it elevated the prestige of its owner through
his conspicuous display of the pin. In fact, the fraternity pin
carried so much social currency that it was featured prominently

Advertisers used the image of the fraternity man to emphasize the importance
of consumerism and appearance.95
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in collegiate films of this era such as The Fair Co-Ed. Some men
regarded their fraternity membership as a key marker of their
masculine identity, granting them social prominence on campus.
In The Plastic Age, Hugh Carver notes that his pin was “a sign that
he was a person to be respected and obeyed; it was pleasant to be
spoken to by the professors as one who had reached something
approaching manhood.”96 Since fraternity culture promoted material consumption, appearance, and social conformity, advertisers played off these ideas to convince college men to buy their
products.97 These ads revealed the ways in which fraternities
endorsed and encouraged modernized elements of masculinity
that were socially oriented and appearance-based.98
However, fraternities were not solely linked to social status and superficiality; they also reinforced values of fidelity, civic
duty, and scholarship. Some fraternities considered the moral
standing of men before admitting them. Harvard’s chapter of
Kappa Sigma summarized its selection process as follows: “We
do not, therefore, pick men simply because they are athletes or literary wonders, but we try to get men of character.”99 Fraternities
also encouraged community engagement through chapter-based
programs and activities. For instance, Kappa Sigma at Harvard
revealed plans to maintain scholastic achievement through peer
advising. Their “Big Brother” or “Daddy” system was “intended
to bring the newly initiated and younger men into closer contact
with the chapter work, and, through the watchfulness of one of
the older brothers, keep the younger fellow up in his studies if
need be.”100 This program indicates that while promoting male
bonding, fraternities also upheld the values of loyalty and service. One article from The Pennsylvanian explained that fraternities
helped students “become better men; better qualified to assume
positions of leadership; better qualified to help others.”101 Thus,
fraternities sought to prepare men to take their place as leaders
in business, industry, and professional fields.
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College Sports: Integrated Models of Masculinity
Similar to fraternities, college sports reflected a nuanced
construction of masculinity that combined social appearance
with internal convictions. Displays of male physicality were
celebrated during the 1920s, giving rise to the “Golden Age of
Sports.”102 Scholar Michael Oriard postulates that interest in football grew in an uncertain time of masculinity: “Concern about…
football was inevitably highest when American life seemed softest, in the 1920s.”103 Through football in particular, masculinity
was publicly contested and proven.104 In the aftermath of World
War I, college educators received a national directive to focus on
sports. The records of President Lowell of Harvard testify to the
growing interest in college athletics. Among his archived documents is a 1920 message from P.P. Claxton of the United States
Commission of Education stressing the importance of physical
endeavors for young males: “The highest ambition of every boy
should be to become a man as nearly as possible perfect in body,
mind and soul; fit and ready for all the responsibilities of manhood…Every boy should want to excel in boyish sport, and win
and hold the respect of his fellows.”105 President Lowell retained
this communication, which aligned with his commitment to expand athletic programs. College football had wide-ranging appeal, connecting to notions of nationalism, masculine strength,
and fidelity, qualities that were especially prized at this time. One
1928 issue of the Saturday Evening Post placed the iconic image of
a pilgrim side by side with a football hero, suggesting that these
male figures were both emblematic of America’s culture, past
and present.106
While football had already been an important part of college life, it became commercialized in an unprecedented manner
during this era as college enrollment increased and universities
invested in expanding their athletic programs.107 The Yale Bowl,
a massive stadium that could seat 80,000 individuals (the largest
stadium since the Roman Coliseum), was constructed in prepaPenn History Review
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ration for future Yale-Harvard games.108 By the 1920s, athletics
often dwarfed academics, an increasingly common phenomenon
satirized in The Freshman, a film in which Tate University was
described as “a large football stadium with a college attached.”109
The immense popularity of college football was further evidenced by its rapidly growing fan base. Oriard explains that “[a]
ttendance at college football games increased 119 percent in the
1920s, exceeding 10 million by the end of the decade, slightly
more than for major league baseball.”110 As further evidence of
this craze, news pertaining to football was plastered across the
front pages of The Harvard Crimson and The Pennsylvanian on a
daily basis and given significantly more coverage than other stories.111 As the weekends approached, these periodicals included
glossy inserts that featured pictures of the school’s football team,
biographies of individual players, and statistics about the home
team and its rivals. Additionally, college newspapers regularly reminded students about upcoming games against important rivals
and included ads that encouraged them to purchase cars, raccoon coats, and other big-ticket items in connection with attending these events.112
Football became so visible that it naturally led to a glorification of the men who played it, increasing their popularity
and prominence on campus.113 Since an athlete’s success “sold”
his school to the broader public, students respected the sports
heroes who brought honor to their institutions.114 An editorial
from the Yale Daily News described school spirit as “the flames
which burn at the altar of the God of football,”115 and an editorial in The Harvard Crimson remarked that athletes “cease to be
mortal.”116 This deification elevated football to a sacred sport
whose heroes were idolized by their peers. Percy Marks captured
this tendency in his novel The Plastic Age. As a professor upbraids
his students for their shallow values, he exclaims: “Who are
your college gods?…They are the athletes…And they are worshipped, bowed down to, cheered, and adored.”117 The professor’s dismissal of “false gods” reflects the tension between the
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older and younger generations, as youth often prioritized athletics over academics and challenged the importance of traditional
values.118
However, while college sports featured externally-based
aspects of masculinity (such as social status, physical vanity, and
the pursuit of personal glory), they were also essential to campus
life as they promoted aspects of character development in young
men (such as loyalty, hard work, and honorable conduct).119 In
fact, the football hero epitomized the ideal man because he
straddled two worlds, the old and the new. He seamlessly manifested aspects of both the traditional model of masculinity and
the more modernized version, earning both the praise of his
elders and the esteem of his peers. The struggle to integrate
these opposing forces is illustrated in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s short
story “The Bowl.” In this tale, protagonist Dolly Harlan plays
football for the good of his team as well as to attain popularity and prestige. When his girlfriend Vienna tries to get him to
quit football, she exposes his need for male attention, which was
satisfied through the sport: “You’re weak and you want to be
admired. This year you haven’t had a lot of little boys following
you around…You want to get out in front of them all and make
a show of yourself and hear the applause.”120 However, Dolly
rejects this view and frames his participation as a noble act: “If
I’m any use to them—yes [I’ll play].”121 Fitzgerald’s story indicates that football not only served as a way of gaining popularity,
but was also linked to traditional values, including self-sacrifice,
loyalty, and filial obligation.
Elite universities endorsed athletic competition as a vehicle for promoting character development,122 often prioritizing
this extracurricular activity above academics.123 Mather A. Abbott, a crew coach at Yale, explained that a thorough and sustained involvement in athletics would help to develop “character
and manhood” in college men.124 Coaches like Abbott were entrusted with reinforcing moral values in the students they trained
by modeling ideal behaviors themselves: “The coach is more than
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a teacher; he is a character-builder; he molds personalities.”125 By
tying physical pursuits to personal virtues, college sports grew
in importance and became self-justifying. Administrators held
athletes to high moral standards and expected them to demonstrate honesty, great effort, and fair play when competing for
their school. The “Athletic Code of Ethics,” which appeared in a
1922 issue of The Pennsylvanian, explained that the student-athlete
must: “strive to carry more than [his] own burden, to do a little
more than [his] share…To be unselfish in endeavor, caring more
for the satisfaction which comes from doing a thing well than for
praise.”126 The imperative to maintain a “sportsmanlike ideal of
honor” indicates that college sports promoted aspects of gentlemanly conduct among athletes, including honorable conduct and
fair play.127 By competing in this manner, sports produced “the
greatest pride deep down in the individual that he is a Yale man
or a Harvard man.”128 Thus, college athletics provided students
with a way to construct a nuanced concept of masculinity that
integrated new and old values into their social repertoire.
Conclusion
The 1920s was a decade of youth, as the younger generation suddenly became visible and influential. Embracing new
values, college students symbolized the broader national trajectory toward modernity and became objects of social criticism.
As they emphasized the ways in which they were different from
the previous generation, collegiates increasingly turned to peers
to assert themselves and to shape their identities. In doing so,
they challenged institutional authority, often created chaos on
campuses, and prioritized the pursuit of social relations over academic studies. While these behaviors indicate new features of
masculinity, there is also evidence of continuity in the extracurricular activities that collegiates pursued. Although senior societies, fraternities, and athletics had existed in previous generations, they became especially prominent during this era, fulfilling
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an even more essential social function. These opportunities for
male bonding reinforced conformity within select groups and
maintained a culture of elitism. As students stretched to meet
the competing demands of parents, school administrators, and
peers, they navigated disparate social systems and expectations,
weaving together multiple forms of masculinity rather than adhering strictly to one template. For these college men, the shift
to a modernized version of masculinity was not monolithic or
abrupt but instead was fluid and integrative.129
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The Big Stick Split in Two:
Roosevelt vs. Hay on
the Anglo-American Relationship
William Shirey
In 1895, the United States and Great Britain found
themselves in a state of crisis over a British intervention in
Venezuela that had been sparked by a disagreement over the
Venezuela-British Guiana border. Most American political elites
sought to solve the issue by arbitration; many academic elites
wished for their government to be as conciliatory as possible.
During the crisis, a half-cowboy-half-politician named Theodore
Roosevelt, then a candidate for the New York City mayoralty,
wrote a letter to his alma mater’s newspaper stating his thoughts
on the international debate in no uncertain terms: there was no
time now, Roosevelt declared, for “stock-jobbing timidity” or “the
Baboo kind of statesmanship,” nor was there any time for those
who were “still intellectually in a state of colonial dependence
on England.” The United States, according to Roosevelt, should
insist upon the Monroe Doctrine in its fullest application, and,
for good measure, “build a really first-class Navy.”1 Yet according
to most historians, within two decades, Theodore Roosevelt
had played a significant if not determinative role in laying the
foundation for the Anglo-American “special relationship” that
carried the two nations through the world wars.
Frederick W. Marks III, in his 1979 book Velvet on Iron: The
Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, posits that “[Roosevelt] liquidated
virtually every object of discord between the two countries and
would probably have sought a more formal tie had he not feared
the veto power of German and Irish-American voters.” Marks
argues that Roosevelt’s seemingly cool attitude toward Britain
was concealing his true desire, Anglo-American partnership, for
the sake of political prudence in a largely Anglophobic country.2
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The main scholar of Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship
with Great Britain, William N. Tilchin, argues that Roosevelt
combined his own bombastic nationalism with a pro-British
attitude, a sentiment he held because of the cultural affinities
between American and British societies as well as his cherished
relationships with British statesmen such as Cecil Spring-Rice,
the best man at his second wedding. Tilchin writes that, from
his grand geostrategic considerations down to his handling of
minor details, Roosevelt played a pivotal role in nurturing AngloAmerican relations.3
Howard K. Beale, the deliverer of a prolific set of
lectures on Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy at Johns
Hopkins University and the author of perhaps the most-cited
work on the subject, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to
World Power, argues that Roosevelt and his ardent companion
Henry Cabot Lodge were indeed cold (if not somewhat hostile)
toward the British in the early 1890s, but grew friendlier as
their careers progressed. This friendliness grew, his narrative
goes, after the Spanish-American War, when Britain refrained
from censuring America like the other European powers.4 After
describing Roosevelt’s fury toward Britain’s aforementioned
incursion upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, Beale posits
that by 1898 Roosevelt had “developed a full-blown foreign
policy based on the belief that the British and Americans shared
common interests.”5 Beale propounds a view of Roosevelt’s
actions toward Great Britain that he dubbed “the cementing of
an Anglo-American entente”; in other words, Roosevelt helped
consummate an informal but mutually understood relationship
of diplomatic solidarity with Britain. His analysis is colored by the
fact that Roosevelt “played England’s game” in the conferences
and diplomatic skirmishes that led to the First World War.6
Scarce dissent is to be found on Theodore Roosevelt’s
general affinity for England and his playing a major role in
the building of the Anglo-American entente. Indeed, England
and America began to deliberately form a friendly diplomatic
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relationship beginning, at the latest estimate, in 1900, when Lord
Lansdowne became the British secretary of state for foreign
affairs.7 Furthermore, it is plain that Roosevelt had a respect for
the affinities between American and British culture and that he
had dear British friends in important diplomatic roles.
But the trend from wariness to entente in BritishAmerican relations was more a British phenomenon than an
American one; the respect that Roosevelt found for British
culture was not meaningfully different from the respect that he
found for other nations as disparate as Russia, Germany, and
Japan. Similarly, though Roosevelt’s greatest foreign friends were
indeed British, he surrounded himself with an international
coterie of Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Japanese, and
Russians with whom he shared an immense mutual fondness.8
Yet one must go back to 1957 in order to find a historian who
credits the strengthening of the bonds between England and
America not to Theodore Roosevelt himself, but to people like
John Hay, Lord Pauncefote, Henry White, or the general foreign
policy establishments of England and America, or even to the
mutual enmity toward Germany from both countries.9
The historical facts, upon closer examination, cast the
general conclusion of historians like Marks, Tilchin, Beale, and
others in a suspicious light. Historical episodes involving both
the United States and Britain reveal that Roosevelt was, even after
1898, often blatantly anti-British, while in fact other Republican
actors worked to pacify Washington’s dealings with London.
The general historical consensus thus fails to recognize that a
diplomatic and political corps whose ideologies and affinities
differed from Roosevelt’s levied a crucial influence on the actual
comportment of his administration. In addition to obscuring
the importance of other Republican policymakers, the historical
consensus regarding Roosevelt’s foreign policy interprets his
actions anachronistically through the screen of the world wars,
attempting either to ascribe to him a foresight that he did
not possess, or to fit him into a facile teleology of America’s
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seemingly inexorable entente with Britain while ignoring the
contingencies of that relationship. No history has adequately
explained Roosevelt’s role in Anglo-American relations without
falling into these traps of faulty historical reasoning.10
Historical Background:
Britain, Europe, and the United States
Britain, from at least the termination of her disastrous
effort in the Second Boer War, had been in need of a new
geopolitical approach. Before the imperial boom of the 1870s
and 1880s, only Britain had anything more than a toehold in the
wider world. Once the other European powers—save AustriaHungary—crashed into Africa and Asia, Britain’s comparative
naval and financial advantage began to wither. In the late 1890s,
the British fought their disastrously long war in southern
Africa against the Boers for three years, seriously draining their
resources and their morale; at the same time, Britain and France
nearly collided on their imperial frontiers. Under Kaiser Wilhelm
II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany began the
construction of a “risk fleet” to compete with the Royal Navy
in the late 1890s, a clear threat against Britain’s traditional
dominance on the sea.
The British realized that the “splendid isolation”—in
actuality, unilateralism—that they had practiced for decades was
no longer viable in an increasingly multipolar world order. Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury, the last great lion of British conservative
statecraft and a staunch supporter of unilateralism, left office in
1902. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne
had been working since 1900 on broadening Britain’s friendships
and minimizing the number of her enemies, a task that became
easier when Salisbury could impede him no longer. Although
Lansdowne’s attempted overtures to Berlin were fruitless, the
British successfully formed a naval compact with Japan in 1902,
an “entente cordiale” with France in 1904, and a triple entente
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with France and Russia in 1907.
Before all of this, however, Britain had made diplomatic
overtures to the United States, even though many northern
American statesmen—Senator Lodge foremost among them—
publicly conveyed their detestation of both Britain’s antagonism
toward American control of Hawaii and her stringent upholding
of Canadian fishing rights. Nevertheless, the path to an unofficial
Anglo-American entente was paved by Britain’s hostility
toward Spain in 1898; the relationship was slowly brought
to its consummation as Britain brought garrisons back from
Canada. The British at this time were also beginning to negotiate
over recognizing at least partial American rights to the future
Isthmian canal—and was, therefore, tacitly toying with allowing
full American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
The diplomatic behavior of the United States was going
through a set of changes at the turn of the century as well, perhaps
even more profound changes than Lansdowne was to make in
Britain. In 1898, the United States crashed onto the world scene
in the Spanish-American War, taking the Philippines and other
colonies. Roosevelt and his fellow “imperialist” Republicans
such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and—though he only
influenced policy indirectly—the historian Alfred Thayer Mahan
had been working their way up the ranks of the Washington elite
during the preceding decade, and by the late 1890s they were
influencing naval affairs, the State Department, and the Senate.
These men developed what Henry Cabot Lodge called the “Large
Policy,” meaning worldwide American assertion. The Large
Policy finally found its way into the Oval Office when Theodore
Roosevelt assumed the presidency after the assassination of
William McKinley in 1901.
The expansions, different as they were, of both Britain
and the United States throughout the globe were in part
subtended by cultural assumptions of civilizational superiority.
These assumptions were the product of both Enlightenment
thought and retroactive justifications of colonial control and
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displacement.11 In the U.S., the Republican Party and progressive
elites peddled imperial expansion in the lead-up to the SpanishAmerican War as synonymous with national honor; dominance
in the Western Hemisphere became, therefore, an imperative for
the sake of civilization and Christendom.12 Furthermore, not
only did the British end up ceding hemispheric dominance to the
United States for pragmatic reasons during this period, but they
also held the selfsame cultural assumptions that made it appear
valid. That published works of fiction, philosophy, and social
and political thought began to flow in sharply increased volume
between the U.S. and her motherland during the dawning hours
of joint Anglophone global dominance was no coincidence.13
England was reaching out for friends and allies at the
same time that the United States began to seriously exert its
power throughout the world; the friendship was, in a sense,
natural. (German Weltpolitik had seemed always to stand athwart
America’s aims at expansion; by virtue of the Anglo-German naval
race and general rivalry, then, British and American diplomatic
goals of the late nineteenth century found a somewhat organic
alignment.) The historiographical consensus is that Roosevelt
played a positive role in bringing about this alignment, which
facilitated Anglo-American cooperation during both world
wars. Among major historians on the subject, Howard Beale has
the most generous view on when Roosevelt began to seriously
cooperate with the British. By 1898, Beale argues, Roosevelt was
basing his foreign policy on the palpable necessity of the AngloAmerican understanding.14
Yet Roosevelt, rather than favoring Britain categorically
over Germany or other European powers, was far more erratic
than historians have acknowledged. He was friendly toward the
diplomats of Downing Street when Britain stood to advance
American interests, but he could be shockingly pugnacious
whenever Britain posed even a minimal threat to America’s
geopolitical goals. Besides the latent trend that made an AngloAmerican understanding propitious at the turn of the century,
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it was Roosevelt’s diplomatic corps, including his Anglophilic
Secretary of State John Hay, that truly made an effort to build
the Anglo-American relationship that came to define later
decades. The clearest case of the tension between the rabid
“pro-American” style of Roosevelt and the Anglophilia of
Hay and the State Department—and the importance of the
structural trend of Anglo-American friendship—can be seen in
the Alaskan boundary dispute of the early 1900s.
Hay and Choate in Canada
By the end of the nineteenth century, the spheres of
both British Canada and the United States were growing; by the
1890s, they were bumping into each other. Roosevelt’s “proAmericanism” reached a fever pitch in the face of this ever-somild and indirect abrasion between America and the Imperial
Parliament at Westminster, which controlled Canadian foreign
affairs at the time. In 1895, two years after a dispute between
the British and the Americans over fisheries in the Bering Sea
had been resolved by arbitration, then-New York City Police
Commissioner Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge
to say that “Great Britain’s conduct about the seals is infamous…
[we should] seize all Canadian sailors as pirates.”15 Roosevelt also
expressed his wish to invade Canada as punishment for Britain’s
half-violation of the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In late 1895,
he wrote: “Let the fight come if it must; I don’t care whether our
sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”16
(The Americans would most emphatically not have taken Canada;
at the time of Roosevelt’s letter, Great Britain had fifty available
battleships in the northern Pacific to America’s three).17
Canadian-American—and, by extension, BritishAmerican—friction ebbed after 1895. The British Admiralty
continued to worry about both American and German naval
ambitions in the North Pacific, but the Anglo-Japanese
agreement of 1902 eventually diminished the fears.18 Downing
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Street recognized that, in the event of a war with the United
States in the coming decades, British ships would ineluctably be
batted away from Canada’s Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence
by the up-and-coming United States, which had established
its Naval War College in 1884 and come under the leadership
of a fire-breathing naval advocate in Roosevelt. Aside from a
small fleet of submarines, the British abandoned their military
presence in the Western Hemisphere, preferring to count on
diplomatic courtship of the Americans and the loyalty of the
Canadians.19 Still, the tension between America’s increasingly
positive relations with Britain and America’s increasingly strained
relationship with British Canada was the dialectic that defined
the Anglo-American understanding in its infant stages.
The year 1900 saw the beginning of the Alaskan
boundary question. According to the 1825 treaty that demarcated
the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the line of separation
was to “follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the
coast” north of the Portland Channel. Yet the language was far
too vague to draw an actual line, and an exact boundary had not
been established.20 It is in fact unclear whether or not a mountain
summit line parallel to the coast even exists. The treaty also
included the phrase “winding of the coast” and referred to the
“Portland channel” at points crucial for its own interpretation,
neither of which is an obvious feature based on geography alone,
and neither of which had been previously defined. The British/
Canadians and the Americans each claimed two different lines
that ran approximately northwest-southeast along the coast.
Crucially, each side claimed control of a pass over the Lynn
Canal, the key spot which controlled the headwaters and allowed
for all riverboat transport in the area.21
When gold was discovered in the Yukon in the 1890s,
the Canadians pressed their claim for territories that were
left ambiguous by the treaty. In January 1900, the American
ambassador to London, Joseph Choate, made it clear that the
United States would agree to an arbitrative tribunal on the matter.
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Lansdowne, wishing to be as conciliatory as possible toward
the Americans while still keeping the Canadians happy, saw
the question as an unnecessary roadblock to an entente.22 With
discussions between London and Washington about the nature
of the future Isthmian canal becoming more serious by the
week, the Alaskan boundary dispute became a major bargaining
chip for both sides. As it was the most emotionally charged issue
dividing the British and the Americans and was tightly linked
to the future of transportation, trade, and naval power in the
Western Hemisphere, the topic of Alaska’s boundary was the sine
qua non of Anglo-American rapprochement.23
Secretary of State John Hay sent a drafted proposal
for the tribunal to Julian Pauncefote, envoy extraordinary and

The Lynn Canal and the Skagway River.
A gold discovery in the area would bring the United States and the British
Empire into a pivotal near-confrontation.
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minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The British were
initially surprised and satisfied, but Pauncefote reported that the
judges would have very little interpretive power outside of the
1825 treaty, which was firmly in the United States’ favor. Canada
and Governor-General Minto were at first “delighted,” but on
further consideration of the precise terms, they considered the
United States’ proposal “most insidious.”24
Secretary Hay, as historians have noted and as was clear
to his contemporaries, was willing and eager to bend U.S. policy
in England’s direction. “In sum,” comments one Hay biographer,
“under Hay’s direction, American neutrality was distinctly
benevolent to England.”25 In the Alaskan situation, however, an
American interest was directly involved. Once Roosevelt was in
office, Hay could not nakedly alter U.S. policy to favor England,
even though (as will be shown) he disagreed with President
Roosevelt’s tacit idea that American claims in Alaska were more
important than the prospective relationship between Washington
and London.26 His willingness to arrange an arbitration only
served to put him on thin ice as secretary of state. As Roosevelt
would recall after Hay’s death, he was simply “not to be trusted
on issues concerning England”—and, as an important corollary,
he was “foolishly distrustful of the Germans.”27
Fortunately for the Americans, a canal treaty with England
was in its final stages and Lansdowne was determined not to
jeopardize it. Lansdowne’s secretary wrote to his counterparts in
the British Colonial Office that Lansdowne wished
that the communications to the Dominion
Government should not in any way imply that His
Majesty’s Government associate the settlement
of the Alaskan Boundary and other primarily
Canadian questions with that of the Interoceanic
Canal question, or that the negotiations for the…
Treaties are interdependent.28
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Lansdowne and Hay, therefore, were committed to an amicable
resolution of the issue. It was Roosevelt who stood as an inhibitor
of the trend toward conciliation.
Hay vs. Roosevelt in Canada
Canada already stood on shaky legal ground. That her
mother country of England was unwilling to throw weight
behind the Alaskan issue only worsened her hopeless situation.
The British, as Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier knew,
would frown upon any further obstructive tactics he used.29
Thus Laurier, in January 1902, decided to arbitrate.30 Hay and
those at the British Foreign Office were delighted that this
source of friction between Washington and London would soon
be removed.
But the events of the previous September—the
assassination of William McKinley and the inauguration of
Theodore Roosevelt as president of the United States—had
introduced a great deal of volatility into America’s cooperation
on the Alaskan issue. Roosevelt immediately made clear his
opposition to any such arbitration as had been tentatively
approved by the Canadians, the British, and Hay. In March 1902,
a crestfallen Pauncefote told Lansdowne that “the President
considers the claim of the United States is so manifestly clear
and unanswerable that he is not disposed to run the risk of
sacrificing American territory under a compromise that is the
almost certain result of an arbitration.”31 Roosevelt, according to
Henry Cabot Lodge, had posited in the presence of two senators
that at the first sign of trouble in the disputed territory he would
send United States troops to occupy it. One of the two senators
intimated that this would be a popular decision among both
members of Congress and the people.32
Secretary of State Hay pushed the reluctant Joseph
Choate to enter private discussions at the British Foreign
Office despite Roosevelt’s heated opposition toward anything
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resembling arbitration. Choate noted that the British and
Canadians were indeed open to significant compromise. In
August 1902, Lansdowne had suggested to Choate that the
United States could even determine the format and style of an
arbitration if it were to take place.33 The significance of Hay’s
apparent dismissal of Roosevelt’s hawkishness on this issue is
often overlooked in the later historiography.34
In September 1902, Lansdowne sent Sir Michael Herbert,
a friend of Roosevelt’s, to Washington as ambassador to the
United States. Roosevelt gave him a warm reception but made it
clear that he wished to move immediately ahead with the Alaskan
issue. The president suggested, during his first interview with
the new ambassador, that he might accept an Anglo-American
jurist tribunal that carried no formal weight. Instead, it would
be made up of jurists selected by the American and British
governments. The Canadian government gave its tentative assent
on November 18. Said the Governor-General of Canada, “My
ministers would be disposed to consider it favorably, provided
that the reference to a Tribunal should include all aspects of
the question.” Lansdowne told Hay that the British, too,
would agree.35 Roosevelt’s grudging acceptance of Hay’s initial
arbitrative idea could be put into effect because Lansdowne was
willing to cooperate and because Hay had used his influence to
grease the skids for peaceful diplomacy.
The Alaskan issue was primarily seen as one between
Britain and America, not as one between British Canada and
America or some combination of the three. Hay, in predictable
if absurd Anglophilic fashion, wished to see only one American
on the commission of six jurists. Herbert wished to see three
Americans and three Britons, leaving out any Canadians.36 This
was no small source of friction between Canada and her imperial
motherland. Laurier, in January 1903, once again publicly
criticized the Americans for their position and actions regarding
the Alaska treaty. He would have rather had the issue submitted
to The Hague than to what he increasingly saw as a clearly biased
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Anglo-American old boys’ club.37
Herbert and some British diplomats began to dream
of some sort of Anglo-American supreme court, while other
elder British statesmen were more cautious of the Americans.38
But Herbert, Hay, and Lansdowne were the central players in
the Alaskan boundary issue, and their wish for Anglo-American
friendship superseded Roosevelt’s demand of the satisfaction of
American interests on one hand and British colonial relations
on the other. In Canada, Minto and Laurier recognized their
helplessness and on January 21 assented to a tribunal of six
impartial jurists. Two days later, King Edward VII gave his
blessing.39
In the U.S., representatives from the northwestern states
put up a fight. They believed that ceding to Canada what was
not Canada’s would endanger their own states; they asserted that
there were no legal grounds on which the Canadians could stand

Secretary of State John Hay, c. 1904.
The unsung hero of the Anglo-American relationship, but to Roosevelt,
“not to be trusted on issues concerning England” and
“foolishly distrustful of the Germans.”
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and that even deigning to arbitrate was a farce on the part of
the United States. Those Americans who favored the arbitration
declared that no matter what the tribunal said, no territory would
be lost to Canada. Despite the protestations of the Northwest
(whose states were the most anti-Canadian of all) and the
constant, truculent “pro-Americanism” of the president, the
treaty passed the Senate on February 11 and cleared the path for
negotiations to take place.40
The international table was set for the pacification of the
Alaskan issue. Hay, Herbert, and Lansdowne had ensured AngloAmerican friendship, and the Canadians’ complaints seemed to
have been sacrificed for the sake of placating the Americans.
Even so, Theodore Roosevelt and his pro-Americanism found a
way to make trouble. On February 18, 1903, Roosevelt appointed
three of the most grossly biased politicians in all America as his
“impartial” jurists: Secretary of War (and longtime Roosevelt
man) Elihu Root; Senator George Turner of the anti-Canadian
state of Washington; and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, progenitor
of the “Large Policy” and Roosevelt’s most steadfast political
partner.41 When the inevitable outrage came, the pathetic
American excuse was that three unbiased judges could not be
found. This, of course, did little to quell the anger.42 Herbert
declared himself severely disheartened and disillusioned with the
Americans.43
Lansdowne was disappointed but still hoped for
accommodation over anger. Britain had just terminated its
involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela on
February 14, and the blockade had caused Roosevelt’s animal
Americanism to come frightfully to the fore. The president—
perhaps by coincidence, but more likely not—had ordered the
admiral of the navy to practice naval maneuvers on what was
then the largest scale in American history in the same theater as
the Anglo-German blockade.44 Now was simply not the time for
the British to anger the rough-riding Roosevelt. Herbert, too,
fully comprehended the strength of American feeling about what
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was seen as Britain’s bad faith. He sent notes on February 23 to
Ottawa and London urging amicability and a quick conclusion.45
The will of the Canadians would not be allowed to obstruct the
rapprochement of the English and the Americans.
The Canadians, angered at once by the Americans for
their preposterous choice of “impartial” jurists and by the British
for their appeasement of Roosevelt’s bullish Americanism,
“felt called upon not only to express their dissatisfaction at
the recent exchange of ratifications at Washington before their
official consent had been given, but practically to indicate that
their assent had been rendered unavoidable by His Majesty’s
Government.”46 Lansdowne, struggling between the rock of
Anglo-American amity and its import and the hard place of
Britain’s colonial obligations, was forced to ask the Americans
for two delays in the tribunal to allow the Canadians to gather the
necessary documents. Hay was also trying to reconcile his own
intense, fundamental affinity for the British with the fact that
he was the secretary of state of the United States of America.
Hay expressed disappointment at what he saw as stalling tactics.
Roosevelt asserted to Hay a duty:
If the English decline to come to an agreement
this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel that it
is simply due to bad faith—that they have no
sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I
think they ought to be made to understand that
there must be no delay; that we have come to
a definite agreement with them and that the
agreement must be kept on their side as well as
on ours, and that we shall expect them to live up
to it without fail…I shall probably, if they fail to
come to an agreement, recite our case in the message
to Congress and ask for an appropriation so that we may
run the line ourselves.47
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Yet Hay was not the only member of the American
foreign policy establishment to receive word from Roosevelt in
these terms. On June 29, Roosevelt wrote Lodge to say that, if
the British continued to make things difficult, he would “declare
the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress,
and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it
should be run.”48 To Hay on July 29, he stated that “if we can’t
come to an agreement now nothing will be left but to act in a way
which will necessarily wound British pride.”49 To Root on August
20, Roosevelt expressed his hope that the “the British will see
reason. If they do not, it will be unpleasant for us, but it will be
far more unpleasant for Great Britain and Canada.”50 To Hay on
September 21, Roosevelt stated that he was wondering
if the Jacks realize that…it will be far more
unpleasant to them, if they force the alternative
upon us; if we simply announce that the country
is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has
not been reduced to possession it will be reduced
to possession, and that no further negotiations in
the matter will be entertained.51
Other letters of Roosevelt’s indicate even more explicitly
his proclivity to use state force to resolve the issue. To Henry
White on September 26, Roosevelt wrote that
I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours,
as being for the most part in our possession,
and the remainder to be reduced to possession
as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—
and to declare furthermore that no additional
negotiations of any kind would be entered into.52
To Elihu Root on August 8, the president wrote how he “shall
at once establish posts on the islands and sufficiently far up the
Penn History Review

117

The Big Stick Split in Two

main streams to reduce at all the essential points our claim to
actual occupancy…This will not be pleasant to do and it will be
still less pleasant for the English.”53 To Frederick Jackson Turner
on August 8, he stated that in case of “captious objections on the
part of the English, I am going to send a brigade of American
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed
territory and hold it by all the power and force of the United
States.”54
Roosevelt was playing fast and loose, and the British saw
that he would risk severely harming the budding relationship
between England and America for the sake of a small strip of
land in a barely inhabitable area bearing trace amounts of gold.
Fortunately for the sake of smooth Anglo-American relations
at this critical stage, Hay and the British statesmen kept cool
heads and paved the way for London and Washington to get

Theodore Roosevelt in his presidential years.
A pugnacious pro-American: “I am going to send a brigade of American
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed territory and hold
it by all the power and force of the United States.”
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along. Joseph Chamberlain, then British secretary of state for
the colonies, had been spooked enough by Roosevelt. He too
resolved to quickly settle the Alaskan issue no matter the cost to
Canada and the empire.55
The negotiations began in September. According to
Lord Alverstone, the British representative at the tribunal, the
Americans behaved badly, but he wished to put up a fight. On
several issues concerning the dispute he remained unwaveringly
set against all that the United States wished to do. An abrupt
turnaround in early October was likely the result of pressure from
Lansdowne (who was in turn feeling pressure from Roosevelt)
toward conciliation on the part of the British.56 The Americans
came out with a total victory; Roosevelt and the three jurists
were met with wide acclaim for what was seen as an enormous
diplomatic win. The Canadians were fittingly resentful and knew
that all injuries to Canada were being sustained for the sake of
British friendship with America.57
But it was Hay, not Roosevelt, who worked for diplomacy
surrounding the Canada issue. It is difficult to imagine a scenario
where Anglo-American amity would have remained on a smoothly
upward ascent without Secretary Hay tempering the Roosevelt
administration’s response. Roosevelt’s truculence, in actual fact,
threatened significant setbacks to Anglo-American amity on
multiple occasions; it brought Lansdowne and his enormously
conciliatory attitude to his wit’s end. Hay’s Anglophilia and
Lansdowne’s determination to end Britain’s “splendid isolation”
were the determining factors that allowed the Anglo-American
understanding to progress despite the Alaskan boundary conflict.
Roosevelt was, realistically, a liability throughout the resolution
of this dispute.
Limitations and Implications
Roosevelt and Hay’s respective roles in the Alaskan crisis
should bring the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s
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relationship with Britain under much harsher scrutiny. Yet a far
more thorough analysis of the diplomatic episodes throughout
Roosevelt’s career is needed to establish precisely when Roosevelt
became more disposed to treating the Anglo-American entente as
a serious diplomatic goal. These analyses must rely on explorations
of the attitudes of Roosevelt’s fellow American diplomats and
policymakers, as the Alaskan boundary case shows that perhaps
they were the authors of the Anglo-American rapprochement that
undeniably took place between 1895 and 1917. (Tantalizing leads
for such an analysis exist: Roosevelt left much of his East Asian
diplomacy to Secretary Hay until his death in 1905, and Hay, in
a remarkable suspension of logic fitting only the most ferocious
of Anglophiles, attempted to blame the Russo-Japanese conflict
on Germany, then clearly Britain’s nemesis. Roosevelt, on the
other hand, at one point attempted to blame Japanese aggression
on Britain, also a plain twist of the reality on the ground.) In any
case, a fuller exposition of Roosevelt’s potentially more neutral
attitude toward Britain—as opposed to the palpable Anglophilia
of other Republicans of his time, like that of John Hay, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, and Henry White—must explain the fact that
Roosevelt seemed to favor Britain in his later diplomacy.
The Alaskan boundary dispute does not conclude
the inquiry into Teddy Roosevelt’s views on Great Britain
or the evolution of those views, but it does destabilize the
historiographical consensus that Roosevelt was, in his personal
thought, a friend to Britain—or that he had become a friend
to Britain by 1898. That others in the Republican Party of
Roosevelt’s time—most importantly, Secretary of State John
Hay—were indeed Anglophilic has created the illusion that
Roosevelt himself was pro-Britain, whereas, in fact, until at least
the early 1900s, Roosevelt was in fact something of a practical (if
absurdly feisty) “pro-American” situated in a largely pro-Britain
party and administration. Secretary Hay, in the case of the Alaskan
boundary, was not tightly managed by Roosevelt with regard to
diplomatic actions and, as illustrated above, would sometimes
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go against the wishes of his president. Despite Roosevelt later
denying that Hay was a major player in the boundary dispute, it
was indeed Hay who curbed Roosevelt’s dangerous influence on
the situation, made the necessary diplomatic maneuvers, took
advantage of the British retreat from “splendid isolation,” and
allowed the conflict to come to its peaceful resolution.
The case study above has implications for the debate that
runs through the literature on the appropriate characterization
of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the grandest sense. Some
scholars, most famously Henry Kissinger, have argued that
Theodore Roosevelt can be most accurately be described as an
American realpolitiker, always thinking systemically and globally
while at the same time remaining conscious of the balance of
power.58 Historian Walter McDougall also projects some degree
of realism and balance-consciousness onto Roosevelt, although
McDougall’s narrative is far more nuanced than Kissinger’s and is
informed by the fact that the extant “Progressivism” at the turn
of the century was a fundamental aspect of the Rooseveltian
worldview.59 Howard Beale also portrays Roosevelt as seeing the
world chiefly through the lens of power.60 Others have disagreed
sharply with the realist school of analysis. Frank Ninkovich in
his book American Imperialism argues that a structural, cultural,
and intellectual moment was the plinth upon which American
expansion in the Edwardian era stood, while William C. Widenor
and John Milton Cooper Jr. have in tandem argued that Roosevelt
and Lodge were in fact more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson
and William Jennings Bryan, due to the “Large Policy” group’s
Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian assumptions, their (arguably)
more overt racial paternalism, and their near-worship of the
militaristic spirit.61
The clearest example of the anti-realist view of
Roosevelt’s foreign policy is Frank Ninkovich’s article “Theodore
Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” where Ninkovich asserts
that Roosevelt’s diplomatic thought and behavior was driven
primarily and fundamentally by an idealization of “civilization”
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informed by a “metahistorical outlook” of a sort of soupedup Whig history.62 Citing Roosevelt’s praise of imperialism, his
efforts to form diplomatic ties with European nations, and his
tendency to try to be on the “civilized” side of conflicts abroad,
Ninkovich portrays Roosevelt as a blind ideologue, one who saw
himself as having, above all else, a “duty upon the civilized races
to transplant the seeds of civilization where they had failed to
germinate of their own accord.”63
Ninkovich’s article is unconvincing. A disproportionately
large amount of the primary source material used by Ninkovich to
create his narrative is made up of letters to high-ranking foreign
officials, texts of public speeches, or articles in widely circulated
magazines—all discursive scenarios in which any president or
diplomat might justify his actions in the most high-minded
light. While Ninkovich’s argument in American Imperialism, which
places Roosevelt’s actions in their proper intellectual and cultural
context, is a welcome tonic to Kissinger’s retrojection of latertwentieth century American realism onto Roosevelt, his selective
and tenuous material for “Civilization as Ideology” causes him
to miss the mark. Ninkovich’s “civilizational” framework is
excellent for Roosevelt’s approach to, for example, Latin America,
but is unequipped to handle the looming and central diplomatic
question of Roosevelt’s presidency: how the United States
should navigate the increasingly dire Anglo-German rivalry. It
is no wonder that Ninkovich’s article only dares to approach the
question of Roosevelt’s ideas on U.S.-German relations after the
point that the German war machine brutalized Belgium, five
years after Roosevelt had left office.64
The Alaskan boundary issue seems to show that
Roosevelt’s self-proclaimed “pro-Americanism” manifested
itself as a short-term explosiveness, inimical both to calculated,
systematic, balance-of-power realism and to high-minded
normative ideas of “civilization.” Roosevelt’s actions, when
examined closely, cannot fit on any facile midpoint between the
two. Furthermore, it seems that the steady hands in American
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foreign policy were in Roosevelt’s administration. The emphasis
ought to be taken away from Roosevelt the man, and a responsible
evaluation of U.S. diplomacy from 1901 to 1909 should not
attribute successes blindly to the president but rather take into
account the efforts of Hay, White, Root, and others who worked
to set policy and tame the wild man in the White House.
The question of Roosevelt’s role in the informal, loose
drawing together of the United States and Britain also engages a
hotly debated topic in the theory of international relations: the
degree to which leadership matters in statecraft and diplomacy.
Most in the field of international relations implicitly or explicitly
work with the idea that looking at structural, impersonal forces,
along with culture, bureaucracy, and political systems, is the
appropriate method by which to understand diplomacy and
history. This is not an uncontested idea: Daniel Byman and
Kenneth Pollack, for example, have asserted that even small
idiosyncrasies of leaders can have a profound impact on the
course of history—that the human element is a significant
variable. They defend their thesis on a theoretical level, positing
that state intentions—often tied up with specific leaders’
intentions—are germane to theories of international relations;
they ground their idea in case studies as well.65
Within the debate of leadership vs. structural causes in
international relations theory, Robert Jervis engages with the
tension between leaders and advisors. Jervis argues that political
role can be a determinative force in the intentions of different
actors, though Jervis himself is somewhat ambivalent about
the extent to which structural forces dominate personal forces
in statecraft.66 The president, Jervis’s argument goes, will face
political pressures, while a secretary of state like Hay will be freer
of electoral constraints. Jervis’s thesis is a powerful explanation
of the dynamics of the Roosevelt administration during the
Alaskan boundary crisis. Yet Roosevelt’s personality—along
with the residue of his previous tepidness regarding Britain—
most certainly was a factor in how he behaved, in addition to the
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presidential pressure he faced. Similarly, Hay’s well-documented
Anglophilia was a factor in his comportment along with his
position at the State Department.
Even if structural factors were among the ultimate
causes of the Anglo-American rapprochement, to ignore the
role of leaders—especially particularly influential ones, like
Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, or Lansdowne—is dangerous
and reductive.67 Matters of international relations and diplomatic
history are too complex to focus only on any one element;
biography and psychology must be explored as much as political
systems and international structures. The historiography on
Theodore Roosevelt’s own tastes and predilections regarding
diplomacy has crucially ignored evidence of his own ambivalentat-best attitude toward Great Britain, and Roosevelt’s very
persona is far from unimportant in this analysis. The AngloAmerican entente steadied both nations before the coming
collapse of world order, and the causes of that entente—not
only those distal and impersonal, but also those proximate and
personal—deserve painstaking attention.
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President Lyndon Johnson,
Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the
Re-Southernization of the White House
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Introduction
At 12:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, President
John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas.
Two hours later, the Texan Lyndon Baines Johnson was sworn
in as the thirty-sixth president of the United States aboard Air
Force One. Kennedy’s assassination stunned the world. As with
momentous events such as Pearl Harbor before, and 9/11 after,
the great majority of Americans remember exactly where they
were and what they were doing at the moment Kennedy was shot.
Despite being floored by a profound sense of loss, however, the
American people also recognized the symbolic importance of
President Johnson’s ascension to the highest office in the nation.
As soon as Johnson entered the White House, commentators
stressed that he was the first resident of a southern state in a
century to get there.1 Although President Woodrow Wilson
was born in Virginia, another former Confederate state, he was
considered to have voided his southern credentials by establishing
residency in New Jersey. Many thought a true southerner would
never reach the Oval Office, and southern elites were among the
principal doubters. As historian William Leuchtenburg stated in
his book, The White House Looks South, prior to the culmination
of Johnson’s political ascent, “[a]mong Southerners on Capitol
Hill it was an article of faith—bitter faith—that no Southerner
would ever be President of the United States.”2 As Johnson
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assumed the presidency and prepared to run for election in his
own right, this “southern-ness” quickly became a critical issue.
This paper examines the story of Johnson’s rise and
his victory in the 1964 presidential election. It traces the arc of
Johnson’s ambitious political career, paying specific attention to
the 1964 election and the way in which the Texan won North
Carolina. This paper argues that Johnson calculated and shaped
a specific path to the White House by leaning heavily on figures
such as Jonathan Worth Daniels, the North Carolinian editor
of the Raleigh News & Observer (N&O). Daniels and Johnson’s
relationship was more than simply a strategic bond; it offers a
case study of southern identity and the evolution of southern
liberalism in the twentieth century. The give and take between
Daniels and Johnson yields interesting takeaways with regard
to the press, the populace, and the president. Their interactions
reveal that Jonathan Daniels was a pivotally important figure in
Lyndon Johnson’s presidential campaign. Johnson’s relationship
with Daniels afforded the Texan a window into the minds of
North Carolinians; it allowed him to truly grasp these citizens’
feelings, especially on divisive issues such as race. This nuanced
understanding of North Carolinian politics ultimately proved
decisive in carrying the state.
Although Daniels was clearly among the elite of
society—his family was one of the wealthiest in the southeastern
United States—his correspondences reflected interactions with
all elements of society. For every letter addressed to President
Johnson or Governor Terry Sanford, there is one postmarked
to a farmer in eastern North Carolina, or a thoughtful piece
authored in response to an angry “letter to the editor.” These
letters provide a fascinating window into North Carolinian
politics, where race was a contentious, highly partisan topic in
the 1960s due to polarizing events such as the Greensboro sit-ins
and ongoing debates regarding segregation.
Throughout his tenure in national politics, Lyndon
Johnson maintained a close relationship with Jonathan Daniels,
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a bond held together by a mutual commitment to bring the
South back to the forefront of American politics. While
several biographers—most notably Robert Caro, Robert Dallek
and William Leuchtenberg—have written on the issue of
Johnson’s southern identity, none have done so by examining
his relationship with the press, or more specifically with Daniels.
The correspondence between Lyndon B. Johnson and Jonathan
Worth Daniels raises important questions about the nature of
relations between press and president in the twentieth-century
election cycle. It also exposes questions about the concept of
“southern-ness” in early twentieth-century America and sheds
light on the intense feelings of alienation many southerners such
as Daniels and Johnson felt.
Ultimately, this paper concludes that Lyndon Johnson
and Jonathan Daniels formed a mutually beneficial relationship,
which allowed the Texan to gain a more nuanced understanding
of North Carolinian feelings on issues such as sectionalism and
race. Despite their vastly different professional and personal
backgrounds, Daniels and Johnson bonded over their shared
southern identity and desire to mend regional tensions. Moreover,
the two men possessed the foresight and determination to realize
that providing a solution to the South’s racial issue would be the
best way forward. Johnson and Daniels’s symbiotic relationship
was built upon a bedrock of mutual southern understanding and
borne out of a shared desire to correct the historical record as it
pertained to the South’s post-Civil War reputation.
Jonathan Daniels Finds His Voice
During World War I, Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels posed for his picture at the entrance to the White House
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his assistant secretary. Later,
while reflecting on the photograph, Daniels said to FDR, “We
are both looking down on the White House, and you are saying
to yourself, being a New Yorker—‘Some day I will be living in
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that house’—while I, being from the South, know I must be
satisfied with no such ambition.”3 Josephus would not live to be
proven wrong. Nor would the senior Daniels live long enough to
watch his son Jonathan become an integral part in the rise of the
southerner he could not foresee.
Jonathan Worth Daniels was born on April 26, 1902,
in Raleigh, North Carolina. Daniels enjoyed an unconventional
childhood, yet he did so within the mainstream of southern
society. Though Daniels was encouraged to adopt traditional
southern liberal attitudes towards race—his father taught him to
condemn the Ku Klux Klan, but favor segregation—Jonathan’s
unique childhood experiences led him to eventually reconsider
such norms. The Danielses’ house sat directly across the street
from Shaw University, a historically black college in Raleigh.
According to his biographer, Charles Eagles, Daniels’s proximity
to Shaw likely led him to believe that black and white differed
less than most whites thought, since Daniels saw young black
students working and studying at Shaw just as whites did at
nearby schools like North Carolina State.4 Daniels also enjoyed
the company of a black housekeeper and playmate during
his youth. These relationships in Raleigh proved vital to the
formation of Daniels’s inquisitive nature and atypically liberal
attitude towards race. The experiences of his childhood echoed
in Jonathan Daniels’s mind for his entire life and undoubtedly
shaped his attitude regarding civil rights.
Daniels’s father, Josephus, was a prominent southern
liberal who served as secretary of the navy during World War I
and as United States ambassador to Mexico. These jobs forced
the Daniels family to move to the nation’s capital when Jonathan
was ten, but they also afforded him an exciting change in lifestyle.
Jonathan Daniels benefited from his parents’ intellectually
stimulating lives. Their position in society provided Jonathan
with an abundance of good books to read, interesting people to
meet, and serious conversation in which to engage.5 Josephus’s
work also provided Jonathan with the opportunity to travel
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and expand his worldview. Among his various jobs, Josephus’s
true love was journalism. This passion led the elder Daniels to
purchase a controlling interest in the Raleigh News & Observer, a
once proud regional publication, at a foreclosure sale in 1893. At
the conclusion of his tenure on Capitol Hill, Josephus and his
family returned to the Tar Heel State to run the N&O as a family
enterprise.
Jonathan Daniels was similar to, and shaped by, Josephus.
Both father and son graduated from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Both father and son served time on
Capitol Hill. And both of them possessed a natural curiosity,
which begat a love for journalism. The Raleigh News and Observer
would become the channel for this passion and a vessel for fatherson bonding. Like his father, Jonathan Daniels worked closely
with Franklin Roosevelt in Washington. Whereas Josephus
served above FDR as secretary of the navy during World War I,
Jonathan served under Roosevelt as his press secretary prior to
the president’s death in 1945. In late 1944, Josephus became sick
like FDR himself.
After remaining on board long enough for President
Harry S. Truman to choose his replacement, Jonathan Daniels
returned home to assume control of the News & Observer. He
presided over the paper during a period of immense growth,
as the News & Observer bought out the Raleigh Times, opened a
new downtown office, and rapidly built upon its base readership
throughout North Carolina. All the while, Daniels made sure
the paper maintained its liberal bent. Personally responsible for
the bulk of the editorial board, Jonathan ensured that the News
& Observer actively promoted stances in keeping with those of
his father and the Democratic Party. It is critically important to
qualify, however, that the News & Observer’s positions were typical
of North Carolinian Democrats and not the national party. Like
Josephus Daniels, the paper often supported positions such
as segregation in schools that were antithetical to the national
Democratic Party. This began to change as Jonathan assumed
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control.
As Jonathan took over the News & Observer, he sought
to uphold his father’s vision of the role the paper should play
in North Carolinian life. As Cleves Daniels wrote in a letter to
his family concerning the future of the N&O in October 1964,
“[Josephus] believed that it was important to both give people the
news and to educate them at the same time.”6 The younger Daniels
worked steadfastly to ensure that his family’s newspaper did just
this. The News & Observer did not simply present stories for its
readership to digest. “Old Reliable,” as it was known, brought its
readers—who hailed primarily from the rural, otherwise isolated
parts of North Carolina—into the mainstream by shaping their
understanding of how to think about certain issues. A September
1963 letter to the editor from a seemingly typical reader named
C. Stanton Coates demonstrates the degree to which Daniels was
successful. Coates detailed in gushing terms the way the N&O
had served as a father figure and educator in his life. As a boy,
Coates “always looked forward to the Sunday issue, which came
to [him] in rural Johnston a day late via R.F.D.”7 The N&O
was not simply a source of entertainment for Coates as a child,
however. Coates grew with the paper, and in turn “Old Reliable”
educated him on the affairs of the world and how to feel about
such developments: “Growing into manhood I put away the
comics for the more noble and glorious sections.”8 Despite
expressing concerns over the veracity of some stories in the
N&O’s recent past, Coates’s account reveals the degree to which
the News and Observer was more than just a paper. The Danielses’
family paper was not only a fixture in the community and an
educating force—it constituted a powerful political weapon.
Jonathan Worth Daniels reached his prominent, publicly
visible position largely due to the influence of his father. Josephus
Daniels paved the way for his son financially and professionally.
Moreover, Josephus taught Jonathan to think critically, develop
his passions, and view education as an essential, never-ending
pursuit. While Daniels owed his father a great deal for helping
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him grow, Jonathan had to split from Josephus in order to further
his growth and cultivate his own voice. This meant adopting
more progressive stances in his daily editorials. As Charles
Eagles wrote, Josephus Daniels saw no need to discuss racial
affairs; he simply accepted that segregation and subordination
of Negroes was the best solution for the matter.9 On this issue
specifically, and many others, Jonathan Daniels refused to accept
the status quo or simply take traditionally accepted beliefs at face
value. Jonathan was somewhat apologetic for his racial editorials
at first.10 He knew that he had his father’s confidence and trust,
however, which overcame their differences in opinion.11 Not
only did Josephus accept his son’s stances, he even encouraged
them. In a personal correspondence between father and son,
Josephus agreed to set aside his private ideological differences
with Jonathan for the good of the N&O. He told Jonathan, “In
the meantime you must go ahead doing your duty as you see it.”12
LBJ Finds His Passion
Despite the fact that they were born over 1,300 miles apart
and into entirely different socioeconomic backgrounds, Lyndon
Johnson and Jonathan Daniels enjoyed similar upbringings in
several critical respects. Although he was not a national figure
like Josephus Daniels, Lyndon’s father, Sam Ealy Johnson Jr., was
a prominent regional figure who served in the Texas House of
Representatives for a decade. Sam Johnson and his wife, Rebekah,
encouraged their eldest son to read newspapers and interact
with his fellow schoolchildren so as to nurture his curiosity
and broaden his worldview. Johnson’s parents also emphasized
achievement, ambition, and public service. According to his
primary biographer, Robert Caro, Johnson’s parents instilled in
him a civic ethic from a young age.13 Sam Johnson would also
encourage his children to think critically; he would spur talk of
“serious issues” and stage debates on a myriad of topics at the
dinner table on a regular basis. Like Daniels, Johnson was said to
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have had a “highly inquisitive mind” from his earliest days. Well
aware of this fact, Sam Johnson consciously worked to nurture
his son’s curiosity.
Much like Jonathan Daniels, Lyndon Johnson was the
beneficiary of an unconventional racial education. Although he
grew up in a nearly exclusively white section of Blanco County,
Texas, Johnson witnessed the worst excesses of southern
segregation and racial prejudice while teaching at the Welhausen
School in Cotulla, Texas, as a young man.14 In 1927, Johnson
moved to Cotulla, in the state’s southwestern corner, in order
to earn enough money to complete his undergraduate degree.
Upon reaching Cotulla, he found it to be a destitute town with an
overwhelmingly Mexican population. This experience, however,
did not reaffirm Johnson’s preexisting racial biases. Instead,
Johnson’s time in Cotulla became a watershed event in the
formation of one of his guiding political ideologies, as he came
to view education as the key to realizing the American dream.

Lyndon Johnson as a young boy in 1915.
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Johnson felt that his students were hampered not by inherent
racial inadequacies, but by poor education and the unfortunate
circumstances of their birth.15 Thus, Johnson’s spell in Cotulla
led him to second-guess his innate racial biases.
Whereas Josephus Daniels nurtured his son to love
journalism, Sam Johnson raised Lyndon to take an interest in
politics. Much as Jonathan revered Josephus, Lyndon adored his
father from a young age; he could usually be found sticking to
Sam like a shadow and imitating his mannerisms.16 As Lyndon
Johnson grew, so too did his ambition. When Sam Johnson was
elected to the legislature in Austin, it only seemed natural to bring
Lyndon with him. Sam brought his son into Austin’s legislative
chamber so frequently that many legislators believed Lyndon
was one of the page boys.17 While Johnson certainly learned a
great deal with his father in the state capital, his experience in
Austin paled in comparison to the wisdom Sam imparted to
him on the campaign trail. Lyndon relished the opportunity to
campaign with his father and interact with people across Blanco
County. Prior to one particularly important campaign stretch,
Sam told Lyndon, “If you can’t come into a room and tell right
away who is for you and who is against you, you have no business
in politics.”18 This piece of advice stuck with Johnson his entire
life and permanently shaped his approach to politics.
Lyndon Johnson’s father was integral to his son’s political
rise and to the development of his political ethic. Sam Johnson
paved the way for Lyndon’s professional future by introducing
him to the world of politics. He also encouraged his son to think
critically, develop his passions, and treat education as essential.
Like Daniels, Johnson inevitably had to split from his role model
in order to realize his true potential. While Jonathan Daniels
looked past his father’s ideals, Lyndon Johnson set his career
sights significantly higher than his father had. Although Lyndon
idolized his father in his youth, the two Johnsons strove to fulfill
starkly different dreams. The elder Johnson never harbored
ambitions of making it to Washington. As fellow Congressman
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Wright Patman once said of Lyndon’s father, “Sam’s political
ambitions were limited. He didn’t have any aspirations to run
for Congress. He wanted only local prestige and power, and
the Texas House was fine for him as his limit.”19 For Sam’s son,
Blanco County—and even all of Texas—would never be enough.
Legend has it that on the day of Lyndon’s birth, the Johnson
family patriarch rode around town on horseback shouting that a
United States senator—his grandson—had been born that day.20
Lyndon did not shy away from such rhetoric; rather, it imbued
in him a strong sense of belief. Johnson truly believed he would
one day become president.
The difference in political aspirations between father and
son is encapsulated perfectly in the account of a Johnson City,
Texas, resident who told Robert Caro, “Sam liked to argue; Sam’s
son liked to win arguments—had to win arguments. Sam wanted
to discuss; Lyndon wanted to dominate.”21 Lyndon Johnson
sought to dominate every discussion, win every argument,
and triumph in each election. This ceaseless ambition would
ultimately lead LBJ to Washington and later to the highest office
in all the land. It was there on Capitol Hill that he would become
acquainted with Jonathan Worth Daniels.
Circumstances of Acquaintance
Lyndon B. Johnson relied on a savvy use of the press as
a political weapon to take the pulse of his constituency and to
widen his sphere of influence. Jonathan Daniels proved to be
a particularly important figure in helping Johnson realize these
aims. Although the precise first point of contact between the
two men is unclear, correspondence between them dates back
to the mid-1940s. Johnson and Daniels continued a steady, if
not robust, rapport over the years as Johnson accrued power on
Capitol Hill. Naturally, as Johnson’s power and reach widened, so
too did his level of interaction with the press across the nation.
From the early days of his youth, Johnson recognized the power
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of the newspaper. Throughout his childhood, he could be found
reading a copy of whatever he could get his hands on. Johnson
would read any paper cover to cover; it did not matter if the
publication was from a local outlet or a national titan. When he
ventured into the world of regional politics, he maintained this
habit and began to interact strategically with the major players.
He made a concerted effort to make friends with the most
important people across his district. Johnson canvassed far and
wide to court the right people in the right places all across Texas,
leading many to believe that he had statewide ambitions from the
day he arrived in the legislature.22
Johnson made and used friends in the press to solidify
his support within his district, specifically by allying himself
closely with George Marsh and his influential Austin newspaper,
the Austin News-Tribune and Herald.23 Lyndon Johnson could work
his constituency directly when he was simply a congressman.
As former Texas State Representative Welly Hopkins attested,
“Lyndon knows every man woman and child in Blanco County.”24
By all accounts, Johnson possessed an unusual gift for meeting
and interacting with the public. As Johnson’s ambitions and reach
shifted, however, so too did his contacts, as his ability to reach
the people directly diminished. Upon moving to Capitol Hill,
he kept on reading, yet Johnson began to favor more nationally
influential publications such as the New York and Washington
newspapers, as well as the Congressional Record.25 During his
rise, Johnson never forgot his father’s advice. He possessed an
incredible ability to find and identify the pulse of his constituents,
and the press played a pivotal role in his ability to do so. This
luxury allowed Johnson, as his father instructed, to always know
who was for him and who was against him as he walked into
any given room. Johnson sought to retain this advantage as his
influence expanded from the fourteenth district to the entire state
of Texas. In the nation’s capital, this task became exponentially
more difficult as Johnson’s influence magnified. As his ambitions
outgrew even the Lone Star State, regional mouthpieces such
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as Jonathan Daniels became necessary contacts for Johnson’s
Rolodex.
Daniels and Johnson’s Symbiotic Relationship Forms
Jonathan Daniels and Lyndon Johnson would eventually
strike up a mutually beneficial relationship based on a shared
southern understanding, which existed in the hopes of delivering
North Carolina to Johnson in the 1964 election. In exchange for
his political support, Daniels received a host of benefits. This
relationship began to form in the period between Kennedy’s
assassination and the 1964 presidential election, as Daniels and
Johnson’s correspondence intensified. During this period, the
two men discussed a wide-ranging set of issues in a consistently
cordial and friendly tone. They spoke about everything from
issues of minor importance to matters with serious national
implications. Ultimately, however, their conversations centered on
the two men’s visions of a better America. Johnson and Daniels
bonded over discussions of civil rights and their progressive,
evolving ideas regarding the matter. They also bonded over their
shared southern identity.
Lyndon Johnson and Jonathan Daniels asked and received
a great deal from each other. From Daniels, Johnson asked for
public support—in editorial form—on several key issues, which
would shape popular opinion and ultimately help sway the 1964
election in North Carolina. Johnson understood just how much
Daniels’s word—and the paper’s word by extension—meant
to the readers of the News & Observer. Kennedy had added
Johnson to the Democratic ticket in 1960 almost exclusively to
win states in the solid south, such as North Carolina. Johnson’s
increasingly progressive stance on racial equality, however—in
tandem with Goldwater’s pandering to segregationists—meant
these southern states would be in play in 1964. Keeping his
father’s advice in mind, Johnson recognized that he would have
to campaign aggressively and work collaboratively with major
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figures of the press like Daniels in order to retain traditionally
Democratic strongholds such as eastern North Carolina, where
the N&O circulated heavily.
Johnson and his advisers would repeat a simple process
when reaching out to Jonathan Daniels. President Johnson would
write Daniels, asking for an editorial on issue X, written with
slant Y. Daniels would comply immediately. Shortly thereafter,
he would receive a letter from Johnson thanking him graciously
for his support. Daniels would then write back to the president,
thanking him for his letter and pledging unlimited support in
the future. Typically, such letters would close with a bonding
remark relating to southern pride, or with Daniels mentioning
how thankful he was for Johnson’s friendship. One example of
many concludes with a note from Jonathan Daniels postmarked
September 28, 1964. In this letter, Daniels wrote, “Dear Mr.
President: I am grateful for your note about my editorial based
on my understanding and appreciation of your fighting qualities
back in the days of our first associations.”26 This remark was
in response to Johnson’s earlier request for Daniels to write an
editorial acknowledging the pair’s longstanding relationship.
By “the days of our first associations,” Daniels alludes to the
early days of the pair’s friendship, dating back to the mid-1940s,
when Johnson was a little known member of the House hailing
from Texas’s tenth district. This editorial served as an “I knew
him when” piece. It was likely effective in fostering a positive
perception of Johnson in the eyes of working class eastern
North Carolinians.
Such an editorial aimed to make the readers of the
N&O understand Johnson as a relatable character—a hard
worker of modest origins. In reality, Johnson likely understood
these citizens, as he had developed sympathy for the poor and
oppressed during his childhood and experiences in Cotulla.27
The Texan never forgot the poverty and rural isolation of
the Hill Country of his youth. Although Johnson did ask for
specific editorials to portray himself and his candidacy in a
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calculated manner, Daniels’s personal notes indicate that the
North Carolinian wrote in good faith while doing so. The two
operated with a mutual understanding that Daniels’s work was
of vital importance; though never explicitly stated, it is clear that
Daniels and Johnson believed a series of strategically planned,
well-written editorials would help the Texan carry the eastern
portion of North Carolina and win the state.
While Johnson asked a considerable amount of his
North Carolinian friend, Jonathan Daniels also requested his
fair share of favors in return. Daniels’s correspondence with
Johnson reveals a bevy of requests for the Texan. On January 18,
1964, Daniels wrote President Johnson at Governor Sanford’s
suggestion in order to notify the president of the excitement in
North Carolina relating to “the establishment of the proposed
Environmental Health Center of the United States Public
Health service.”28 Daniels hoped that the president could turn
the proposed center into a reality. While Daniels’s request, like all
from his camp, was submitted humbly, it also not so subtly listed
reasons why it would be in Johnson’s best interests to comply.
Knowing that the president was eyeing the 1964 election, Daniels
pleaded a case for Johnson having the N&O on his side: “We
have had three tough goes in Presidential elections in the years
just behind us. I’m proud that we carried the State all three times,
and thought it may sound like boasting, we carried it in the area
dominated by the circulation of the News and Observer.”29
Moreover, in asking for the realization of a North
Carolinian dream, Daniels crafted an appeal that detailed the
ways in which the N&O could prove pivotal in the realization
of some of Johnson’s own political aspirations: “[The N&O’s
area of circulation] roughly is our ‘black belt’ where feeling has
been highest on civil rights and could be intense again.”30 Here,
Daniels craftily hinted at the merits of forming a reciprocally
beneficial relationship and appealed to Johnson on an issue in
which he knew they both had a vested, common interest. Thus,
Daniels subtly indicated to Johnson that he could not only help
142

Simon Panitz

“We of the South”

him win North Carolina, but also shape the state after winning it.
Jonathan Daniels submitted a variety of other requests
for Johnson’s consideration, such as one in March 1964 to issue
a “stern rebuke to extremists on city streets as well as political
platforms.”31 All evidence suggests that the president was
receptive to such requests. The Environmental Health Center in
the aforementioned correspondence was erected in Durham in
1966, two years after Daniels helped provide Johnson with the
east North Carolinian firewall the Texan needed to win the Tar
Heel State.
Daniels’s support proved immensely important for
Johnson as he carried every North Carolinian county east of
Randolph. Johnson ran up particularly large margins in winning
rural eastern counties where the N&O reigned supreme, despite
the expectation that such counties would be hotly contested. As
Daniels noted in a post-election letter to Johnson, “We’re proud
of you! We’re proud of North Carolina! And we are happy about
the fact that Eastern North Carolina, where the News and Observer
circulates went strong for Johnson despite dire predictions that
that was the area where Goldwater would break through to victory
in this state.”32 Daniels and Johnson’s correspondence continued
well after the Texan had secured victory in 1964. Despite the
importance and maintenance of their relationship, however,
Daniels’s post-election communications were outsourced to the
president’s staff. Nonetheless, Daniels sent requests for Johnson
to consider certain proposals and attend events in North
Carolina, such as the Shaw University centennial celebration of
1965, which he saw as relevant to the promotion of the Great
Society.
Daniels, moreover, remained happy to publish editorials
essentially on demand when they would promote positions he
already supported. He penned one typical editorial in October
1965, advocating the adoption of the highway beautification bill.
He wrote to the president’s wife, Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson,
“Your Gal Friday Liz Carpenter called me yesterday morning
Penn History Review

143

“We of the South”

about an editorial on the highway beautification bill and I was
happy to oblige.”33 On this occasion, and many others, Daniels
immediately and obediently served Johnson and his administration
when called upon. Later in the same letter, Daniels voiced his
appreciation to the Johnson administration, writing that he had
been “beating the drum” for the cause of highway beautification
for many years, adding that he did so “without much hope before
you came along.”34 This remark reflects Daniels’s feelings for
President Johnson. Despite Daniels’s obvious strategic interest in
forming a relationship with the president, the North Carolinian
also revered and believed in the man.
Although he was called upon to write on a wide variety
of subjects, Daniels’s correspondence with President Johnson’s
office indicates that the North Carolinian was always ready
to serve on command. On May 14, 1965, for example, one
of Johnson’s special assistants wrote to “express [President
Johnson’s] sincere appreciation for [Daniels’s] editorial of May
5th concerning the nature of America’s actions in the Dominican
Republic.”35 This aide went on to detail why President Johnson
felt Daniels’s literary contribution was so crucial:
The situation in the Dominican Republic is most
troubled and complex. The reasons for the United
States’ actions could easily be misinterpreted to
America and to the World. Because of this, the
President was so pleased to see the informative
explanation which you gave to this manner.36
Johnson and his advisers recognized Daniels’s reach and role
in shaping public opinion in North Carolina. The Johnson
administration viewed Jonathan Daniels as a valuable asset
in securing re-election and in promoting stances on a variety
of issues such as foreign policy, mental health, and specific
proposals such as the highway beautification bill once re-election
had been secured. Johnson viewed Daniels as having the power
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to correct the historical record in North Carolina on complex
issues such as U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in the
1960s. Daniels held a reciprocal belief in the ability of a Johnson
presidency to correct the historical record on a major issue near
and dear to both men.
What LBJ’s Presidency Meant for the South
Daniels’s relationship with the president suggests that
they both felt a shared duty to restore the South’s reputation
and return the region to national prominence. Although
Daniels’s primary job was editor of the Raleigh News & Observer,
the North Carolinian concurrently worked in several auxiliary
capacities. Daniels represented North Carolina as a delegate at a
handful of Democratic National Conventions. Additionally, he
published a number of books and poems. Interestingly, Daniels
also accepted invitations to write forewords on a wide variety
of subjects, frequently using these forewords as a platform to
correct the historical record as it related to southern attitudes
towards race and the South more generally. In his 1957 foreword
for Dr. Thomas J. Woofter’s Southern Race Progress: The Wavering
Color Line, Daniels wrote:
Sometimes in the South today [the segregation
problem] is treated like something that fell off
the moon or was dropped almost as fortuitously
by a fumbling supreme court. And in the North
the impression is sometimes given that the South
itself is one furious posse pursuing every colored
man who asserts its rights.37
Daniels believed that racial issues such as segregation were too
often portrayed in a fundamentally incorrect, incomplete, and
harmful manner. He refuted the notion that racism and racial
issues were problems that were simply dropped in the South’s
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lap. As a southerner, Daniels was deeply aware of the region’s
long, complex racial history. He believed that discounting
that history, and looking solely at recent developments, was
reductionist. In his foreword for Dr. Woofter’s book, Daniels
also addressed what he deemed to be an unhealthy relationship
between the North and the South as it related to race. Daniels
was very well-educated and progressive; he clearly acknowledged
that the South had room to improve inter-racial tensions. Yet he
also recognized and hoped to debunk two myths: Daniels hoped
to prove that racial issues were not exclusive to the South and
that the region was not composed solely of racists.

President Johnson’s official White House portrait.
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Another foreword for a revised edition of George
Nichols’s The Story of the Great March illustrates the ways in
which Daniels believed the Civil War was the genesis of the two
aforementioned myths and the reason for a southern sense of
profound collective guilt. Daniels was highly critical of Nichols,
a former Union soldier and journalist who served under General
William Tecumseh Sherman prior to publishing his account in
1865. Daniels pointed to inconsistencies in Nichols’s work and the
way they created a “devil’s brew.” Nichols wrote that seeing “the
spectacle of burning homes aroused in him only feelings about
a south paying its long overdue debt to justice and humanity.”38
Daniels believed that Nichols’s factually incorrect, biased, toxic
narrative, and thousands like it, led Americans to view the South
as fully culpable for the Civil War without acknowledging the sins
of the North. Daniels eloquently pointed to the hypocrisy of this
statement and highlighted the ways in which Sherman’s march
“wasn’t simply a march of disciplined military destruction.”39
Nichols noted that “men and officers, too, took everything from
silver cups to carriages, gold watches, chains and rings.”40 Daniels
did not seek to excuse the wrongs of the South; he simply aimed
to prove that the South was not “occupied only by extremists on
both sides,” in the hope of debunking the idea that the South
had a long overdue debt to pay.41 Moreover, Daniels hoped to
highlight the fact that the South and North could work together,
as the two were neither diametrically opposed nor free of guilt.
He believed that Lyndon Baines Johnson could be the man to
foster this reunification of a splintered nation and correct the
South’s historical record.
Lyndon Johnson was acutely aware of his southern
identity and of the potential he held to mend daunting regional
tensions. As a president born in a former Confederate state,
Johnson felt he carried a personal burden in representing the
South and dispelling the myths surrounding the region. When
he became president, Johnson determined, “I’ve got to show
southerners are not dumb, I’m going to defend the south by
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showing every time how much I know. I’m not going to use
metaphors. I’m not going to be folksy.”42 He felt a personal duty
to prove that southerners belonged in the executive branch.
Johnson and Daniels both recognized that a successful LBJ
presidency could help bring the South back into the Union and
the mainstream of American politics. From his first moments
in office, Johnson offered the hope of reconciliation and the
prospect of a future in which the South could be an integrated
part of the United States rather than a separate region that stood
against the rest of the nation.43
Johnson was uniquely well equipped to appeal to the
South. As a southerner himself, he understood both the history
and feelings of southern people.44 He truly understood what it
meant to come from the South in twentieth-century America.
Johnson empathized with the southern pride the Sons of Dixie
felt, and he understood the shame of being discriminated against
solely due to his place of birth. The president understood these
concepts because he had lived and breathed them. Lyndon
Johnson and figures like Daniels were also prescient in recognizing
that promoting civil rights would unblock the quickest route to
reclaiming southern pride and correcting the South’s historical
record. In the words of political journalist Theodore White, LBJ
spoke “in the presence of other southerners as a southerner who
had come to wisdom.”45 This wisdom led Johnson to provide his
southern compatriots with an ultimatum disguised as a choice.
On the campaign trail in 1964, he issued one of the signature
speeches of his political career, declaring:
Today the south like the rest of the nation is
at a crossroads…between a glory of what can
be—and a glory that was. A choice has been
forced upon us. It is the choice between a new
progress—and a new nullification. Here in
Charleston, once the hub of the Old South, you
have to make that choice.46
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Daniels, Johnson, and Jim Crow:
Race as the Key to Southern Reintegration
Daniels and Johnson eventually came to see race not as
an issue, but as the issue that prevented the South from reentering
the American political mainstream. This was not always the
case, however, despite the prognostication of another Texan,
sociologist V.O. Key. In the 1940s, Key identified the bulk of
literature on southern politics as conforming to one of two
caricatures:
In both caricatures there is a grain of truth; yet
each is false. The south, to be sure, has its share
of scoundrels, but saints do not appeal markedly
less numerous there than on the other side of
Mason and Dixon’s line. Rather, politics of the
south is incredibly complex.47
Key asserted that a variety of issues set the South “against the
rest of the country.”48 Despite all of its issues he believed that
one towered above all the rest: “The race issue broadly defined
thus must be considered as the number one problem on the
southern agenda. Lacking a solution for it, all else fails.”49 While
it is difficult to pinpoint an exact date, it is clear that Daniels
and Johnson came to the same conclusion as Key by 1964; they
believed that abandoning Jim Crow once and for all was the only
way the South could truly merge with the rest of the nation.
Neither of these men, however, came to such a
conclusion in a linear manner. According to Charles Eagles,
Daniels’s challenge to attitudes towards race emerged tentatively
over the span of several decades.50 Daily editorials forced Daniels
to constantly grapple with his personal stances, as well as the
moral and political ramifications of such statements. Johnson
also took many years to see the light and incorporate civil rights
into his own political imperative. Reflecting on his career after
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the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, LBJ observed, “I
do not want to say that I have always seen this matter, in terms
of the special plight of the black man, as clearly as I came to see
it in the course of my life and experience and responsibility.”51
Daniels and Johnson also shaped each other’s understanding and
views regarding racial equality during their two decades-long
correspondence. Upon reaching this understanding, the two
men were uniquely qualified to enact the changes they deemed
necessary.
Daniels used his pen to educate and shape the minds of
his readership. Week after week, he sold the men, women, and
children of rural, eastern North Carolina on the idea of a new,
post-Jim Crow South, while Johnson attempted to make that new
South a reality. Lyndon B. Johnson had the sensitivity, personal
experience, political acumen, and southern credentials to connect
with southerners and work the political establishment to inspire
a shift in attitudes towards racial issues. He was able to connect
with people in places such as rural, eastern North Carolina
partially because of contacts like Daniels, but also because he

President Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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knew how the denizens of such areas felt. Johnson knew that
citizens of poor, rural southern states were not just poor. He
understood that they felt poor. The president empathized with
these men and women who felt “back in the woods” because as
a southerner in Washington, he felt the same way.52
Johnson was able to tap into an intangible feeling and
rally enough support in key areas of the South to carry the torch
for an evolving southern liberalism in Washington. His alliance
with Daniels was integral in rallying the base of support that
was necessary to carry North Carolina in 1964. Johnson had to
internalize and set aside both his southern pride and his southern
shame in order to lead. Rather than serving as purely a southern
leader, Johnson served as a national leader. The president
certainly felt the sting of northern elitism and name calling; he
battled crippling insecurity and constantly wondered if he could
ever fit in amongst the Washington elite, whom he referred to as
“Harvards.” Yet Johnson overcame these feelings of insecurity in
an attempt to lead the South back into the political mainstream.
As much as he tried, however, Johnson could never
entirely separate himself from his southern pride. He toiled
ceaselessly to ensure that future generations of southerners would
not have to feel the sting of “discrimination for the geography
of their birth” or grow up in a dichotomy of two regions in
which it was simply unthinkable that a southerner could become
president.53 Johnson’s southern identity served as the catalyst for
his fight against racial injustice and his struggle to correct the
South’s historical record as Daniels had hoped. He once said,
“I know the burdens the south has borne… And I want to see
those burdens lifted off the south. I want the ordeals to end and
the south to stand where it should stand as the full and honored
part of a proud and united land.”54 Even some of Johnson’s
fiercest opponents—many of them southern—conceded that
the Texan was integral in leading the region from the fringes of
politics into the core of the nation. One of these opponents,
Virginia Durr, stated, “Lyndon brought the south back into the
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mainstream politics of the United States. That is my belief, that
he really struck the shackles. I mean, Lincoln struck the shackles
off the slaves, but Lyndon struck the shackles off the south.
He freed us from the burden of segregation.”55 Johnson could
never have done so without the help of men like Jonathan Worth
Daniels.
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Rejecting the Blackmail of the Enlightenment: Foucault’s
Critical Ontology of the Present
Kyle Bigley
This thesis analyzes the way in which the Enlightenment
served as a catalyst in the work of Michel Foucault, a twentiethcentury French intellectual who contributed to diverse
disciplines, including political theory, philosophy, sociology,
and literary theory. In examining Foucault’s treatment of the
Enlightenment, this work rejects the notion that Foucault was
“anti-Enlightenment,” the accusation he faced throughout his
career that he rejected science, reason, and universality. Instead,
this thesis argues for an understanding of Foucault’s work that
posits a distinction between the Enlightenment as a historical
period and the Enlightenment as a philosophical ethos, or
critique. In making this distinction, this thesis can distinguish
between Foucault’s criticism of practices that emerged during
the Enlightenment in the human sciences and his simultaneous
commitment to a Kantian and Enlightenment form of critique.
The findings conclude that Foucault attempted to turn the form
of critique the Enlightenment engendered against what Foucault
considered to be pernicious practices that originated during the
eighteenth century.
Plebiscite and Partition: Propaganda, Mass Mobilization,
and Diplomacy in Weimar Germany’s Struggle for Upper
Silesia
Samuel Byers
This thesis examines the propaganda, political mass
mobilization, and diplomatic campaigns waged by the nascent
government of Weimar Germany to defend its sovereignty
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over the disputed border province of Upper Silesia in the years
immediately following the Treaty of Versailles. The Weimar
government has conventionally been characterized as impotent
during this period and subjugated by the harsh terms of the
Versailles Peace. However, the handling of the Upper Silesian crisis
demonstrates that this is at least in part a mischaracterization. The
provisions of the Treaty mandated that the region’s sovereignty
would be determined by a popular referendum of its ethnicallymixed (and nationally-ambivalent) residents in accordance
with the principle of national self-determination. This thesis
uses documentary evidence from the records of the Weimar
Chancellery and Interior Ministry, as well as newspapers and
the personal papers of local government officials, to argue that
Berlin’s propaganda and political mobilization campaigns were
successful in convincing Silesians to vote to remain in the Reich.
Successive Weimar governments leveraged their own advantages
and exploited the terms of the Treaty to their advantage in order
to defend Germany’s patrimony. The Weimar government then
leveraged its victory in the March 1921 plebiscite as the key part
of its diplomatic strategy to retain control of the province. This
research joins a growing body of work which characterizes early
Weimar Germany as a dynamic and vibrant government capable
of taking initiative and effectively defending its own interests,
even when placed at a significant disadvantage by the Treaty of
Versailles or the governments of the victorious Allies, giving
us a more nuanced perspective on inter-war German political
development.
Progressive Profit: Identity, Culture, and Branding at
Polaroid in the 1970s
Conor Cook
Although one rarely sees a Polaroid camera in use today,
the Polaroid Corporation remains an iconic American brand.
Little research, however, has analyzed the company’s cultural
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history and legacy through the latter half of the twentieth
century. Building upon existing scholarship, this work integrates
sources such as advertisements, interviews, photographs, and
annual reports to illuminate a larger narrative about Polaroid.
Polaroid embodied technological innovation and novelty, and by
the late-1960s and 1970s, the company promoted a constructed
progressive public image that emphasized its social and cultural
agenda. This work examines the Polaroid Corporation’s social
and cultural progressivism and the extent of its eventual
impact using the contemporary framework of corporate social
responsibility (CSR). Ultimately, the economic environment in
which the Polaroid Corporation promoted its products stunted
the impact of the company’s social and cultural progressivism.
The thesis highlights three essential components of Polaroid’s
cultural history: the place of Polaroid in the social and racial
zeitgeist of late-1960s and 1970s America, artistic initiatives
and sponsorship, and the Polaroid Corporation’s marketing and
branding strategies. Though Polaroid’s contributions to minority
self-expression and self-actualization were significant, they were
ultimately limited because they did not address the material,
organizational, or structural causes of corporate marginalization.
A Long, Hot Summer: The 1964 Columbia Avenue Race
Riot and the Jewish Community Relations Council of
Greater Philadelphia
Hannah Fagin
In August of 1964 on Columbia Avenue in North Central
Philadelphia, a minor police incident escalated into a weekendlong race riot. This thesis explores how this specific event shaped
Black-Jewish relations in Philadelphia through the perspective of
the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia
(JCRC), a local community-organizing agency. On Columbia
Avenue, like many northern cities during the 1960s, Jews served
as landlords and business owners in Black neighborhoods, yet
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lived elsewhere in emerging middle class areas of the city. The
vandalism and looting perpetuated by rioters largely affected
Jewish business owners, increasing hostilities and resentment
on Columbia Avenue and complicating the JCRC’s mandate
to promote Black-Jewish relations. While many contemporary
observers viewed August 28, 1964, as the pinnacle of the decline
between Philadelphia’s Black and Jewish communities, this thesis
argues that hostilities existed well before the violence ensued
and that collaborations continued long after. Over the course of
the decade, partly because of the riot, the JCRC transitioned its
work from promoting interpersonal relationships and sustaining
dialogue between Jews and Blacks in the early 1960s to aiding
Jews in moving out of Black neighborhoods by the early 1970s.
Through archival research, largely derived from the unprocessed
JCRC Records Collection, this study explores a race riot that has
been largely overlooked in previous historical literature due to its
relatively mild outcome. This thesis claims that the mythologized
Black-Jewish relationship in Philadelphia promoted by the JCRC,
and elsewhere in the United States, was never a true or natural
alliance, but one always defined by fractures and fissions long
before and long after the race riot.
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy: Public Art Museums,
Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Britain, 1805-1862
Julia Fine
This thesis examines the evolving nature of cultural
authority in early- to mid-nineteenth century Britain, focusing
specifically on the aristocracy’s involvement in the creation of
public art museums and exhibitions. The eighteenth century was a
period of aristocratic cultural dominance, during which a codified
notion of correct ‘Taste’ was created and expressed by the art
treasures collected during Grand Tours and housed in elaborate
country homes and London townhouses. The 1800s, however,
witnessed a dramatic expansion of the economic and political
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presence of the upper middle class, although the aristocracy still
retained significant power. This period also saw the creation of
public art museums, including the National Gallery and the South
Kensington Museum (later called the Victoria & Albert), and my
research explores the shift in the balance of power between the
aristocracy and the emergent middle class in this cultural realm.
Who were the main drivers of these newfound institutions, and
who controlled their management? Which sectors of society
were desired and allowed to enter into these spaces of culture?
This examination of the cultural issues related to the rise of
public museums illuminates the social history of class relations
in a time of political change. Through the use of institutional
Boards of Trustees minutes, parliamentary reports and debates,
newspaper articles, and treatises on art and collecting in Britain,
this thesis traces the history of art for public consumption in this
era through the lens of class. Ultimately, elite authority over the
arts, once so firmly established, was diminished as Parliament,
professionals, and men of business and industry became the new
managers and overseers of museums and exhibitions. Aristocrats
were reduced to figureheads, holding positions of symbolic
control. However, their influence as the original tastemakers
was to be felt for generations, as their art treasures became
firmly established throughout this period as the nation’s cultural
heritage.
Trimming Liberty’s Tree: John Dickinson Before He Was
“A Farmer”
Benjamin Fogel
John Dickinson (1732-1808) did more to affect the
founding of this nation than nearly any man, yet his refusal
to sign the Declaration of Independence has confounded
scholars for centuries. He earned the sobriquet “Penman
of the Revolution” for his Letters from a Farmer (1768) and
The Liberty Song (1768). He was the de facto voice for the
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colonies, drafting the Declaration of Rights (1765), the Bill of
Rights (1774), the List of Grievances (1774), the Letter to the
Inhabitants of Quebec (1774), the Petitions to the King (1774,
1775), the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking
up Arms (1775), and the Articles of Confederation (1776).
He was an elected representative in the Delaware (1759-1761)
and Pennsylvania (1762-1764) Assemblies, a delegate to the
Stamp Act (1765), First Continental (1774), Second Continental
(1775-1776), and Confederation (1779-1781) Congresses, and
the President of Delaware (1781-1783), Pennsylvania (17821785), and the Annapolis Convention (1786). He personally
took up arms during the Revolution and served as a colonel
in Pennsylvania’s militia before joining Delaware’s. And yet, he
abstained from the vote on Independence. Dickinson is largely
forgotten and oft neglected for this decision. It has become his
sole legacy and source of confusion about his politics. Only
two proper biographies have been published on Dickinson and
neither offers an adequate explanation for his fateful decision.
Contradictory claims have failed to explain the apparent paradox:
How could Dickinson, that staunch advocate for the American
cause, reject the Declaration yet still fight for liberty? Several
recent discoveries at archives in London and Philadelphia offer
a unique glimpse into Dickinson’s education and legal career and
help construct a new understanding of his theory of government,
conceptions of rights, and jurisprudence. With these tools, this
thesis reconsiders the nuances of his politics and presents a new
perspective on his ideological influences.
Out of Control: The Ulster Special Constabulary, the
Cushendall Incident, and Anglo-Irish Relations, 1920-1922
Anna Garson
On June 23, 1922, in the village of Cushendall in
Northern Ireland, three Catholic civilians were brutally
murdered by members of the Protestant-majority Ulster Special
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Constabulary, a newly formed quasi-military police force. The
Specials claimed they had been attacked and fired in self-defense,
a lie accepted by the government of Northern Ireland. Subject
to four investigations—including one ordered by Winston
Churchill—hundreds of letters of correspondence, and two
trials, the truth of the incident was suppressed and all files
relating to the matter were classified for 75 years. Analysis of
the incident is almost entirely absent from secondary scholarship
or is discussed anecdotally with little archival evidence. Why,
then, is this particular moment of violence, which appears
to have been an immense problem for the Northern Ireland
government, worthy of study now? This thesis argues that the
Cushendall incident exposes competing authorities and political
ambiguities and inconsistencies within the very new Northern
Ireland government, and it is also evidence of the state’s
deliberate encouragement of the Ulster Special Constabulary to
be the violent Protector of Northern Irish Protestant, Unionist,
and Loyalist supremacy at the expense of the Catholic minority.
The Specials were designed to organize Protestants and to
disorganize Catholics: the Cushendall episode tested whether the
new Unionist regime would be free to keep the Ulster Special
Constabulary from British scrutiny and determined the tone with
which the government of Northern Ireland would approach the
next fifty years of sectarian conflict.
“Let George Do It”: Simkins v. Cone and the Making of
Hospital Integration in Greensboro, North Carolina
Eli Goldman
This thesis examines the role that local civil rights activist
George Simkins Jr. played in the struggle to integrate Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Wesley Long Community
Hospital in Greensboro, North Carolina, during the 1950s and
1960s. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, racial
segregation defined southern healthcare, as hospitals regularly
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denied patients treatment on racial grounds and relegated
African Americans to inferior service in segregated facilities.
Not until 1963, when Simkins organized a successful legal
challenge to segregation at Greensboro’s two prominent, private
hospitals in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, did the
federal government address this critical inequality in healthcare.
However, existing scholarship on the medical integration
process lacks the same attention paid to other aspects of the
civil rights movement and often overlooks the complexities of
grassroots efforts to integrate. This thesis addresses these critical
shortcomings by analyzing the importance of the local sociopolitical climate in Greensboro, as well as the agency of local
leaders like Simkins in the progression of the Simkins v. Cone
case. In doing so, it relies on official court documents from the
case, correspondences between civil rights leaders and hospital
administrators, hospital administrative records, news coverage,
and transcripts of interviews with Simkins. Ultimately, this thesis
demonstrates the great impact local circumstances and activity
had in forcing the desegregation of southern hospitals and
draws connections between the Simkins case and the broader
progression of medical integration.
Between Judaism and Christianity: The Intellectual Journey
of Moses Margoliouth
Jill Golub
This thesis analyzes the life and thoughts of one convert:
Reverend Dr. Moses Margoliouth (1815-1881). Margoliouth
was a Polish-born Jew who grew up in a traditional Jewish
household. Eager to escape his observant Jewish community
and the wife he had just married, Margoliouth set out to see,
and better understand, the larger world. While traveling, he
ended up in Liverpool, England. There, he met members of
the conversion society called the London Society for Promoting
Christianity Amongst the Jews, read the New Testament, and
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converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, for the remainder of
his life, Margoliouth’s identity was caught between Judaism and
Christianity. Although religiously he had become a full Christian
after his conversion, his connection to his Jewish heritage and
ethnicity was never foregone. As a result, both the Jewish and
Anglican communities were never able to fully accept his change
of faith. Margoliouth’s split identity manifested itself in his
writings and relationships. The study of Margoliouth not only
contributes to the general historiography on the phenomenon
of conversion, but also focuses on a much smaller segment of
the convert population—those who left Judaism because they
believed in the Christian message. Margoliouth went on to
become a devoted Christian missionary and his story allows a
closer analysis into faith-based conversions and the climate in
England in the nineteenth century for those who converted and
attempted to get others to do the same.
Sermons of Sacred Fire: Interwar Congressional Attenuation
of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia
Joseph Kiernan
This thesis explores the influence of the New Deal
political coalition upon the United States’ foreign policy positions
in East Asia. The subtle sinews between the frenetic domestic
politics of the early 1930s and the decay of American post-First
World War internationalism reveal a striking abandonment of
key precepts of the 1920s U.S. foreign policy order. Through
the triumph of newly-empowered populists, progressives,
and militarists with the Roosevelt coalition, dormant political
agendas achieved consonance and strength in the congressional
milieu. Illustrating the ramifications of this political revolution
and seeking to explore the domestic catalysts for the United
States’ East Asian foreign policy shifts, this thesis examines two
distinct narratives: the quest for pro-silver economic policies and
the promotion of naval rearmament, and their ramifications for
164

Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts

Honors Thesis Abstracts

American diplomacy and global geopolitical change.
Before the advent of the Roosevelt era, the 1920s were
marked by the emergence and maturation of an international
order, founded on the Washington treaties of 1922 and largely
guided by the United States, which emphasized multilateral
cooperation on naval disarmament and the defense of Chinese
sovereignty. Through Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover’s
administrations, these efforts were centerpieces of American
foreign policy, a careful balance between the United States’
expanded presence in world affairs and the popular reluctance
to pledge to the enforcement of peace promotion through
overseas military commitments. The U.S., therefore, would lead
by example as an advocate for Chinese self-determination and
expansive naval disarmament.
This foreign policy order, emphasizing American
leadership, entered terminal decline due to the insurmountable
pressures of the New Deal political system and Roosevelt’s singleissue allies. By forcing the United States to massively increase
the price of silver, pro-silver and pro-mining congressmen and
senators knowingly sacrificed the Chinese economy, which was
dependent upon a stable price. This dramatically, and perhaps
fatally, weakened the Chinese Nationalist government while
enhancing Japan’s interference in China. Navalist politicians,
such as Carl Vinson, used the demand for military economic
stimulus to finally overcome the pacifistic, disarmament status
quo defended by the Hoover administration and its predecessors.
The internationalists of the 1920s could not endure the onslaught
of introverted progressivism, an irresistible political populism
which contradicted the inertia of preexisting policy and hobbled
the United States’ alleged friend, China. The disregard and
contempt for the system enshrined at Washington in 1922 reveals
how the United States’ politicians of the 1930s played a key role
in destroying the post-WWI order and amplifying the conditions
that would lead toward the Second World War.
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“Unhallowed Bonds”: Interracial Sex, Rape, and the Law
in the Antebellum Carolinas
Dorian Ledbetter
This thesis explores the legal response to interracial
sexual relationships in two southern states, North and South
Carolina, during the antebellum era. Such an analysis reveals how
interracial sex functioned in a slave society and further elucidates
the complexities of the racial hierarchy and the structure of
southern power dynamics in the period leading up to the Civil
War. Legal responses to interracial adultery are examined primarily
through the use of divorce petitions penned by betrayed spouses.
The study also expands to include nonconsensual relationships,
specifically analyzing trial transcripts from cases of rape. This
thesis also considers the dangers that the children of interracial
sexual relationships produced for North and South Carolina and
their racial hierarchies. When attempting to racially classify an
individual, the courts of North and South Carolina considered
factors beyond ancestry—physical appearance, character, and
reception in society could all contribute to either the elevation of
an individual to the superior white caste, or the relegation of an
individual to the inferior black caste. Relevant state statutes are
referenced throughout. The research demonstrates that during
the antebellum era regulations regarding interracial sex were
less necessary as slavery ensured that boundaries in the racial
hierarchy were well defined—the peculiar institution ensured the
confinement of black people to a degraded position in society.
Popular Neutralism in the English Civil War, 1642-49
Julia Levitan
This thesis examines the everyday experiences of
individuals of the middling sort in six localities during the English
Civil War (1642-1649) in order to assess the various nuances of
popular allegiance expressed throughout the conflict. In doing
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so, the findings of this thesis undermine traditional notions of
allegiance that fall into such clearly defined camps as the Marxist
interpretation, the geographic interpretation, and the social
deference interpretation. Instead, this work posits that popular
neutralism pervaded England’s middling sort throughout the
war years. Popular neutralism was not just a renunciation, but
a capacious idea into which various defenses of local identity,
articulations of social grievances, and patterns of popular
association could be accommodated. This argument for popular
neutralism has a profound impact on the rest of seventeenthcentury England, a period of turmoil and change. It calls into
question the authority upon which Oliver Cromwell took power
and provides a better understanding of the muddled motivations
of a people who removed the very institution of monarchy only
to quickly replace it.
In Search of the Great Lies and the Clever Disguise: The
Life and Legacy of Baron Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben
Aaron C. Mandelbaum
After another dismal year of fighting in the American
Revolutionary War, the Continental Army limped into Valley
Forge, Pennsylvania for the 1777-78 winter season. While this
hiatus from the battlefield afforded the Patriots time to regroup
and reassess their war strategy, much of their attention had to
address the blistering cold, pelting snow, rampant disease, and
diminishing supply lines of food, clothing, and firewood in the
encampment. Indeed, as one observer noted, the Patriots had
become a “skeleton of an army.”
Curiously, though, it was in the midst of these deplorable
conditions that an unlikely hero, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm
de Steuben, a former lieutenant general in the Prussian Army
and aide-de-camp to Frederick the Great, emerged onto the
scene. Almost instantaneously elevated to the role of Inspector
General of the Continental Army, Steuben succeeded in
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instilling organization and discipline into the Patriot soldiers
and, as a result, transformed what was a ragtag militia into a
formidable armed force in less than four months. In fact, after
his experiences at Valley Forge, Steuben transcribed the first
standardized drill manual in American military tradition, which
helped solidify his promotion to the Pantheon of American
Military Heroes. Upon further review, however, Steuben’s selfportrayal and commitment to the American Cause calls for
deeper examination. This thesis, therefore, explores the life and
legacy of Baron de Steuben and, in doing so, concludes that the
Baron committed one of the greatest deceptions in American
history. Specifically, this thesis analyzes Steuben’s European
prosopography, revealing that Steuben was not an aristocrat,
procured and liberally leveraged the title of “Baron,” advertised
himself as a lieutenant general due to a mistranslation, and
spoke no English whatsoever. Moreover, this thesis suggests
why Steuben’s career in Europe had ended so abruptly, which
some historians suspect emanated from the Baron’s rumored
homosexuality. Thus, ultimately, this thesis argues that the man
described as “indispensable to the Achievement of American
Independence” was a self-promoting charlatan who, through
a series of back room dealings, combined an exaggerated and
opaque past with his adroit talent as an ambitious sycophant
to dupe the inexperienced and nascent American military and
political leadership to secure a position in the Continental Army,
and attempt to obtain the wealth and distinction that had eluded
him in Europe.
Thou Shalt Not Kill? Religious Violence in SeventeenthCentury London
Kathryn Marshalek
Political turmoil and religious tensions plagued
seventeenth-century London as the city underwent dramatic
changes between the ascension of King James I in 1603 and
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the Glorious Revolution in 1688. During this period, tensions
festered between Catholics and Protestants, erupting into violence
centered around three key nodal points: the potential ‘Spanish
Match’ between Prince Charles and the Infanta of Spain in the
early 1620s, the English Civil War and Commonwealth era of the
mid-century, and the panic surrounding the Popish Plot of the
late 1670s. This thesis traces the nature of this violence across
the changing political landscape to reveal the ways in which larger
national anxieties surrounding religion materialized in small-scale
interpersonal relationships. Specific cases of violence are read
as meaningful gestures that reflect popular anxieties, fears, and
animosities that express fundamental features of Catholic and
Protestant relations in post- Reformation England. This work
aims to augment the historical record, largely focused on statesponsored action, by emphasizing religious violence committed
by Catholics who felt the oppressive weight of the state and by
Protestants who felt the state’s negligence left them at risk. To
demonstrate that the perpetrators of violence viewed their actions
as a conscious challenge to the prevailing order, three aspects
of these actions—motivation, justification, and response—were
examined using an in-depth consideration of rhetoric, theological
defenses of violence, and a number of pointed case studies. The
result challenges the traditional exclusion of violence from the
category of social crime and shows that interpersonal religious
violence was employed to defend a doctrine, to issue a charge,
and to demonstrate that attitude of the perpetrator toward the
law differed from those who made and enforced the law.
Gone Viral: The Role of the Press during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
On December 22, 1894, French captain Alfred Dreyfus
was convicted of treason for leaking military secrets to the
German military attaché in Paris. Dreyfus did not, however,
commit the crime. The press immediately joined the budding
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polemic, both in defense and in condemnation of the disgraced
captain. This internal debate played a massive role in publicizing
the Dreyfus case, turning a minor domestic scandal into a fullblown international affair, which only concluded following
Dreyfus’s exoneration in 1906. While many historians have
analyzed the complex history of the Dreyfus affair, the media is
rarely treated as a central figure. This thesis attempts to recast the
affair as one that was intimately shaped by the press. Indeed, the
French government maintained daily reports on the writings of
the domestic and foreign press, in what amounted to an attempt
to control the narrative of the affair. To this end, the government
surveilled newspaper delivery boys at home and censored proDreyfus theater productions abroad, though it failed to censor
any newspapers due to European free press laws. Ultimately,
no one was sure how to harness the power of the mass press
for one’s own benefit. The strategies discussed by the thesis—
centralized monitoring of the press, censorship, and government
pressure exerted by the press—would become commonplace in
the coming century. In this regard, the Dreyfus affair served as a
preview of the modern mass media and domestic pressures that
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
Collegiate Masculinity and the Rise of American Youth
Culture during the Roaring Twenties
Chloé Nurik
Using a combination of both archival sources (from
Harvard, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania) and media
depictions, this study examines the construction, representation,
and lived reality of collegiate masculinity in 1920s America. In
particular, the factors of consumerism, the increased public
presence of women, and the rise of youth culture are analyzed
for their impact on the way that young men viewed themselves
and their peers. This thesis argues that multiple models of
masculinity existed at this time, creating tension for young men as
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they navigated these competing ideals and formed their identities
in an increasingly complicated social environment.
“From Dump to Glory”: Robert Moses & Flushing
Meadows-Corona Park
Mark Paraskevas
This thesis explores the intricacies of infamous New
York urban planner Robert Moses’s park-planning process
in regards to Flushing Meadows-Corona Park, with the two
World’s Fairs hosted at the site (1939-1940 and 1964-1965) as
bookends. Examining this gargantuan process piece by piece, we
can determine Moses’s intentions for the park—both long-term
and short-term—with confidence. With an overhead view of the
four-decade endeavor, it is possible to compare the earliest plans
of the project with the final product to determine what changed
during the process and whether these changes were deliberate
or due to circumstances not decided by Moses. This study also
offers an analysis of his managerial style and its effectiveness
(or lack thereof) in efficiently furthering his agenda. Moses
had an especially abrasive and blunt style of management and
communication that often alienated those he worked with, and an
analysis of the Flushing Meadows project shows that his attitude
likely had a negative effect on the final result. Finally, this project
considers the role that Flushing Meadows plays in modern
Queens, and it also examines its relevance in the ongoing debate
over the benefits and drawbacks of Moses’s vast influence on
the city in the twentieth century and their effects on today’s New
York. The park-building process involved endeavors that Moses
is lauded for, such as massive and unprecedented public works
projects, and those he is criticized for, such as his preference
for roadways and automobile travel over expansions to the city’s
public transportation system.
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From Lamb to Lion: The East India Company and the East
Indies, 1600-1630
May May Pau
This study provides a counterpoint to the narrative of
the unstoppable rise of Western empires through situating the
founding, struggle, and evolution of the English East India
Company in the narrative of early modern Western expansion.
Though it ultimately found fortune and fame through conquest
of the Indian subcontinent and trade with China, the Company
struggled to achieve its founding mission of gaining a trading
foothold in the East Indies during its early years of operation in
the seventeenth century. The rise and fall of the Company in its
early years in the East Indies informed and shaped the norms
and patterns of Company operation in the Indian subcontinent,
and the Company subjects in the East Indies played a significant
role in shifting the focus of the Company from relational trade
in the East Indies to more direct territorial control of India. This
shift in Company operation is further incited by the English
Company’s rivalry with their Dutch counterpart, the Dutch East
India Company, and the English Company’s estrangement from
the English Crown. The struggles confounding the Company in
its early years suggest that the rise of Western powers in Asia is
a complex story of intricate relationships, conflicting interests,
and circumstantial innovation.
What was lost in the fire: Analyzing Representations of the
Bogotazo
Mariana Pavia
On April 9, 1948, as he was walking out of his office, the
enormously popular leader of the Colombia Liberal Party, Jorge
Eliécer Gaitán, was mortally shot in broad daylight on one of the
busiest streets in Bogotá. His assassination immediately sparked
a wave of riots originating in the very spot where Gaitán fell
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and radiating across the capital city and the rest of the country.
The violence that followed his assassination was complicated by
the accusation that either communist forces or the Colombian
conservative party were implicated in the assassination and by
the presence of North and South American diplomats gathered
in Bogotá for the Pan-American Conference. In Colombian
popular lore, the Bogotazo—as the riots are known—has come
to be known as the day that “split Colombian history in two.”
This thesis analyzes how this singular event has been represented
politically, socially, and culturally. The belief in the titanic impact
of the riot on the whole of Colombian history is simplistic;
however, by looking at the way that Colombians have come to
terms with Gaitán’s death we can see how this singular day of
violence stands out in a long history of conflict. The research
used includes oral history interviews, analysis of literary and
artistic representation, and immediate political reactions both in
Colombia and abroad.
Who’s Invited? The Desegregation of Emory University,
The University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton University
Samantha Rahmin
This paper deconstructs the desegregation of Emory
University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton
University. Analyses of these schools’ various archival collections
reveal that each school desegregated when doing so would
foster a more positive national reputation. Both local contexts
and individual agents catalyzed each school’s desegregation
process. While each school had desegregated by the early 1970s,
the schools did not begin integration processes until a more
significant proportion of black students attended each university.
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Japanese Foreign Policy and Jews: Misconceptions and the
Promotion of National Interests
Hannah Rosenfeld
The story of Jewish refugees escaping Europe to the Far
East between 1938 and 1941 is generally little known and can
easily be overlooked or even forgotten. The story of the Japanese
and Jews is a complex and protracted one, and this thesis sheds
light on Japan’s Jewish policy before, during and after World
War II. This study indicates that the Holocaust had far-reaching,
complex repercussions that extended far beyond Europe. It is
estimated that over seventeen thousand Jews reached Shanghai
in 1939 and their number exceeded twenty thousand by the end
of 1941. This influx of a large number of Jewish refugees to
Japan and Japanese-occupied territories in the late 1930s was the
result, not of a military policy or a humanitarian cause, but rather
the crude state of Japanese immigration policies, the lack of
coordination within the government, and their misconception
of Jews. This shift over time demonstrates the consistency in
Japanese attitudes toward Jewish refugees: that Jews were simply
a diplomatic apparatus in systematic efforts to appease other
international powers and to fulfill Japan’s national agendas.
“An Outstanding and Unusual Contribution”: The
Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign
Scholars
Sarah Samuels
This thesis will investigate the efforts and impact of the
Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Scholars. The first
chapter delves into the obstacles faced by the committee because
of the social and political climate of the time. Xenophobia and
anti-Semitism were deeply entrenched in American culture, and
many of these tensions came to a head in the years surrounding the
Second World War, impeding the acceptance of refugee scholars.
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The United States closed its borders to fleeing scholars, and
American universities often followed suit. Though universities
did not always make these reasons explicit, independent
research conducted by the Emergency Committee, as well as
private correspondence, reveals the pervasive anti-Jewish and
anti-foreigner sentiments that hindered the immigration and
placement of refugee scholars.
The Emergency Committee sent scholars to different
colleges and universities throughout America. Historically Black
Colleges and Universities, or HBCUs, employed a small subset of
refugee scholars. Chapter Two explores the tension inherent to
the relationship between refugee scholars and HBCUs through
two case studies.
Regardless of their placements, refugee scholars endured
ongoing struggles. They were thrust into a foreign society and
expected to acclimate immediately. Chapter Three examines
the scholars’ sense of cultural dislocation. The Emergency
Committee attempted to ease these transitions, advocating on
behalf of the refugee scholars to the American government
and university professors. More than just financial support, the
Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars
served as an invaluable resource to refugee scholars at a crucial
turning point of their lives.
My research at the NYPL archives supported my
hypothesis that the individual scholar’s transition to American
university life was more turbulent than previously thought. The
records revealed that xenophobia and anti-Semitism did obstruct
some of the committee’s efforts. Additionally, correspondence
between the Emergency Committee and refugee scholars placed
at HBCUs complicated the optimistic narrative presented by
historians. The inter-office correspondence and application
dockets suggest that the selection process was less randomized
than I had assumed; certain refugee scholars requested to be
placed at HBCUs. Finally, refugee scholars placed at various
universities reported difficulties in adjusting to their drastically
different surroundings.
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Hugh Broughton, The Cantankerous Christian Hebraist:
A Case Study in Sixteenth Century Jewish-Christian
Boundaries and Borrowing
Logan M. Staller
This thesis explores the life and works of Hugh
Broughton, a sixteenth-century Christian scholar of Hebrew
texts. In particular, this study focuses on Broughton’s most
controversial works, examining them through three different
lenses and placing them in three different contexts. First, the
work attempts to construct a previously neglected biographical
history of Broughton, the man, using his works and letters as
primary sources to help piece together his life. Next, those same
works are again examined from the perspective of Christian
intellectual history, placed into a larger English Puritan context.
Finally, they are reviewed one last time from the lens of Jewish
history, revealing their previously uncovered Jewish significance.
Thus, this work aims to bridge the gap and blur the lines between
the fields of Jewish and Christian histories of sixteenth-century
England. The research methods entailed primary research, both
in person at various archives in London, and online utilizing
records and archives from around the world. The research
suggests that, while previously, historians have thought that
English Jewish history begins in the seventeenth century, in fact,
the sixteenth century is fruitful with Jewish elements, albeit more
subtle and less pronounced. Thus, through this study, a greater
understanding of the broader intellectual history of Early
Modern England is achieved.
Defrocking Cuba’s Clergy: The Catholic Church’s Struggle
for Autonomy in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1961
Daniel Thompson
Scholars studying the Cuban Church from 1959 to
1961 generally concur that its conflict with the government
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arose from gradually escalating tensions between clergymen
and government officials. Indeed, the clash between clerics
and government leaders progressively intensified, eventually
culminating in violence and the large-scale expulsion of most of
Cuba’s Catholic clergy in 1961. However, previous scholarship
has largely ignored that clerical opposition to the government did
not progress in a linear fashion. Instead, the clergy’s resistance to
the government fluctuated, intensified, solidified, expanded, and
finally collapsed.
The first chapter of this thesis compares Church
responses to major socialist reform in two areas: land and
education. The Catholic clergy’s varying reactions to agrarian and
education reform reveal that clerics were more concerned with an
expansion of the government’s power than socialist reform. The
second chapter discusses the role of clerical power, as defined
by intra-clerical unity, support from the Cuban people, and the
Church’s political legitimacy and influence. Contrary to current
scholarly assumptions, the Catholic Church gained increasing
power from 1959 to the beginning of 1961. The final chapter
examines the role of violence in the conflict between Catholics
and government officials. Government authorities and other
anti-Catholic groups specifically targeted Catholics in churches
and at Catholic gatherings because these places functioned as the
clergy’s main platforms to spread dissent.
Over the ensuing decades, the Cuban Catholic hierarchy
began to tentatively recognize the legitimacy of the Cuban
communist regime. Nonetheless, the confrontation between
the Church and the government in Cuba from 1959 to 1961
captures a moment in the history of the Cuban Church—and
transnational Latin American Church—before many clerics
accepted that Marxist precepts could be integrated into Catholic
thinking.
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The Enemy of My Enemy: Motivation and Disillusionment
Among British Volunteers to the International Brigades
Miranda van Dijk
This work explains some of the more detailed aspects of
motivation and disillusionment among British volunteers to the
Brigades by examining initial ideological positions and attitudes
towards the Spanish Civil War among British communists. It
focuses on profiles of six men: Will Paynter, Fred Copeman,
David Crook, John Angus, Bob Cooney, and James Jump.
This thesis contends that the motivation of volunteers was
substantially different for hard line communists, described as
“Real Communists,” than it was for anti-fascists, described as
“Popular Front Communists.” This work then tracks how the
process of disillusionment originated from tensions between
these two groups and affected each of them in unique ways.
By identifying distinct sources of motivation and processes of
disillusionment, this work is able to show the breakdown of
morale among British Volunteers to the International Brigades
without the need to place blame on a certain group.
Orange, Green, and Blue: Sectarian Politics and Police
Reform in Northern Ireland, 1922-2001
Alec Ward
This paper examines the ways in which political
processes and interests affected attempts to reform Northern
Ireland’s policing infrastructure in three major moments during
the twentieth century. In each of these cases, a major political
event prompted the creation of an expert committee charged
with proposing a set of reforms; the Committee produced a
recommendation to “de-sectarianize” Northern Irish policing;
and the suggested platform was modified during the political
processes of passing it into law. In tracking these processes, the
paper explores the linkage of policing, conflict, and political
178

Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts

Honors Thesis Abstracts

power in a region which has remained deeply divided in ways
that make it, in the author’s view, illustrative of trends in politics
and policing which have broad implications for communities and
challenges worldwide.
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